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Agriculture is important for most of the world’s poor population not only as a source of income 
but defense against hunger. Over the last three decades, agricultural supply chain organizational 
structures in developing countries have increasingly become complex and transformed because of 
the emergence of competitive, fast-moving business environments. These changes have 
particularly affected several food value chains, creating in some cases positive effects, and 
resulting in the exclusion of smallholders who are unable to meet specific supply chain 
requirements. This counteracts the achievement of development goals by disrupting associated 
distributional effects to excluded smallholders in developing countries. Evidence suggests that 
affected smallholders respond by switching marketing channels and shifting to organizational 
network relationships. This consequently intensifies the formation of dualistic systems in which 
both modern and local value chains coexist. However, since the mid-1990s, the focus of 
development analysts and researchers has been on the expansion and inclusion of smallholders in 
modern value chains. This has resulted in total neglect of local value chains, which remain a 
significant source of income for many rural populations and ensure effective food delivery that 
meets culturally diverse needs in developing countries. Only recently has agribusinesses’ and 
development analysts’ attention been placed on local value chains yet, some key knowledge and 
research areas remain unaddressed. 
Indeed, our understanding of how local value chains are organized and function within dualistic 
systems remains generally limited. In particular, little is known about the role of socially 
constructed concepts such as gender-relations and decision-making power in driving value 
additions. Understanding these fundamentals is important for the postulation of policies for 
agricultural and local value chain upgrading and equitable distribution of wealth. Besides, 
smallholders continuously face external and internal contingencies that affect their 
competitiveness along food systems. Theory posits that the effects of changing business 
environments on smallholder performance can be mitigated by fitting supply chain network that 
includes vertical, horizontal and lateral relationships. However, the associations between these 
constructs as postulated theoretically remain generally underexplored, especially for smallholders 
in African food sectors. Frameworks and empirical analyses that holistically and simultaneously 
analyze these associations are rare. Furthermore, over the last two decades, there has been 




through producer groups in developing countries. Producer groups are widely viewed as valuable 
institutional arrangements for smallholders to cope with/overcome market inefficiencies arising 
from changing business environments. However, little is known about the effect of membership 
in producer groups on smallholder performance in fishery subsectors. Overall, bridging these 
gaps is important to understand and posit practical implications on how to promote alternative 
development models and smallholders’ opportunities in dynamic food systems. 
On this account, this dissertation fills these gaps by analyzing the links between organizational 
structures, gender roles, and performance of smallholders in African local value chains. The 
dissertation consists of three main papers that are based on two types of data from the Nigerian 
shrimp and prawn sector. First, qualitative data was obtained between December 2017 and 
January 2018 from 48 respondents in three States namely; Akwa-Ibom, Delta and Lagos. The 
second data includes two sets of quantitative data obtained from the survey of 405 producers and 
238 processors in Akwa-Ibom, Ondo and Lagos States between May and August 2018.  
The first paper aims to uncover how local value chains in dualistic food systems are organized, 
depicting the predominant governance themes, gender roles for value addition, and necessary 
upgrading strategies for smallholders in Africa. Failure of existing studies to capture the 
evolution and multiplicity of governance structures, and hidden social constructs has resulted in 
mixed findings on the organization and drivers of local value chains. Using qualitative data 
obtained from 3 in-depth focus group discussions and 21 key informant interviews, we rely on 
the global value chain approach to map local value chain’s organization distinctively from 
modern value chains. We make a conceptual contribution by extending this approach to include a 
gendered dimension of the value web approach, which we developed. This allows for 
simultaneous analysis of the roles of governance schemes and hidden gender relations in driving 
local value chains.  
Our main results reveal that competitive traders, the mutual dependence between production and 
processing segments and strategic business activities of female processors were crucial for the 
chain’s functioning. Results from the Net-maps show that the predominant marketing channel is 
long: producer–women processors/marketer–trader–retailer–consumer, however, analysis of the 
governance dimensions shows the importance of the relational governance between producers 
and women processors that allows for better coordination of supply and marketing activities at 




in ensuring value additions and smooth flow of products along the chain. Women processors act 
as financial buffers for producers, points of contact and precursors to all midstream value 
additions in the value web. 
The second paper builds on the results and implications of the first paper. Here, we suggest a 
comprehensive quantitative research framework to determine the relationship between changing 
business contingencies, organizational supply chain networks and smallholder performance. 
While supply chain contingencies and organizational complexities have been widely studied in 
organizational theory literature, it only became a subject of quantitative analysis in recent times. 
Still, several conceptual and research shortcomings exist in the literature such as the neglect of 
the concurrent fit of organizational strategies to both external and internal contingencies, lack of 
comprehensive analysis of organizational networks, and less focus on multiple tiers. Hence, we 
use a variance-based structural equation model to analyze the quantitative data from producers 
and women processors. We first take a cue from contingent resource-based theory and netchain 
approach to conceptualize the influence of both external (market turbulence, technological 
progress, distrust and power asymmetry) and internal (human and financial resources) 
contingencies on organizational relationships and performance, extending an existing empirical 
model. We then empirically test the so-called “Contingency-Netchain-Performance” (CNP) 
framework, on two tiers to derive valid and comprehensive evidence comparable across the tiers.  
Results from the estimations indicate that both external and internal contingencies significantly 
influence adaptational change in organization supply chain network, which in turn contributes to 
smallholders’ performance. All the smallholders’ external contingencies influence the formation 
of tighter vertical coordination but their influences differ on horizontal and lateral relationships. 
More importantly, results reveal that smallholders’ internal contingencies concurrently influence 
their organizational network structures and performance. However, the influence of both external 
and internal contingencies on organizational networks seems to differ across tiers while supply 
chain vertical relationships tend to intensify the formation of closer network structures. Several 
conceptual, theoretical and practical contributions emerged from the successful application of the 
CNP framework in this study. 
In the third paper, we examined the selectivity-corrected role of fisher groups on the capture and 
technical efficiency of artisanal shrimpers in Africa. We empirically identify factors that 




capture and technical efficiency. Methodological augmentation using Greene’s stochastic 
production frontier method and propensity score matching that correct for selection bias, allows 
us to account for different technological set if any, and sample selection bias from both observed 
and unobserved factors. We use quantitative data of 353 producers that operate outboard engines, 
comprising of 95 members and 258 non-members. We found that the overall participation in 
fisher groups is positively determined by shrimpers’ socioeconomic characteristics; female 
participation in shrimp-related groups; and infrastructural facilities like credit and tarmacked 
roads. The stochastic results reveal that technical efficiency scores remain consistently higher for 
members regardless of how biases were corrected. Although technical efficiency scores for 
members and nonmembers tend to be over-estimated if selectivity is not appropriately controlled, 
our findings suggest that participation in fisher groups is important for smallholders with below-
average performance and positively related to increases in catch and technical efficiency. 
Important lessons and conclusions were derived from the results of this dissertation. The papers 
confirm that organizational network structures matter for smallholders’ upgrading and local value 
chain development in Nigeria. Our results confirm strong influences from highly dynamic 
external and internal contingencies on the formation of dense and complex organizational 
network structures in which vertical and network relationships are dependent. By aligning their 
organizational network structure to fit changing external and internal contingencies, smallholders 
can create and remain competitive within dualistic sectors. However, associated concepts such as 
gender roles and internal contingencies across mutually dependent tiers are important to upgrade 
smallholders’ activities. Furthermore, fisher groups is a valuable institutional arrangement as they 
tend to improve shrimpers’ capture and technical efficiency, and might be crucial for attaining 
equitable distributional effects to smallholders with below-average economic performances. 
Relevant policy implications for smallholders’ upgrading and local value chain development, as 
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1 General introduction  
Agriculture is important for most of the world’s poor population not only as a source of income 
but defense against hunger. In most developing counties, the agricultural sector accounts for 
three-quarters of employment, one-third of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and nearly four-times 
more increase in income than growth in other sectors (The World Bank, 2012). As a result, 
agricultural development has remained a powerful tool to reduce global poverty and improve 
economic development. The ongoing transformation of agricultural food systems is no more a 
quiet revolution as it is seen as a pro-poor arrangement in developing countries. Over the past 
three decades, many agrifood systems have become restructured, urbanized and globalized due to 
changes in consumption, competition and trade patterns (Mather, 2005; Qaim, 2017; Reardon et 
al., 2009). In the process, the overall organizational dimension of agrifood systems has become 
more heterogeneous and complex with several implications for smallholders (Dolan & 
Humphrey, 2000; Mather, 2005; Mhlanga, 2010; Neven et al., 2009; Scoones et al., 2016). 
1.1 Background 
Nigeria, a lower-middle-income country in Africa, presents a suitable case of the ongoing 
agricultural transformation because it shares similar economic and agricultural characteristics 
with other developing countries. Despite the importance of the oil sector, agriculture has 
remained the main basis of the Nigerian economy, employing about 36.6 percent of the entire 
labor force. Although the value-added of the Nigerian agricultural sector is relatively high at 
about 21 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it does not reflect in the livelihood of the 
population, as 53.5 percent of the population lives below the poverty line of $1.90 per day (FAO, 
2018; WorldFish, 2018). Like other developing countries, about 88 percent of Nigerian farmers 
and fishers are smallholders and face myriad contingencies that come from agricultural 
production and marketing. Farmers and fishers face typical problems relating to low productivity 
and technological advancement, limited commercialization, weak infrastructural and financial 
amenities, and limited institutional support. Thus, more than 72 percent of Nigeria’s smallholders 
are poor and reside in rural areas (FAO, 2018). 
What is never mentioned is the deepening poverty level in the coastal areas due to neglect of the 
fishery subsector (Zabbey et al., 2010). Fishery subsector is an important source of direct and 
indirect income to more than 28.2 million people in Nigeria, 70 percent of whom are women 




in the subsector from which smallholders can better benefit (FAO, 2017a; NBS, 2016). However, 
SP production and marketing are impacted by several contingencies, including volatile supply 
and demand and high perishability (see Figure 1.1). With the growing global demand and 
dwindling SP supply in Asia and the Americas, more attention is paid to Africa countries to 
expand SP’s frontier. As a result, the Nigerian SP subsector has undergone immense 
transformations in the last two decades (Figure 1.1). More prominently is the globalization of and 
introduction of stringent governance mechanisms and private standards by private companies in 
the subsector, which have resulted in the emergence of export and modern value chains (MVC).  
While several positive effects relating to increasing productivity, income, and price have been 
stimulated by the organizational structures and institutional attributes inherent in the MVCs, 
another set of challenges and risks, particularly for smallholders and women have been created 
(Udong et al., 2009; Udong et al., 2010). Similar to other developing countries, poor smallholders 
not participating in MVCs struggle with economic marginalization over the years (Figure 1.2), just 
as the potentials and effects of attrition and exclusion from MVCs increase (FAO, 2007). This 
counteracts the achievement of a sustainable development goal aimed at reducing inequality, 
especially since modern and export retailers prefer to engage private companies that are more 
efficient. 
 
Figure 1.1: Nigerian shrimp and prawn capture and export-based of FAO database 
The attrition and exclusion of smallholders from the MVC have resulted in a lock-in effect and 
forced smallholders to swap markets and/or modify their organizational relationships. This 
deepened the formation of dualistic systems in which local value chains (LVC) function parallel 
to MVCs. Unlike MVC, LVC is within the reach of poor smallholders and women, and so its 


































































































Nigeria, which has the highest poor population in Africa (Figure 1.2). With the LVC driving 
overall SP supply (i.e. quantity captured minus exported in Figure 1.1) and accounting for over 
two-thirds of urban consumers’ expenditures, many poor smallholders including women can 
benefit from stable demand by effectively connecting with the growing local and regional 
markets (Lie et al., 2012; Markelova et al., 2009). The issue remains how to develop the LVC 
and organize associated smallholders and women to deal with inherent contingencies and 
improve their performance. 
 
Figure 1.2: Poverty differences among households in MVCs and LVCs (Swinnen et al., 2013)  
Indeed, evidence suggests that smallholders’ benefit and success from the development of LVCs 
is partly based on their organizational structures (Corsi et al., 2017; Lie et al., 2012; Markelova et 
al., 2009). The unfavorable business situations that smallholders face in the Nigerian LVC 
require organizational adaptation to reduce associated transactional risks and costs. First, there is 
the option of implementing some coordination mechanisms, which go beyond the conventional 
open-market mechanism. Implementing higher coordination mechanisms is expected to improve 
smallholder’s performance by fostering better risk and cost management along supplier-buyer 
relationships (Carbone et al., 2009; Codjo et al., 2016; Elomri, 2015; Handayati et al., 2015). 
Contract, information sharing, joint decision-making, and collective learning are peculiar 
coordination mechanism tools crucial to harmonize smallholders’ activities and deal with 
dynamic business situations. Second, smallholders to a large extent can forge relational networks 
with players along the LVCs through collective actions and links to broad networks of 
government, donors and development agencies (Markelova et al., 2009). Besides, though still 
unclear how, this array of relationships can also be complementary in fostering smallholders’ 
performance by leading to a boost in the market, creating more value additions and supporting 




























Focusing and understanding smallholders’ organizational structures is crucial to create alternative 
LVC-based development models, which will ensure the inclusiveness of poor smallholders and 
women, and improve their opportunities in light of persistent transformations in the SP subsector 
(Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Maertens & Swinnen, 2012). Women will particularly benefit from 
an inclusive organizational structure because their prominent marketization and commoditization 
activities along LVCs are often invisible and unvalued. There is an on-going argument whether 
women’s activities along the SP LVC are livelihood strategies aimed at ensuring the survival of 
their families or fully involved in economic decisions (Udong et al., 2010). Gender-sensitive 
LVC development can increase women’s yield by 20-30 percent, consequently raising 
agricultural output by 2.5-4 percent and reducing poor population by 12-17 percent (FAO, 
2016a). Yet, various family and VC contingencies such as power asymmetry and socio-economic 
and cultural settings affect women’s roles and integration in LVC development (Schumacher, 
2014). 
Research about LVC development with gender sensitivity is timely with the recent postulation of 
the Nigerian Agriculture Promotion Policy, which seeks to support smallholders and women, and 
engage the 20 percent of youth population (ages 15-24) who are unemployed in Agriculture 
(FMARD, 2016; WorldFish, 2018). Against this background, this dissertation uses a “gender-
lens” to analyze the neglected influence of smallholders’ organizational structures on their 
performance in a developing country’s LVC. With the case of the Nigerian shrimp and prawn 
subsector, transferability of results and implications seems likely since similar agricultural 
attributes are shared with other developing countries. 
1.2 Research gaps 
The promotion of smallholders’ opportunities through LVC development has started attracting 
immense attention from agribusiness and development analysts in developing countries (Lie et 
al., 2012; Neven et al., 2009). There is a growing body of literature exploring the organizational 
structures of LVCs, particularly relating to inherent business contingencies and smallholder 
performance. Yet some conceptual and research gaps exist in this literature. 
1.2.1 Local value chains and organizational structures in dualistic sectors 
As mentioned above, several agricultural sectors in developing countries have undergone an 




This has prompted several studies to analyze various VCs in developing countries. Although 
several studies have analyzed LVCs in several cases of the world’s developing countries, several 
research gaps still exist. Existing studies do not make a comprehensive analysis of LVCs that 
exist in dualistic sectors. For example, Ketema et al., (2016) used a multinomial model to 
determine factors that influence producer’s milk channel choice in the dairy VC of Harar and 
Dire Dawa Areas of Eastern Ethiopia. Similarly, Ouma et al., (2017) used a multinomial logit 
model to identify the determinants of vertical integration among pig traders in Uganda. 
Hichaambwa and Tschirley, (2010) relied on a qualitative approach to understand how vegetables 
are moved into Lusaka by assessing the existing market structure. Lie et al., (2012) also 
qualitatively analyzed how smallholders use their capabilities to establish and sustainably manage 
the local dairy VC through Twawose goat cooperative in Tanzania. While these aforementioned 
studies focused on non-dualistic sectors, studies such as Mani et al., (2018) and Chagomoka et 
al., (2013) have analyzed LVCs in dualistic sectors. The latter studies however profiled actors 
and segments in such a way that there are no clear distinctions between LVCs and MVCs. Yet, it 
remains unclear how neglected LVCs are organized and function parallel to MVCs within a 
dualistic sector, such that a niche is created for smallholders, women and numerous localized 
wholesale and retail outlets.  
Traditionally, governance analysis of VCs is essential to understand how they are controlled and 
coordinated (Gereffi et al., 2005; Hichaambwa & Tschirley, 2010; Kaplinsky, 2000; Ouma et al., 
2017; Wentink et al., 2017). Recent evidence has shown that VCs are driven through multiple 
interacting governance structures and social concepts that might be rather hidden (Gereffi & 
Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Lie et al., 2012; Schumacher, 2014). Studies listed earlier have however 
failed to account for the evolution and multiplicity of governance structures, thus resulting in the 
identification of incomplete governance typologies as fundamental drivers of LVCs. 
Additionally, solely analyzing governance typologies creates another research gap in itself. 
Governance analysis focuses only on the coordination of LVCs, neglecting other key drivers, 
which are considered hidden. Hidden drivers that are socially constructed such as differentiated 
gender roles and relations and decision making power have received little attention in recent VC 
literature (FAO, 2016b; GIZ, 2013; Lie et al., 2012; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009, 2012; 
Schumacher, 2014). The effort to comprehensively understand how LVCs in dualistic sectors are 




depth insights into how neglected LVCs in dualistic sectors are organized along governance 
mechanisms and gender-relations. Analyzing these concepts is important to understand the role of 
social and economic components in shaping LVCs and postulating practical upgrading strategies 
for further LVC development in developing countries. 
1.2.2 Organizational structures, contingencies, and performance of smallholders  
During the last decade, research has paid increasing attention to smallholders’ organizational 
structures and their effects on farm performance (Maertens & Vande Velde, 2017; Ochieng et al., 
2018; Ton et al., 2017). However, such studies lack a holistic view of different inter-
organizational relationships, even though smallholders in developing countries concurrently 
engage in several complex organizational network relationships. Many studies focused on 
vertical relationships that depict supplier-buyer relationships between smallholders and their 
trading partners. For instance, Barrett et al., (2012) studied the contracting arrangements between 
smallholders and commodity-processing firms in five developing countries. They highlighted 
different narratives explaining patterns of contracting and non-contracting and found its effects 
on smallholders’ economic performance and welfare to be elusive. Conversely, Bellemare (2012) 
and Ton et al. (2017) found substantial positive income effects on household welfare, even 
though the poorest smallholders were rarely included. While these studies focused on MVCs, the 
reasons for indefinable and inconsistent effects of vertical relationships on smallholders’ 
performance have remained unexplained so far. 
Another stream of literature focuses on horizontal relationships that define collective interaction 
among competing smallholders. For example, Fischer and Qaim (2012) found positive income 
effects for active cooperative group members in Kenya. Collective groups are important in 
facilitating innovation adoption since they enhance efficient information flow. Similar results 
were also found by Verhofstadt and Maertens, (2014) and Ochieng et al., (2018) in Rwanda and 
Central Africa respectively. Although both vertical and horizontal relationships could be 
complementary in enhancing smallholder performance (Barrett et al., 2012; Ton et al., 2017), 
smallholders rely additionally on interactions with external stakeholders such as research 
institutes, extension agents and NGOs to organize themselves (Gramzow et al., 2018). 
Until now, the conceptual associations between these organizational relationships are unclear 




has remained open. Only strategic management studies such as Mesquita and Lazzarini, (2008) 
and Otter et al., (2014) have considered the simultaneous and holistic influence of organizational 
SC network structures on smallholders’ performance. These gaps, therefore, spur the need to 
implement a more comprehensive and integrative model to analyze the organizational SC 
network structures of smallholders in neglected LVCs. 
Besides having a holistic view of their organizational SC network structures, development and 
strategic management studies have struggled to concurrently establish the link between 
contingencies, SC organizational networks, and smallholders’ performance. Studies relying on 
organizational theories have solely focused on forging a fit between external business 
contingencies and organizational strategies to maximize business performances (Gnizy et al., 
2017; Otter et al., 2014). Conversely, non-holistic development studies made emphasis on the 
role of individual and business characteristics as sources of competitiveness and determinants of 
organizational strategies (Barrett et al., 2012; Forsman, 2004; Wang et al., 2015).
 
 In reality, 
smallholders face both external and internal contingencies. 
Depicting this reality requires a complex framework, which is still subject to rigorous conceptual 
development and empirical application. Although several studies have attempted to bridge this 
research gap, the links between these key concepts have remained vague and underexplored in 
developing countries. For instance, Otter et al., (2014) relied on contingency theory and netchain 
approach to analyze the influence of the interplay of organizational relationships, determined by 
external contingencies on farmers’ performance in Chile. They found evidence that external 
contingencies influence the interplay of organizational relationships though the role internal 
contingencies were neglected. Kayser et al., (2015) instead relied on industrial organization and 
resource-based theories to analyze the impact of external and internal factors on strategic 
management practices of agribusiness firms in Tanzania. They found that internal rather than 
external factors consistently influence organizational strategic actions. This study is flawed by the 
limitation of its definition of external factors and consideration of strategic management, which 
do not capture all organizational SC network relationships. Overall, the general lack of consistent 
directional links between contingencies and organizational strategies, and non-holistic 
consideration of both contingencies in existing literature suggests the need for further conceptual 




1.2.3 Collective action and smallholders’ productivity and technical efficiency 
In recent times, government and development scholars have focused on supporting the formation 
of producer/cooperative groups to help smallholders cope with and overcome complex market 
constraints such as high transaction costs in accessing input and output markets, lack of physical 
and financial infrastructure, high power asymmetry and limited technological advancement. 
Though most attention has been on farm-based subsectors, there is growing evidence that 
producer groups have positive effects on smallholder’s overall economic performances and 
welfare (Ainembabazi et al., 2017; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Ma et al., 2018; 
Mojo et al., 2017; Ochieng et al., 2018; Orsi et al., 2017; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). 
Insignificant and negative effects have also been documented (Bernard & Taffesse, 2012; 
Bernard et al., 2008; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Hellin et al., 2009; 
Mujawamariya et al., 2013). Similar patterns also exist for group membership effect on 
smallholders’ productivity and technical efficiency, although empirical evidence has remained 
generally scarce and vague (Abate et al., 2014; Gedara et al., 2012; Hailu et al., 2015). 
There are several explanations for these mixed findings in the literature. The first is the 
heterogeneity among producer groups. The fact that each producer group differs in their 
operational objectives (production versus marketing), leader and member characteristics, and 
location, etc. stresses the need to also study producer groups in nonfarm-based subsectors. For 
instance, the question regarding what factors influence smallholders’ decision to participate in 
nonfarm-based producer groups has remained under-explored and unanswered.  
Furthermore, the presence of selection bias is another prominent reason for biased and 
inconsistent findings. Indeed, selection into producer groups is often non-random as smallholders 
decide to participate in producer groups based on some observed and unobserved factors. 
Different methods and models have been applied to account for selectivity in the literature. The 
most common has been propensity score matching (PSM) which largely accounts for selectivity 
from observed attributes. However, PSM is flawed by its inability to account for selectivity from 
unobserved attributes (Abdulai & Huffman, 2014; Fischer & Qaim, 2012). Instead, several 
studies employed endogenous switching regression models which are known to produce 
inconsistent estimates as a result of misspecifications of the error term (Alene & Manyong, 2007; 




productivity and empirical economics literature (Greene, 2010). Yet, studies on productivity and 
efficiency often neglect selection bias (Abate et al., 2014; Gedara et al., 2012; Hailu et al., 2015). 
In response, a new stochastic frontier model that corrects for sample selection from unobserved 
factors was suggested by Greene (2010). Over time, this approach has been further developed and 
implemented in several studies (Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012; De los Santos-Montero & Bravo-Ureta, 
2017). Only Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai (2018) and Ma et al. (2018) have applied this approach 
in the context of membership in cooperative groups’ effect on productivity and efficiency in 
farm-based subsectors. Thus, applying this approach to study smallholders in nonfarm-based 
LVCs is important to understand the immediate and unbiased effects of producer groups in the 
subsector and contribute to alternative practical implications on how to attain income and welfare 
equality in developing countries. 
1.3 Research objectives and approach 
The main research objective of this dissertation is to analyze the influence of organizational 
structures on the performance of smallholders in developing countries’ LVCs. By addressing the 
aforementioned research gaps, this dissertation contributes to the propagation of alternative 
development models for smallholders excluded from MVCs and the attainment of gender 
equality in developing countries. This dissertation comprises three main chapters, each presenting 
one paper and addressing the aforementioned research gaps. 
The first paper focuses on uncovering how LVCs in dualistic systems are organized, the 
predominant governance themes and gender roles for value addition, and necessary upgrading 
strategies for smallholders in developing countries. To do this, we build on the studies by Lie et 
al. (2012) and rely on the global value chain (GVC) approach to distinctively map and analyze 
how LVCs are organized and function parallel to MVCs in the presence of changing agrifood 
systems. We also identify the drivers of LVCs by concurrently analyzing the roles of governance 
and inherent gender relations in LVCs. With this, the paper makes a conceptual contribution by 
extending the GVC framework to include a gendered dimension of the value-web approach 
which we developed based on Virchow et al. (2014)’s study. Based on these analyses, we discuss 
and postulate concrete and novel managerial and policy implications needed to develop LVCs, 
improve the competitiveness of restricted smallholders and posit gender opportunities. This is a 
qualitative study that relies on empirical data collected from three focus group discussions, three 




The second paper builds on the results and implications of the first paper. The paper seeks to 
provide a comprehensive quantitative research framework for analyzing how SC external and 
internal contingencies jointly influence organizational SC network structures and performance 
across two mutually dependent tiers. We build on studies by Otter et al. (2014) and take a cue 
from contingent resource-based theory (Brush & Artz, 1999; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Lazzarini et al., 2001) and netchain approach. With this, we make a conceptual contribution to 
the literature on the influence of external (market turbulence, technological progress, distrust and 
power asymmetry) and internal (human and financial resources) contingencies on organizational 
SC network relationships and performance. We then empirically test the resulting conceptual 
framework on multiple proxies of performance of 405 producers and 238 processors. This 
approach allows us to derive valid and comprehensive evidence comparable across tiers and 
contribute theoretically to the interpretation of the links among these concepts. 
In the third paper, we estimated a stochastic production frontier models that correct for selectivity 
to analyze the role of producer groups in improving capture and technical efficiency of artisanal 
fishers - a nonfarm-based subsector in Africa. We make two empirical contributions by relying 
on studies such as Greene (2010) and Bravo-Ureta Greene and Solís, (2012) to estimate the effect 
of group membership on shrimper’s capture and technical efficiency and identify factors that 
influence shrimpers’ decision to belong to fisher groups. For the former, we make a 
methodological augmentation by using PSM and stochastic frontier methods to correct for sample 
selection bias from both observed and unobserved factors and account for different technological 
set. For this paper, we focus only on producers who operate outboard engines. Thus, we use 
quantitative data of 353 producers, comprising of 95 members and 258 nonmembers. 
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we present the first paper that 
focused on the organizational structure of LVCs in developing countries. Chapter 3 presents the 
second paper that analyzed the contingent resource-based and netchain perspectives of supply 
chain organization and performance, considering two mutually reliant tiers. Chapter 4 comprises 
the third paper and analyzes the effect of producer group membership on productivity and 
technical efficiency, accounting for possible selection bias from observed and unobserved factors. 
In Chapter 5, we summarize and discuss the key findings, policy implications and some 




2 Organizational Structures, gender roles and upgrading strategies for 





To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, research concepts and empirical evidence are 
needed to upgrade developing countries’ smallholder activities within local value chains (LVCs). 
The study aims to uncover LVCs’ (1) organization, (2) governance themes and gender roles for 
value addition and (3) smallholder upgrading strategies in developing countries’ dualistic sectors. 
The global value chain (GVC) framework is extended towards a gendered value web approach 
that captures the importance of hidden gender roles and power relations. Empirical data obtained 
from three focus group discussions and 21 interviews in the Nigerian shrimp and prawn sector 
represent the basis for qualitative analysis. The results clearly indicate that, despite being buyer-
driven by competitive traders, mutually reliant coordination between production and processing 
segments and strategic business activities of female processors are crucial for the LVCs’ 
functioning. Based on these results, manifold managerial and policy implications are derived to 
upgrade and develop smallholder activities and products along the Nigerian shrimp and prawn 
LVC, which can also apply to other developing countries and cases. 
 
Keywords: Governance themes, Gender, Global value chain framework, Value web approach, 
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The last decade has witnessed huge transformations in the food value chains of developing 
countries, such as rapidly increasing globalization, modernization and technologization. These 
transformations are often associated with distributional effects counteracting the achievement of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (Dürr, 2015; WTO, 2019). Smallholders respond to changing 
situations by switching their marketing channels or inter-organizational relationships (Lie et al., 
2012; Schipmann & Qaim, 2010; Teklehaimanot et al., 2017). This intensifies the formation of 
dualistic systems in which modern value chains (MVCs) and local value chains (LVCs)
1
 coexist.  
Typically, MVCs are characterized by tighter governance structures. Contrarily, rampant spot 
market sourcing driven by specialized and competitive procurement agents in a “hub and spoke 
model” (Herring, 2015) and, in some cases, differentiated gender relations and roles (FAO, 
2016a) characterize LVCs. Since the mid-1990s, the focus of development analysts and 
researchers in many developing countries has been on the expansion of food exports, the 
inclusion of smallholders in contract and standard-ridden MVCs and increasing their welfare 
through such participation (Maertens, 2012; Neven et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2006; Schipmann 
& Qaim, 2010). Even though LVCs represent a significant source of income for the rural 
population and ensure effective food delivery that meets the culturally diverse needs of urban and 
rural consumers in a developing country, only recently, has agribusinesses’ and development 
analysts’ attention been placed on LVCs (Dürr, 2015; Lie et al., 2012). This attention aims to 
promote alternative development models and smallholder opportunities in developing countries 
(Ketema et al., 2016; Lie et al., 2012; Maertens & Swinnen, 2012). 
Despite this trend, the existing scientific literature still shows threefold gaps that can potentially 
limit our understanding of LVCs’ functioning in developing countries and the corresponding 
implications for further development. First, most studies on LVCs’ organizational structures have 
focussed on non-dualistic sectors, while studies that did, have not distinguished LVCs from 
MVCs (Chagomoka et al., 2013; Lie et al., 2012). This has created a gap in the knowledge 
regarding how typical LVCs are organized and function in parallel to MVCs. Second, the existing 
literature has shown mixed findings regarding the fundamental drivers of LVCs. Most studies 
that have relied on LVC governance analysis to identify the key drivers have failed to capture the 
                                                 
1
 Series of value-adding activities that are mostly carried out by several informally coordinated actors, the products 




evolution and multiplicity of governance structures (Ketema et al., 2016; Lie et al., 2012). This 
has resulted in the identification and analysis of incomplete LVC governance typologies and 
consequently limited the implications for LVC development. Clearly, many LVCs are driven by 
multiple and interacting governance structures (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016). Third, studies 
that have sought to determine LVCs’ drivers have neglected hidden factors, like gender relations 
and roles and decision-making power, which are socially constructed (Lie et al., 2012). Indeed, 
there is a scarcity of conceptual approaches that integrate gender analyses into the concept of 
value chains (Schumacher, 2014). 
The objective of this study is to uncover LVCs’ (1) organization, (2) governance themes and 
gender roles for value addition and (3) smallholder upgrading strategies in developing countries’ 
dualistic sectors. Using qualitative data obtained from the Nigerian shrimp and prawn subsector, 
this study seeks to achieve the sub-objectives in three ways. First, building on the research by Lie 
et al. (2012) and Maertens and Swinnen (2012), we rely on the global value chain (GVC) 
approach (Kaplinsky, 2000; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001) to map distinctively and investigate how 
LVCs are organized and function in parallel to MVCs in the face of globalization. Second, we 
extend the GVC framework by developing and adding the gendered dimension of the value web 
approach (Virchow et al., 2014) to analyse simultaneously the roles of governance and 
differentiated gendered relations in LVCs. Third, we draw out concrete and novel managerial and 
policy implications needed to further develop LVCs, improve the future competitiveness of 
smallholders and posit gendered opportunities. These managerial implications are of great 
importance for interested parties, such as smallholders and artisanal group leaders, while the 
policy implications are important for private firms and public stakeholders. 
African countries are among those developing countries with a growing real GDP (approximately 
3.8 per cent in 2018) that is largely driven by the increasing domestic demand (+6.7 per cent), but 
they still face development challenges regarding favorable business environments (AfDB, 2019). 
Apart from often obstructive foreign trade policies, the diversity and complexity of the African 
private sectors and the inefficient smallholder integration into regional production networks 
especially represent major pitfalls (AUC/OECD, 2019). The LVC in the Nigerian shrimp and 
prawn sector is of particular interest for this research because it shares peculiar sectoral and 
structural characteristics with many agrifood sectors in other developing and transition countries. 




about 1.2 million (Bondad-Reantaso et al., 2012) – most of whom are poor, limited in scope and 
operations, informally organized and dwell in the rural coastal areas (Agbo & Usoroh, 2015; 
Wategire & Ike, 2015). Despite its importance as a source of livelihood for artisans and for 
fulfilling culturally diverse needs for consumers in the domestic markets, researchers and 
development analysts have paid very little attention to it. As a result, many smallholders in the 
LVC in the Nigerian shrimp and prawn sector, similar to many LVCs in other developing 
countries, continuously face the challenge of effectively coordinating their activities and 
remaining competitive in dualistic systems. Contrarily, the MVC in this dualistic system, which 
is dominated by industrial fishing companies, has attracted more attention because it provides 
opportunities to earn foreign exchange.  
Uncharacteristically, both the MVC and the LVC command higher shrimp and prawn (SP) values 
per unit of catch, especially because the domestic demand for SP still outstrips the supply 
(Bondad-Reantaso et al., 2012). This suggests an opportunity to foster economic gains for the 
smallholders involved through upgrading and further expansion of the LVC. We expect that our 
results will help to clarify how LVCs that coexist with MVCs function and what strategies are 
needed for smallholder upgrading. Insights from this case can, therefore, be useful for other 
developing and transition countries, where LVCs are also underdeveloped and the smallholders 
involved are neglected. 
The study is organized as follows. The next section describes the conceptual framework 
employed in the study. Second, the research methodology is elaborated, including the criteria for 
the selection of the study area and participants, data collection procedures, handling and analysis. 
Thirdly, the results and a discussion of the findings are presented, followed by the conclusions 
and implications. 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
This study is based on two concepts: the GVC approach by Kaplinsky (2000) and Kaplinsky and 
Morris (2001) and the value web by Virchow et al. (2014) (Figure 2.1). The GVC approach is 
useful for tracing patterns of production and linking geographically dispersed activities and actors 
in a chain  (Kaplinsky, 2000; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). Although the focus of the GVC 
approach crosses international boundaries, new evidence suggests the regionalization of GVCs 
(Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016). Four dimensions (mapping; governance; benefit 




Fernandez-Stark (2016) and Gereffi et al. (2005), have commonly been employed in the literature 
to analyse effectively and understand fully the broader issues of value chains. With the first GVC 
dimension, the systematic mapping of value chains, the entire input–output process that brings a 
product from conception to consumers is presented. The main actors and their activities or 
segments, specific characteristics and dynamics of segments, like preferred suppliers, are 
depicted with maps. 
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework 
Source: Authors’ illustration  
The second dimension emphasizes the role of governance. Governance in the GVC approach 
ensures that interactions between actors reflect control and coordination (Kaplinsky, 2000). In 
LVC governance analysis, lead actors are first identified, reflecting on their position, inter-
relationships and influence sources (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016). Then, the distinction of 
value chains is made based on the type of lead actors identified. Producer-driven chains are 
mostly found in capital- and technology-intensive industries and controlled by large producers, 
while buyer-driven chains are mostly found in labour-intensive consumer goods industries and 
controlled by buyers (Kaplinsky, 2000; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). Lastly, the inherent 




by Gereffi et al. (2005) based on the complexity and coding of information shared and the 
competence of the suppliers involved. 
 Table 2.1: Gereffi’s governance structures 
Governance types Description 
Market Typical of a spot market, the price mechanism is central, with little to no formal 
cooperation between actors. Low power relationship asymmetry exists, since the cost of 
switching to new partners is low.  
Modular Relationships between suppliers and buyers are tighter, with a high volume of information 
flow beyond price and semi-low power asymmetry. Suppliers take full responsibility for 
securing the generic processes/technologies needed to meet customers’ specifications. 
Relational Interactions between suppliers and buyers are complex, with mutual dependence and high 
asset specificity managed through reputation, family and ethnic ties. Nevertheless, the lead 
actor can exert some levels of control in medium power asymmetry. Trust is built after 
repeated interaction, so the cost of switching partners tends to be high. 
Captive Characterized by high power asymmetry in which small suppliers are dependent on one or 
a few buyers. Producers face high switching costs by functioning under certain conditions 
set by a buyer, while the lead actor, whose competence tends to be outside production, 
exerts a high degree of monitoring and control. 
Hierarchy Products are complex and product characteristics are hard to transmit, so chains are 
characterized by vertical integration and managerial control. 
Source: Adapted from Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016) and Gereffi et al. (2005). 
The third dimension is the assessment of how benefits are distributed to pinpoint critical 
segments that require upgrading. Different measures have been used to describe the distribution 
of benefits along value chains. For instance, Lie et al. (2012) used three measures: profit, 
employment benefits and non-monetary benefits like knowledge. Adopting these measures in this 
study will be problematic because of actors’ heterogeneity and data unavailability. However, 
price has become an important measure of value since the 1990s, because product processing and 
differentiation significantly add to the margins (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Manning, 2015). 
Therefore, this study employs price as a measure of benefit distribution. Furthermore, the fourth 
dimension entails research on the necessary upgrading patterns. Four types of upgrading were 
identified by Kaplinsky and Morris (2001), namely process, which deals with how production 
efficiency can be increased; product, which entails enhancing products’ quality by either 
producing new ones or improving old ones; function, which entails changing the scope and 
combination of the activities performed; and chain/inter-sectoral, which involves moving into 
new production activities. 
The GVC approach has been applied to analyse different value chains across the world. Bassett et 
al. (2018) used the concept to determine the influence of power relations on the upgrading of the 
cashew value chain in Cote d’Ivoire, from the production segment to exporting. The authors 




functioning of the chain and in setting producer prices. However, their study created a gap 
regarding the inner workings through which different actors influence the price-setting 
mechanism. Nguyen et al. (2017) bridged this gap by analysing the value chain of exported 
white-leg shrimp in Vietnam and drawing conclusions on its organizational structure and drivers. 
They argued that middlemen drive the chain and transfer risk to the producers in the price-setting 
mechanism. De Marchi et al. (2013) leveraged the concept to develop an integrated theoretical 
framework that allows for the analysis of environmental upgrading strategies in the Italian home-
furnishing industry. Conversely, the GVC approach has been applied to analyse LVCs. Lie et al. 
(2012) applied a theoretical framework that is based on the GVC to identify possibilities for 
upgrading in a Tanzanian goat milk yogurt LVC. The study warned against several constraints 
that could impede the upgrading over time. Clearly, the latter studies fused the GVC approach 
with other frameworks to contextualize the organization and upgrading strategies for the actors 
along the chains. 
We draw on these studies by extending the GVC framework to include the gender dimensions 
necessary to determine the role of gender relations in ensuring the proper functioning of LVCs. 
Schumacher (2014) reviewed the studies that have conceptualized gender relations in GVCs and 
offered insights into areas that are completely missing from the literature. According to the 
author, the analysis of differentiated gender roles in transnational networks highlighting gender 
decision-making power and influence is an important topical area that requires immediate 
attention. The FAO (2016) further developed a framework that captures gender issues in value 
chains and emphasized the importance of robust gender analysis in making effective 
recommendations about value chain upgrading strategies. The framework involves the inclusion 
of gender-sensitive information in the mapping of value chains. Apart from this, several studies 
have developed and delved into gender relations in value chains; however, contradictory findings 
on the roles and influence of women along value chains have been found (Barrientos et al., 2003; 
Schumacher, 2014). This gap appeared because studies employed approaches that are product 
specific and cannot deal with disaggregated gender information.  
The value web approach offers a great advantage by depicting all the value additions possible 
within the sector (Scheiterle et al., 2018; Virchow et al., 2014). The multidimensional framework 
of the value web approach provides the study with an avenue to describe certain social factors 




Although the value web is an innovative approach that has commonly been employed in business 
and biomass-based literature (Scheiterle et al., 2018), the relevance of its “web perspective” 
makes it crucial as a concept to depict disaggregated gender-sensitive information innovatively in 
this study. We extend the GVC approach by adding the gendered value web to the second 
dimension of the GVC approach (governance analysis) to assess simultaneously the roles of 
governance and gender relations in driving and ensuring the functioning of LVCs (the second 
sub-objective of the study).  
2.3 Research methodology 
2.3.1 Study design 
The study relies on qualitative primary data collected between December 2017 and January 2018 
in Nigeria. The data collection involved three in-depth focus group discussions (FGDs) and 
twenty-one key informant interviews (KIIs). Questions that take into account the four dimensions 
of the GVC (systematic mapping, governance analysis, benefit distribution and upgrading 
strategies) and gender issues explained in Chapter 2 were asked during the FGDs and KIIs. To 
encourage a diverse and quite representative pool of respondents to participate, the study was 
conducted in several shrimping villages and markets across three States (Lagos, Akwa-Ibom and 
Delta) that were purposefully selected to gain insights across different socio-cultural zones.  
The first pool of respondents was identified by experts from the Nigerian Institute for 
Oceanography and Marine Research (NIOMR). In all, eight categories of actors were selected 
through snowball sampling, as shown in Table 2.2. The data from artisanal producers and 
processors were obtained from two States – Badagry, Lagos, and Eket, Akwa-Ibom – because of 
their high level of shrimping activities. The data from traders, retailers and transporters were 
obtained from two large markets, namely Ibaka and Oron, Akwa-Ibom, and Warri, Delta, based 
on their high level of retailing and wholesaling activities. Additionally, a series of interviews with 
two fishing companies and experts (for triangulation) was conducted in Lagos. 
Table 2.2: Details of the participants in the FGDs and KIIs 
Data 
identification 
Participants Type/frequency Type and number of participants 
and years of experience 








24 fisherfolk:  
5 had >20 years 
13 had 10–20 years 
5 had 5–10 years 






8 processors:  





7 had 5–10 years 
E Collectors 2KII 2 local collectors 
2 had >5 years 
2F 





2 processed retailers 








1 company manager 














1 group leader 
2 settlement leaders 
3M 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
Notes: M: male and F: female. 
2.3.2 Data collection 
Type of information obtained 
The FGDs and KIIs were guided by semi-structured questionnaires using open-ended questions 
to describe six themes that are relevant to analysing the four GVC dimensions and the gendered 
relations. These include information on the inputs; fish resources caught; main actors (indicating 
the relationship and governance mechanisms existing between actors); possible value addition to 
the SP (indicating associated price and quantity flow and market destinations); chain 
characteristics (indicating the historical evolution of the chain, contingent situations, difficulties 
and opportunities, etc.); and gender roles and power relations. Most FGDs and KIIs were 
conducted in local languages, except the KIIs with experts and fishing companies, which were 
conducted in English. The questions varied according to the category of the participants. For all 
the FGDs and KIIs, audio recorders and jotters were used to capture important details. 
The relevance of net-map to the study 
One important tool used during FGDs is the net map, which is often employed in participatory 
research methods (Scheiterle et al., 2018). The net map is advantageous because it helps us to 
visualize implicit knowledge and understand the interplay of complex value networks, power 
relations and actor roles. It allows us to involve respondents actively in the process of visualizing 
differentiated LVCs, gender relations and influences, which are rather difficult to depict through 
conventional methods. The implementation of net maps was adapted following the steps 
described by Schiffer and Hauck (2010). First, prior to the start of the FGDs, the research 
objectives and significance of the study were explained to the participants. Then, the net-mapping 
steps were described to the participants to ensure that everyone understood the procedure, while 




LVC – started with the identification and naming of key actors and activities by the participants. 
The same logic was applied thereafter in the mapping of the value web to determine all possible 
value-adding activities. Here, the names of actors and their activities
2
 were written on stickers 
and glued to A1-sized cardboard. Afterwards, all the stickers were linked by the participants 
using markers to depict a chain.  
Next, the net map was modified either to rearrange it or to accommodate new actors/activities 
that had not been mentioned earlier, the quantity of catches and the price flow. Throughout each 
stage, the respondents were encouraged to argue their points until they agreed on a single 
conclusion, thereby increasing the reliability of the information obtained. The penultimate step 
involved the ranking of actors’ power relations by the participants for the second GVC 
dimension. Questions regarding the importance and influence of each actor were asked to 
determine the power relations in the LVC. The participants were provided with flat button-like 
materials that could be piled up to form a tower. The number of materials in each tower was 
counted and noted for each actor named on the map.
3
 For the gendered value web, activities in 
which both men and women were influential were also ranked. Finally, we ended each session by 
discussing the LVC and the web structure. 
2.3.3  Data handling and analysis 
Content analysis of the qualitative data obtained was conducted following Mayring (2015). The 
first step of data analysis involved the transcription of audio recordings into a separate Word 
document template. The transcribed data were coded into nodes based on the broadly predefined 
thematic information listed in the “Study design” section. Important terms like codes, texts, 
metaphors, storylines and discourse coalition that reoccur in the data and are related to the themes 
were formed into nodes using Nvivo 12 plus. For the first sub-objective, relevant information 
presented in the net maps and data obtained from interviews were combined to portray the 
detailed LVC and MVC graphically. The key input–output components of these value chains 
were profiled to include the main activities/segments and key characteristics of the actors 
involved. Hence, the segments of the LVC and MVC were identified and differentiated by the 
value that they add to the product.  
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 Different activities depicted different LVC segments. 
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 The actors deemed to have the most influence had a maximum of eight layers, while those with the least power 




For the second sub-objective concerning the identification of LVC drivers, information on 
different governance structures between each LVC segment and gendered roles in the value web 
were coded, illustrated graphically and analysed. The governance concepts to be analysed 
included governance schemes and lead actors, reflecting their roles, position and sources of 
power relations. An overview of the value-adding benefits accruing to each actor in the LVC is 
presented graphically to depict the third GVC dimension. For the third sub-objective, the data 
from FGDs and KIIs were further reviewed and coded based on the key constraints and 
opportunities for development in each segment of the LVC. This allowed for the derivation of 
segment-specific implications regarding necessary upgrading strategies as part of the fourth GVC 
dimension (Trienekens, 2011). 
2.4 Results and discussion 
2.4.1 Organization of the Nigerian shrimp and prawn value chain 
In this section, we present the first dimension of the GVC approach by systematically mapping 
the value chain to address the first sub-objective. The Nigerian shrimp and prawn sector is 
organized along the two types of value chains, namely the MVC and the LVC, as presented in 
Figure 2.2. The MVC is dominated by industrial fishing companies, many of which are organized 
under the umbrella of the Nigerian Trawlers’ Owners Association (NITOA) (Managers I&J). 
Figure 2.2 shows that the MVC is structured to target export and modern domestic markets, 
because they can earn a premium for meeting export quality and quantity standards. About 85 per 
cent of the SP captured is exported, mainly to EU countries. Compliance with strict regulations 
and standards is strictly monitored and controlled by the Nigerian Federal Department of 
Fisheries. SP that cannot meet these standards is absorbed by the domestic markets (15 per cent 
of the total industrial capture). Most fishing companies sell through registered agents and not 
directly to final consumers (Company manager I). Overall, the producer–international markets–
consumer link represents the predominant market channel in the MVC. 
The LVC is structured to target traditional domestic markets, firms and regional markets.
4
 The 
majority of the demand for SP comes from the traditional domestic market, comprising the urban 
and peri-urban market and the rural market. In this type of value chain, all the SP captured by 
                                                 
4




fishermen is sold off at the shore to fish mammies,
5
 who, in many cases, process and market the 
SP. Fish mammies, if not selling through their union after processing, prefer to sell to traders.
6
 
Village collectors/brokers and large traders/wholesalers differ in their characteristics and 
activities (Collector E). 
 
Figure 2.2: Shrimp and prawn value chain 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on FGD and KII 
Notes: The flowchart indicates both LVC and MVC highlighting the sources of SP and their different marketing channels. The percentages depict 
the quantity flow of SP across tiers and were obtained based on participants’ perceptions during FGDs and KIIs. Tick arrows are used to link 
actors and segments in LVCs while broken arrows depict MVC. Institutions that intervene to support and regulate the sector are listed in the box 
located on the right side of the figure. Lastly, several segments are listed on the left side of the chain, each separated by thin dotted lines. 
Village collectors/brokers are often closer to landing sites, transact frequently with fish 
mammies, service markets around the landing sites and are sometimes missing along the LVC if 
the landing sites can easily be reached by large traders/wholesalers. Village collectors/brokers 
sell to large traders but not vice versa (Collector E). The study depicts these differences by 
profiling these actors separately but in the same segment, as shown in Figure 2.2. Of the total SP 
processed, 95 per cent is sold to traders who demand in bulk and with whom they have long-term 
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relationships. The remaining 5 per cent is bought by final consumers around the processing sites 
(Processor C). Traders sell about 67 per cent of the SP captured to retailers, while about 18 per 
cent is sold directly to the final consumers in the traditional domestic markets. Contrarily, 
retailers sell very significant quantities (62 per cent) directly to the final consumers through the 
local retail markets, while the remainder ends up in local restaurants and hotels (4 per cent) and 
regional markets, such as Cameroon (1 per cent).  
The interviews with retailers indicated that industrial firms using SP as raw materials and 
regional export markets have sprung up and are being targeted along the LVC (Retailer G). This 
finding highlights further developments in the LVC from the situation in the past, in which the 
demand from firms and regional markets was missing (Agbo & Usoroh, 2015). However, 
industrial firms demand SP in smaller quantities (8 per cent) through procurement agents who are 
well connected to the processors and village collectors (Processor C). Similarly, the quantity 
supplied by traders to the regional markets is quite negligible (2 per cent). Accordingly, the 
producer–processor–trader–retailer–consumer link represents the most important and 
predominantly used market channel in the LVC. 
2.4.2 Connecting landing sites to the markets: drivers of LVC and MVC 
In this section and section 4.3, the answers relating to the second sub-objective are presented. The 
study seeks to identify the key drivers that shape the LVC and ensure the smooth flow of SP by 
analysing the second GVC dimension and the gendered value web approach. To describe how the 
dualistic system works, we first present the drivers of MVC and later focus on LVC. 
Second dimension: governance themes and its role along the MVC 
Local fishing companies also adopt explicit higher degree of vertical coordination to reduce 
uncertainties and transaction costs. They can push and formally meet the demands and 
requirements of international export markets by fully integrating all vertical activities from the 
supply-base to distribution in the export-oriented chain (Manager I). This is an interesting finding 
as forward vertical integration across several segments is not common and premised in many 
other African export VCs (Maertens et al., 2012). The difference in levels of coordination arose 
for two main reasons. First, the export chain is a typical producer-driven chain that is only 
effectively controlled through vertical integration (Barrientos et al., 2003). Interviews with 
fishing companies indicate that export chain is characterized by capital and technology-intensive 




of coordination mechanism to deal with high risk associated with asset specificity at the supply-
base, and the complex nature of transactions in the chain (Ouma et al., 2017). Secondly, the 
export chain is characterized by high transaction complexity, which can only be understood and 
met by a few competent fishing companies that coordinate their activities better and have tighter 
relationships with buyers. Information about quality, specie, form, preservation method, and 
safety, as well as social and environmental conditions under which the shrimp is caught, is 
distinct to market niches and hard to codify.  
Firms manage their chains more tightly when they face such complex transaction requirements, 
both to avert negative publicity for the chain and properly differentiate their products (Barrientos 
et al., 2003). While attainment of certain level of economies of scale and technological 
advancement are criteria for entry and locking of buyers in the chain, inability of many fishing 
companies to deal with this complexity could be one of the reasons why their number shrunk 
over the last two decades from 36 to 14 companies (Manager J). In addition, few lapses in 
government’s policy and support for the sector, including inadequate offshore security 
infrastructure, and irregular supply are barriers to potential business development (Managers I-J). 
Final transaction with buyers in importing countries is done through a less-tighter linkage. 
Therefore, apart from functioning institutions and government regulations, vertical integration 
was another germane reason why the sector performs well in the export market.  
Unlike the export MVC, the modern domestic market is characterized by modular governance, in 
which fishing companies take full responsibility of investing in generic machinery that limits 
transaction-specific costs for domestic customers. Although non-detailed and non-formalized 
agreements characterized company-agent relationship, fishing companies capture shrimp to meet 
agent’s specifications using defined technical standards. Fishing companies take full 
responsibility for investing in generic machinery like shrimping vessels equipped with fish-hold 
and cold-room that limits transaction-specific costs for domestic customers. However, fishing 
companies curb possible agent’s opportunistic behavior by committing them through forward-
payments (Manager J). The governance analysis of the MVC indicates a short, simple chain with 
complex organizations whereas the modern domestic chain is characterized by many 
intermediaries and less complex structure. Such arrangement allows for equitable distribution of 




However, just like the export market, fishing companies are dominant as they drive all the 
activities. 
Second dimension: governance themes and their role along the LVC 
Reflecting on the second dimension in the conceptual framework, the LVC is an unregulated 
buyer-driven chain in which traders dominate and drive the chain because they have better access 
to rich market information and higher purchasing and bargaining power. The power rankings 
made by the respondents during the FGDs indicate that traders drive the overall chain network. In 
addition, during the FGDs, fishermen described traders as “a group who has more power and 
influence” during negotiations and price-setting generally, because they drive the aggressive 
distribution of SP (Fisherman A). This is common in many African sectors in which intermediary 
traders are crucial to the proper functioning of value chains (Agbo & Usoroh, 2015; Gereffi et al., 
2005; Maertens et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 2.3: Governance typologies along the shrimp and prawn value chain 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on FGD and KII 




The dominance of the traders erupts from their relationships with multiple actors across tiers, as 
depicted in Figure 2.2. First, from both ends of the chain, traders can receive essential market 
information that is crucial for their business decision-making processes, especially for spatial 
integration and price determination. Traders engage in hub and spoke business models in which 
they source products from different origins, consolidate them and send them to different markets. 
Traders supplying firms and regional markets also adopt this model but with the more substantial 
relationship needed to meet certain specifications. Although Agbo and Usoroh (2015) concluded 
that a smooth and free flow of information exists, this study opines that traders often hold up 
essential market information as an advantage to themselves, which results in unsmooth and poor 
marketing information across tiers, especially for artisanal producers and processors (Processors 
C&D). As noted during the FGDs with fishermen and processors, this causes a low level or even 
a lack of trust in fish mammy–trader relationships (Processor D).  
Secondly, traders are faced with relatively less liquidity pressure and risk, so they are able to 
make more careful business decisions than artisans and shift negotiations in their favour. 
Conversely, most fish mammies sell at the mercy of traders who buy in bulk, due to their 
liquidity problems and the resultant pressure to sell quickly. Thirdly, traders have relatively larger 
working capital resources, since they can access several sources of income, including credit 
facilities. 
As shown in Figure 2.3, the transactions in the LVC are mostly governed on the spot market in 
which the price is set by both the supplier and the buyer after they have both wielded their 
negotiating and bargaining power. An exception is the collective selling-price fixing and 
marketing by processors/marketers through unions in some shrimping communities. Although 
producer groups also exist, there were no indications of collective marketing (Leaders M&N). 
Producer groups target their activities towards improving production-related activities, like 
employee sourcing and political lobbying (Leader M). With the governance mechanism “market” 
dominating the LVC, actors are faced with no entry barriers, thereby resulting in a relatively long 
and spatially diverse chain with simple interactions. In an attempt to avoid incurring additional 
transaction costs, fish mammies sell directly to traders at their processing site or nearest market 
hub. Over time, this could develop into a strategic and mutually dependent relationship. 
Further, the interviews with processors indicated the evolution of the LVC towards the 




small scale, fish mammies dominated both the production and the processing segments of the 
LVC by shrimping or owning production inputs, processing and marketing (Agbo & Usoroh, 
2015). Over time, as the LVC developed, and as observed by Trienekens (2011), fishermen and 
fish mammies became specialized in the segments in which they have a comparative advantage 
(Leaders M&N). Most fishermen now own their production inputs and shrimp under less exertion 
of the processor’s control. Usually, typical producer–processor/marketer transactions in African 
LVCs are based on market governance (Simon et al., 2016) and in some cases on formal captive 
governance (Markelova & Mwangi, 2010; Reardon et al., 2009).  
The interviews with producers suggested an evolution in the upstream LVC in which producer–
processor relationships are rather based on relational governance (Table 2.1). Due to the 
transactional complexity arising from uncertainty at the supply base, fishermen form strategic 
bonds with fish mammies that are largely managed by reputation, family or ethnic ties and social 
and spatial proximity (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Gereffi et al., 2005). It is therefore 
common to see fishermen selling to fish mammies who are their wives or relations in the LVC. 
Although previous studies have not observed this relational governance (Agbo & Usoroh, 2015), 
this study posits that it provoked the emergence of new processing and marketing segments in the 
LVC. The relational governance ensures that the activities of both producers and processors are 
to a certain extent synchronized and thus an important factor that drives the LVC. In this type of 
arrangement, as also observed in the Philippine tawilis chain (Trienekens, 2011), fishermen sell 
to the same processor(s) for years (Processors C&D). While both parties’ activities have distinct 
and mutually exclusive costs and benefits, shoreline prices or revenue-sharing formulas are often 
agreed when SPs are purchased or product credit is made, respectively. Both parties enjoy a 
certain level of autonomy, as they can switch to other actors temporarily to maximize their own 
gains. Despite this, the power ranking of actors during the FGDs with artisanal fishermen 
suggested that fish mammies are important drivers of the LVC (Fishermen A&B). One fisherman 
said, “They (fish mammies) are very important in this system… They have the ability to 
influence certain things within the community and along the supply chain” (Fisherman A). 
Gendered value web in the LVC 
SP value web
7
 activities are generally undertaken on three levels, namely the shoreline level, at 
which most of the exchanges between producers and processors take place; the local processing–
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household consumer level, at which most of the local processing and consumption are performed 
after active marketing by the middlemen; and the industrial level. Fish mammies process SP by 
smoking on shelves constructed for this purpose or sun-drying. Several important trends that 
support the importance and influence of fish mammies along the LVC can be summarized from 
the gendered value web. First, the value web supports the existence of a strict division of labour 
and specialization based on gender comparative advantages, especially at the supply base. Men 
have a comparative advantage in shrimping mainly because of the physicality of driving plank 
canoes and drawing nets (Fishermen B), while offshore security was another reason expressed in 
some areas. However, “women are expert in drying SP … Fishermen spend hours in the water 
and so rely on women to dry it, else SP will spoil” (Fisherman B). 
 
Figure 2.4: Gendered value-web in LVC 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on FGDs and KIIs 
Notes: The study depicts the different types of value addition possible for SP in LVC. It also depicts gender dominance in different activities:  
represents women dominance while  depicts men dominance in the chain. Thick lines represent the flow of SP while the broken lines represent 
the flow of by-catches.  
Second, fish mammies are important providers of a financial cushion for many fishermen who 




repayments of which are made in subsequent transactions. “That is why you have a lot of 
fishermen with very white hair … If you get one basin, which is not up to your fuel cost, they 
(fish mammies) will buy the little basin you catch and pay your money before trading on it. That 
is why many women are wealthier than most of the men here” (Fisherman A). “It is those women 
who sometimes lend us money so that we can operate and they will take back their money after 
the sale of the SP” (Fisherman A). This has an important impact on the LVC, because a constant 
supply of SP can be attained from the supply base. Third, fish mammies encourage most 
industrial and local value additions for SP through their processing or handling activities. 
Smoking or sun-drying of SP is crucial to increase its shelf life, enhance handling and make it 
available in forms that are generally acceptable to most local buyers. This is particularly 
important for fishermen, as they are assured of consistent demand and no financial loss from the 
deterioration of SP after landing. As shown in Figure 2.4, all possible industrial value additions 
of SP come only after it has been processed by fish mammies.  
Fourth, fish mammies serve as the face of the supply base and can determine the LVC’s shape by 
deciding to sell to either traders or local consumers. Fish mammies are also crucial in 
determining what and how the benefits are distributed to the producers. The repayment time and 
margin that fishermen receive depends on how fish mammies fare in their negotiation with 
powerful middlemen, especially when exchanges between fishermen and fish mammies are based 
on predetermined sharing formula (Fishermen A). As a result, fishermen seek to transact with 
fish mammies who are agile, understand the business relationship and can provide a financial 
background (Fisherman A). Similar to newer findings in some African LVCs (FAO, 2016; 
Kamau & Ngigi, 2013; Schumacher, 2014; Udong et al., 2009, 2010), interviews and discussions 
with several actors also prove that women and their roles are shifting from being totally inferior 
and dependent to being one of the major drivers of chains at and beyond the supply base. This is 
also clearly highlighted in Figure 2.4, in which women manage most value-adding activities 
beyond the supply base, even though the purchasing and bargaining power in the LVC could be 
independent of gender. 
2.4.3 Third dimension: benefit distribution among actors in the LVC 
The analysis, as well as the results shown in Figure A2.1, suggests inequitable benefit sharing in 
the LVC. Generally, more benefits accrue to lead actors (Trienekens, 2011), in this case traders. 




price (N800 = 2.20USD)
8
 per kg received by fishermen. Retailers can also earn four times 
(+150–325 per cent) the shoreline price. Contrarily, fish mammies earn an additional 7 to 25 per 
cent depending on whether they transact with the final consumers or the traders. The strategic 
mutual reliance between fishermen and fish mammies means that the uneven benefit shares given 
to fish mammies also resonate with fishermen. It should be reiterated that the inequitable benefit 
shares of fish mammies cannot be regarded as indirect gender discrimination of fish mammies 
since the LVC is largely in women’s realm; that is, most traders and retailers are also women. 
However, the result tilts towards the theory that smallholders generally suffer from more 
inequitable product market effects in the LVC than in MVCs (Barrientos et al., 2003; Maertens & 
Swinnen, 2012; Schumacher, 2014). Therefore, further development of the LVC requires 
necessary upgrading strategies that will align the benefits better with the supply base. 
2.4.4 Fourth dimension: smallholders’ upgrading strategies in the LVC 
This section addresses the third sub-objective. The presence of several challenges that still inhibit 
the LVC’s development is obvious, even though there is the potential for producer and processor 
upgrading. Table 2.3 summarizes the key constraints and opportunities related to upgrading in the 
production and processing segments. The constraints at the supply base significantly revolve 
around market access and orientation, the unavailability of innovation resources and physical 
infrastructure and institutions (Trienekens, 2011). 
Public constraints and opportunities at the supply base 
The institutional supply-side pillars emphasize the roles that the government (public) and private 
sectors play in providing an enabling environment for artisanal fishermen and fish mammies 
(AUC/OECD, 2019; Trienekens, 2011). Fishermen lamented about the neglect by the 
government (Fishermen A–B). Artisanal fishermen lack access to a range of complementary 
assets, infrastructure, finance, technical assistance and skills that are required to improve their 
operational efficiency and product quality and effectively link them to the growing local demand. 
The lack of basic infrastructure, like tarmacked roads, has prevented many smallholders from 
selling directly to final consumers and limited the activities of private stakeholders. Apart from 
these, the regulation and enforcement of relevant laws to control pollution in water bodies and 
environmental degradation are lacking. These externalities negatively affect the supply 
(Fisherman A). Depending on the available locally fabricated inputs, fishermen expressed that 
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they are technically unable to deal with naturally occurring constraints like seasonality in the 
supply and bad ocean weather (Fisherman B).  
Table 2.3: Constraints and opportunities in the production and processing segments 
Segments Key constraints Opportunities 
Production 
and supply 
High natural seasonality/instability in 
production 
High seasonal demand 
High asset specificity and costs 
Conventional shrimping inputs 
Lack of basic and financial infrastructure 
Information asymmetry 
Limited incentive to store SP further 
High domestic demand  
Increasing post-harvest value 
Collective action to upscale supply 
Communal structure to overcome constraints 
Processing Quality variability 
Lack of a cold chain 
Limited access to modern techniques  
Low education and financial illiteracy 
Lack of basic and financial infrastructure 
Insufficient working capital 
Upscaling the quantity processed 
Collective action to overcome constraints 
Increased processing hours 
Marketing High transportation cost 
Information asymmetry 
Limited market outlets 
Low negotiating power 
Huge competition 
Limited marketing skills 
Unstable demand and high price fluctuation 
Collective marketing and price determination 
Weekly traditional markets 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the FGDs and KIIs. 
Additionally, the lack of basic physical infrastructure often limits fish mammies, increases their 
processing and transportation costs and consequently results in uncompetitive market prices. 
Generally, higher costs are incurred in shrimping communities with no direct access to some 
basic infrastructural facilities, like electricity and tarmacked roads. The lack of electricity in 
many shrimping communities means that certain opportunities, like upscaling sales, longer hours 
of processing and cold processing, cannot be taken (Processor C). This significantly decreases 
their possibilities to target new markets and reduces their bargaining power. Additionally, similar 
to value chains in East Africa, a lack of access to modern processing facilities reduces fish 
mammies’ incentives to improve and attain consistent quality (AUC/OECD, 2019). There are 
opportunities for quality upgrading that fish mammies can capture. However, they need to spend 
more time and effort to ensure that the product quality is uniform and the products are free of 
contaminants. Wealthy consumers in the urban and peri-urban areas are sensitive to product 
quality and willing to pay a premium for high-quality levels (Researcher K). 
Institutionally, the government still needs to provide an enabling environment for private 




smallholders progressively along the LVC. Policy instruments that border on the provision of 
location, gender-sensitive infrastructural and financial facilities and modern technologies are 
generally absent in most shrimping communities. These are essential to improve the efficiency of 
smallholders and enhance equitable benefit sharing. There was no evidence of public-private 
coordination, which includes support from the network of fishing companies in MVCs and non-
chain actors, in most communities. As a result, smallholders generally lack technical assistance, 
training and market information and find it hard to organize themselves better into groups 
(Trienekens, 2011). Furthermore, firms in the SP-based value web still need technical 
infrastructure, a skilled labour force and financial instruments that can support innovativeness, 
ensure a consistent demand and aid further research to develop markets (AUC/OECD, 2019). 
Organizational constraints and opportunities at the supply base 
On the institutional demand side, the smallholder producer–processor interface often lacks 
coordinated vertical and horizontal relationships, resulting in ineffective production and business 
decisions, high market information asymmetry and severe holdup problems (Adekambi et al., 
2016; Watabaji et al., 2016). The interviews with fishermen revealed that they often supply SP 
continuously even when fish mammies have reached full capacity or when the demand is low. 
This often results in holdups and severe liquidity problems for fishermen, especially when 
exchanges with fish mammies are based on credit and profit-sharing formulae. Consequently, we 
found that smallholders are negatively affected by huge product holdups. Fishermen revealed that 
they experience less purchasing and bargaining power when the holdup of products is longer than 
expected (Fisherman B).  
Furthermore, there is inefficient dissemination of the available market information to 
smallholders at the supply base, because traders hide information while several non-functional or 
uncoordinated horizontal relationships still exist in many shrimping communities. Hence, many 
smallholders are inefficient, incurring higher production and transaction costs (Wategire & Ike, 
2015). Additionally, information asymmetry from the unsynchronized and uncoordinated 
activities of neighbouring shrimping communities results in spatial price differences, of which 
traders often take advantage. The result shows that many fish mammies are not willing to adopt 
modern technologies, for example for smoking and drying SP, and show scepticism towards their 
effectiveness. “You cannot use any other technology to process SP effectively” (Processor D). 




techniques are used instead of the conventional method, which is unsustainable health-wise and 
environmentally (Fisherman A). Fish mammies’ scepticism is compounded by the lack of access 
to extension services and government-sponsored training, which could teach and encourage them 
to discard conventional techniques. Lastly, we observed that the location of many processing 
sheds is often unfavourable, hard to reach or far from landing sites; thus, fish mammies incur 
higher costs to maintain sheds and transport SP. 
Finally, the evidence from the interviews with middlemen and experts indicates that the mid-
stream is also constrained by several challenges that resonate back to the supply base (Table 
A2.1). Among others, middlemen in the LVC face high market turbulence and transaction costs. 
As in other African LVCs, the major expense for middlemen is transportation. Middlemen often 
increase the price of SP to accommodate and compensate for the high transport costs incurred 
(Udong et al., 2010) or, as found in this case, transfer the risk to smallholders at the supply base 
by wielding their negotiating power to reduce smallholders’ margins. Apart from the government 
providing an enabling environment, middlemen can alleviate these constraints through collective 
transportation, which helps to distribute the costs across several traders and marginally reduce the 
costs for individual traders. Consequently, this will reduce the amount of risks transferred to 
smallholder producers and processors. 
2.5  Conclusions and implications 
In this paper, we extend the GVC framework (Kaplinsky, 2000; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001) 
towards the gendered value web approach (Virchow et al., 2014) to uncover LVCs’ (1) 
organization, (2) governance themes and gender roles for value addition and (3) smallholder 
upgrading strategies in developing countries’ dualistic sectors using the example of the Nigerian 
shrimp and prawn sector. The LVC map indicates that the predominant marketing channel is a 
long chain of producer–processor/marketer–trader–retailer–consumer (see Figure 2.2). Against 
the background of LVCs, this study finds the LVC structure to be well defined and able to remain 
competitive despite facing uncertain external situations and neglect.  
Historically, the LVC has evolved in response to these contingencies (Agbo & Usoroh, 2015; 
Trienekens, 2011). From the analysis of the GVC governance dimension, the relevant drivers of 
the LVC were identified. The LVC, being a buyer-driven chain, is clearly driven by competitive 
traders who engage in an aggressive hub and spoke marketing model. The result shows that the 




evolved in response to a greater demand, an unstable supply, technological advancement and the 
highly perishable nature of SP at the supply base. This led to the emergence of a new segment at 
the supply base (processing and marketing), as observed in this study. Further in-depth 
governance analysis shows that strategic relational governance and business strategies between 
production and processing segments are crucial in ensuring a constant and smooth supply of SP 
from the LVC’s supply base to the midstream (Figure A2.2). Furthermore, the analysis of the 
gendered value web highlights the vital roles that women play in ensuring a smooth flow of SP 
along the LVC (FAO, 2016; Kamau & Ngigi, 2013; Schumacher, 2014; Udong et al., 2009, 
2010). For example, female processors/marketers act as a financial buffer for many producers, a 
point of contact and a precursor to all midstream value additions in the value web. 
Therefore, potential managerial and policy interventions for effective upstream upgrading and 
LVC development should simultaneously take into account segments that are mutually dependent 
and based on differentiated gender relations (Schumacher, 2014). As a strategic business plan, the 
study suggests an initial focus on the domestic and regional markets until rigorous process and 
product upgrading at the supply base are achieved.  
To attain process upgrading, smallholder producers and processors at the supply base need to 
optimize the coordination and collaboration processes with their trading partners and competitors, 
respectively (Adekambi et al., 2016; Trienekens, 2011; Watabaji et al., 2016). We suggest better 
coordination of the producer–processor relationship in which concrete business strategies and 
plans for shrimping activities are made. Additionally, smallholders need to intensify the 
horizontal bonds. Existing groups need to be empowered to encompass strategic marketing 
objectives that benefit members, while new groups are needed in areas where they do not exist 
(AUC/OECD, 2019). In particular, collective marketing seems to be the imminent cost-effective 
approach for fish mammies. Collective price determination would also increase fish mammies’ 
negotiating power since the price would be the same for buyers in the area (Dürr, 2015; Lie et al., 
2012; Trienekens, 2011). Although this is clearly difficult, smallholders and groups in adjacent 
shrimping villages also need to coordinate better to integrate spatially and ensure uniform prices 
at neighbouring landing sites.  
We posit that only after process upgrading is achieved can product upgrading begin at the supply 
base, in which smallholders shift to supply high-quality SP (Trienekens, 2011). In addition, a 




targeting of institutions, like a school feeding programme, are good business strategies to 
differentiate SP, maintain value and provide constant markets for a potential consistent supply 
from the supply base (Lie et al., 2012). 
There are a few limitations to the study. First, the geographical scope of the study, focusing on 
just three States, means that certain hidden heterogeneous characteristics might affect the 
activities and that the choice of LVC governance schemes might have been omitted. Validation 
by external experts was performed, while the data were triangulated with several sources in 
different States to confirm the consensus. Our sampling method – snowball sampling – 
potentially biased our selection of experienced and better-linked respondents. Despite these 
limitations, the data obtained enabled an understanding of the overall organizational structure and 
the derivation of necessary upgrading strategies for smallholders.  
The upgrading strategies highlighted are, however, without implications for cost and sustainable 
production. Future research can determine the most cost-effective choice of upgrading for 
smallholders and assess the sustainability of the current production technique and efforts. 
Furthermore, the study identified an array of inter-relationships and governance measures that are 
important for the effective functioning of the LVC in the face of changing situations. Future 
research should pay simultaneous attention to segments with mutually dependent gender roles 
and determine the most effective inter-relationships and governance measures necessary to fit 








Figure A2.1: Distribution of additional margins in the value chain 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on FGDs and KIIs. SP shoreline prices are provided per kg while additional margin accruable to actors in each 
segment are in percentages. 
 




Source: Authors’ illustration 
Table A2.1: Constraints and opportunities in the mid and downstream of LVC 
 Key Constraints Opportunities 
Village collection/broking High transaction cost 
High competition with other traders 
Challenges to have a constant supply 
and meet large local demand 
Long distance to the collection site 
Insufficient working capital 
Wild price fluctuations 
Better local market information 
High demand from local markets  
Premium price 
Several differentiation strategies 
Possibility for cold chain 
Large trading/wholesaling Higher transaction cost 
Lack of cold chain 
Competition from other traders 
Challenges to have a constant supply 
and meet larger urban demand  
Very long distance to the collection site 
Infrastructural decay 
Wild price fluctuations 
Better chain information 
Huge demand  
Premium price 
Several differentiation strategies 
Huge capital base 
Retailing Competition from other fish resources 
Externalities 
Limited marketing skills 
Quality variability 
Unknown market demand 
Challenges to have a constant supply  
High demand from urban and peri-urban 
areas 
Possibility for cold chain 
Peri-urban markets
9
   
Local retail markets  
Restaurants  
Local kiosk  
Institutions 
Competition from other fish resources 
Spatial price difference 
Limited local purchasing power 
Challenges to have a constant supply  
Limited marketing skills and 
information 
Unknown market demand 
Quality variability 
Several differentiation strategies 
Possibility for cold chain 
Collective sourcing 
Public school feeding program and hospitals 
Government support 
Premium price 
Road-side food vendors 
Urban markets   
Restaurants  
Large market hubs 
Competition from other fish resources 
Challenges to have a constant supply 
Stall rent  
Quality variability 
Huge competition 
Hotels and university cafeterias 
Huge demand 
Premium price 
Collective sourcing to lower transaction cost 
Huge demand 
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To give an overview of shrimp retail markets, we based the section on the perception of the three retailers interviewed. Shrimp retail market is 





3 Contingent resource-based view of food netchain organization and firm 




Much has been written in the literature on the effect of fast-moving business environments on 
organizational and supply chain (SC) management. Yet, empirical scientific findings on the quantitative 
effect of changing external and internal contingencies on today's globalized SC networks and performance 
are still fragmented into different organizational instruments, with some conflicting results remaining 
unexplained. As this also holds for the implications derived, actors’ mal-adaptation delays and hampers 
the restoration of fit between business contingencies and complex organizational structure to maximize 
performance. This study addresses these deficiencies by providing a comprehensive quantitative research 
framework to examine how SC external and internal contingencies jointly influence organizational SC 
network structures and performance across mutually-dependent tiers. The so-called “Contingency-
Netchain-Performance” (CNP) framework based on contingent resource-based theory and netchain 
approach was empirically tested on data obtained from a standardized survey of 405 artisanal producers 
and 238 processors in the Nigerian shrimp and prawn sector. Partial Least Squares-estimations indicate 
that both external and internal contingencies significantly influence adaptational change in organization 
supply chain network, which in turn contributes to smallholders’ performance. All external contingencies 
influence the formation of tighter vertical coordination but differ on horizontal and lateral relationships. 
More importantly, results reveal that internal contingencies concurrently influence organizational network 
structures and smallholders’ performance. Furthermore, the influence of both external and internal 
contingencies on organizational networks seems to differ across tiers however, supply chain vertical 
relationships tend to intensify the formation of closer network structures. Several theoretical and practical 
implications for SC organization management emerged from this study and are addressed to researchers, 
practitioners, and policymakers. 
Keywords: Contingent resource-based view, supply chain network organization, Partial Least Squares 
estimation, Fishery, Nigeria  
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Organizational supply chain (SC) complexities arising from fast-moving business environments 
have been widely described in organizational theory literature (Donaldson, 2006; Pennings, 
1992). The core paradigm of structural contingency theory defines this dependency as a fit 
situation between organization internal and external contingencies and the organizational 
structure creating the maximum performance possible. Conversely, SC performance as also those 
of its member firms dwindles with changing contingencies, worsening if non-, mal- and/or 
delayed adaptation further creates misfit in organizational SC network structures (Donaldson, 
2006; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Acknowledging this phenomenon, the concept of 
contingency continues to be central element and recurrent concern in many organizational and SC 
management literature over the last half-century (De Clercq et al., 2016; Flynn et al., 2016), 
though it only became a subject of sophisticated modeling as part of quantitative empirical 
analysis in recent times (Flynn et al., 2016; Otter et al., 2014). In line with organizational theory 
(Donaldson, 2006; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), existing empirical studies give evidence that both 
internal (e.g. age and size) and external (e.g. market conditions) contingencies are likely major 
factors considered simultaneously by managers when deciding on organizational instruments as 
part of firms’ strategies and thus, source of competitiveness (Cao et al., 2011; Flynn et al., 2016; 
Leuschner et al., 2013).
 
However, contingency changes nowadays appear in much more diverse 
forms such as increasing deregulation, privatization and globalization (Reardon, 2015), ever-
shorter innovation cycles and corresponding technological progress (Arora et al., 2016; Autry et 
al., 2010), which go hand in hand with rising business uncertainties (Flynn et al., 2016) and 
resource heterogeneity in SCs across multiple tiers (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014).  
Structural complexities increase as firms seek to adapt to these changes by using a myriad of 
heterogeneous and complex strategic SC network instruments to maximize their performance (De 
Clercq et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2004; Otter et al., 2014). Firms’ SC network instruments 
convert into different types and/or combinations of complex relationships, which can be 
categorized into vertical, horizontal and lateral. While vertical relationships are supplier-buyer 
relationships of different intensities (e.g. duration of relationships, degree of formalization), 
horizontal relationships appear between actors on the same SC level (e.g. memberships in 
associations, strategic alliances) (Lazzarini et al., 2001; Otter et al., 2014). Lateral relationships 





and transportation of the good, i.e. stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). These different types of 
relationships might not be independent of each other in their occurrence (Lazzarini et al., 2001; 
Otter et al., 2014). Particularly, sectors including SCs with higher numbers of tiers that show 
different degrees of concentration, such as the agrifood sector, typically witness complex 
organizational adaptation to contingencies (Barrett et al., 2012; Hobbs & Young, 2000).  
Against this background, it more than ever assigns to academia the task of continuously 
suggesting theoretical and practical implications for firms on how to realign complex SC 
organization with predominant dynamic business environments and given resource base. 
However, until now the literature cannot paint the whole picture as the following conceptual gaps 
exist: First, existing empirical SC management research puts focus on external contingencies 
(Arora et al., 2016; De Clercq et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2004; Otter et al., 2014; Wang et al., 
2015). Yet, the concurrent fit of SC organizational strategies to both concurrent changes in 
external contingencies and internal contingencies in the sense of organization resource bundling 
is neglected in most quantitative organizational and SC management literature (Kayser et al., 
2015; Leuschner et al., 2013). Second, also due to the long-lasting coexistence of SC- and 
network analysis until the early years of the current millennium (Lazzarini et al., 2001), up to 
now various literature exists only on particular single organizational instruments or relationships 
(Autry et al., 2010; Dries et al., 2014; Flynn et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2004). The lack of 
comprehensive view on various types of organizational SC relationships as part of management 
strategies still leaves inconsistent or even conflicting results unexplained (Arora et al., 2016; 
Johnston et al., 2004; Kayser et al., 2015; Kwon & Suh, 2004; Wang et al., 2015). Only Otter et 
al., (2014) simultaneously analyzed the influence of the interplay of all three types of 
relationships on firm performance. Third, existing studies typically focus on a single tier of the 
supply chain network (supplier) (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Flynn et al., 2016), though this 
limits implications on how to align SC organizations with changing business environments across 
mutually-dependent tiers (Mena et al., 2013). 
To close these gaps, this study seeks to provide a comprehensive quantitative research framework 
for analyzing how SC external and internal contingencies jointly influence organizational SC 
network structures and performance across two mutually-dependent tiers. This objective is 
addressed by further developing the empirical model of Otter et al., (2014), which integrates 





& Lorsch, 1967), towards the inclusion of firm’s internal contingencies based on the contingent 
resource-based theory (RBT) (Brush & Artz, 1999). Partial Least Squares Structural Equation 
Modelling (PLS-SEM) is used to analyze primary data obtained from 643 smallholders over two 
tiers (production and processing) in the local food system of the Nigerian shrimp and prawn 
sector. Results from this study can tease out concrete conceptual insights for SC organizational 
management in highly dynamic industries of developing and industrialized countries. 
Global food systems have witnessed immense transformation over the last decades whilst they 
emerged as key-sector for achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (FAO, 
2017b). This holds particularly true for local food systems in low and mid-income countries, as 
they are the main source of income for rural households (Barrett et al., 2012; FAO, 2017b; 
Reardon, 2015). The Nigerian shrimp and prawn sector as one of those local food systems is 
dominated by about 1.2 million artisans, most of whom rely on wild capture to supply about 15 
metric tons, representing 80 percent of supply to the local markets (FAO, 2017a).  
The supply-base of the food system is of particular interest because fisher folks experience highly 
dynamic external and internal contingencies, which are typical of agrifood systems in developing 
and transition countries (FAO, 2017b; Udong et al., 2010). Seasonality, extreme weather 
conditions and fast seafood perishability affect shrimping activities, causing high market 
uncertainties and volatilities for artisanal producers and processors. Besides, they face traders and 
influential competitors who have bargaining advantages, financial capability and market 
information access to transfer risks and earn higher values. Particularly producers perceive rapid 
technological changes to motorized canoes, engine capacities and gears due to the development 
in input markets, rising sea levels, and changing consumer demand (FAO, 2017b). Processors, 
however, are especially confronted with spatial market information asymmetry due to their 
remoteness and non-transparency of buyers (i.e. traders) along the SC, making them transact 
under low levels of trust downstream (Udong et al., 2010). Further, many of the artisans lack 
adequate human and financial capital such as skills, experience, and credit, needed to perform 
their activities and create/sustain competitive advantage (Udong et al., 2010). As a result, the 
food system perceives the progressive trend towards denser organizational SC networks. While 
many processors transact with traders in spot-markets, there are convincing indications for 
“relational governance” between producer-processors transactions which allows for better 





producer and processing groups, as well as public extension agents and NGOs, are becoming 
prominent as alternative sources of information and support for the fisher folks (FAO, 2017b; 
Udong et al., 2010). 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the theoretical 
background. The conceptual framework and research methodology are presented in sections 3 
and 4, respectively. Lastly, results are presented in section 5 while sections 6 and 7 are dedicated 
to discuss the results and draw conclusions, respectively. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
3.2.1 Contingent resource-based theory 
The contingent RBT follows the assumptions of contingency theory (Donaldson, 2006; Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967) and RBT (Barney, 2001; Wernerfelt, 1984) by arguing that superior 
organizational performance is attained when firms align their organizational structures with their 
internal and external context variables (Brush & Artz, 1999). Contingency theory provides a 
framework for organizational design and emphasizes that firms must adapt to their external 
business environment. The fit of firms’ organizational SC network structures to their external 
contingencies will determine the significance and magnitude of competitive (dis)advantage 
(Donaldson, 2006; Hobbs & Young, 2000). This forms three dimensions of the situation, 
response and performance indicators (Cao et al., 2011; Otter et al., 2014). Situations, which are in 
this context firms’ external contingencies, and are not under the control of managers but 
continuously exert influence on organization (Zeithaml et al., 1988); responses are the 
organizational factors and strategies that are readjusted to the contingencies; while performances 
are a measure of fit between situations and responses. 
RBT proponents assert that competitive advantage is an outcome of the creation and use of 
bundles of strategic resources and/or capabilities which are heterogeneous and immobile across 
firms (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Barney, 2001; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Cao et al., 
2011; Grant, 1991). RBT’s basic proposition is that firms may gain resource-based competitive 
advantage when their resource bundles are strategic that is, are valuable-(V), rare-(R), 
imperfectly imitable-(I) and can be fully exploited by an effective organization-(O) (Kozlenkova 
et al., 2014). Such “resources and capabilities” (internal contingencies) are central constructs in 
RBT. Extant RBT literature has helped categorize resources into tangible and intangible 





organizational (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Grant, 1991). While resources are inputs in the 
production process, capabilities are derived from the combined utilization of tangible resource 
bundles and are more likely to improve and sustain performance because they intangibly fulfill 
the VRIO conditions (Brush & Artz, 1999). We further reinterpret the RBT by applying it to 
smallholder producer-processor and processor-trader exchanges. Employing RBT at the 
exchange-level is logical since transactions follow similar resource-based assumptions and logic 
as firm-level transactions on which RBT has been mainly applied (Kozlenkova et al., 2014). 
Despite the importance of RBT, as a stand-alone concept, it suffers from the inability to capture 
context-specific settings in which resources become valuable. This, in addition to an attempt to 
add a dynamic adaptation process, justifies the reason we implement the contingent RBT into our 
framework (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2011). 
3.2.2 Netchain approach 
As Otter et al., (2014) did, we integrate the netchain approach into the framework to 
simultaneously disaggregate and capture different organizational relationships that exist within 
SC networks. The netchain approach developed by Lazzarini et al., (2001) incorporates SC and 
network analyses. Both represent different facets of organizational relationships since they are 
characterized by unique types of interdependencies. The netchain perspective suggests the design 
of interdependencies as the foundation for the formulation of organizational SC network 
strategies. SCs are characterized by “sequential” interdependence emphasizing vertical ties in 
which the output of certain SC actors serves as input for other (dependent) actors. Supply 
networks are characterized by “reciprocal” interdependence emphasizing horizontal ties in which 
actors collaborate with their competitors in the same vertical ties. Horizontal relationships 
involve strong social ties, dense networks, value co-creation and collective learning.  
Netchain explicitly differentiates between vertical and horizontal relationships (Lazzarini et al., 
2001), but does not include relationships with actors who are not actively part of creating and 
transporting the product. In this regard, we further take a cue from the stakeholder theory to add 
lateral ties (Freeman, 1984) which depict network cooperation between SC actors and external 
stakeholders. The general notion of stakeholder relationship is for organizations to pay attention 
to all and only relationships that affect and are affected by organization’s achievements. Thus, 
lateral networks could exist to pressurize actors or to address complex problems by enhancing the 





(Freeman, 1984). This is evident in the top-down lateral relationships between SC actors and 
supporting external actors in many African food systems. Following the netchain approach, an 
analytical connection between SC and network analyses exists, suggesting that managers 
consider the nature of vertical coordination before making decisions on horizontal and lateral 
relationships (Lazzarini et al., 2001). Overall, based on these theories, we developed the 
“Contingency-Netchain-Performance (CNP) framework” (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Research framework integrating the contingent RBT and netchain approach 
Source: Own elaboration based on Otter et al., (2014)
 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
Based on the theoretical elaborations in Chapter 2, and the concepts adapted from De Clercq et 
al., (2016); Otter et al., (2014) and Wang et al., (2015), we carefully define external and internal 
contingencies, organizational structures, and performance constructs to have meaningful results. 
3.3.1 Effects of external contingencies on organizational SC network relationships 
Largely, organizational relationships in food SCs depend on the general business environment 
such as market situations, trust, technologies, regulations and legal framework, and power 
relations. Definition of external business environments can be obtained from the perception of 
decision-makers, in this case, smallholders. For the smallholders in developing countries’ food 
sectors, more specifically in the Nigerian fishery sector, four predominant external contingencies 
(market turbulence, technological advancement, distrust and power asymmetry) were identified 
from past literature (Arora et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2004; Otter et al., 2014) and a qualitative 
pre-study. 
The term “market turbulence” refers to the rate of change in market forces, prices and customers’ 





erupts from production and market uncertainty that could strain logistics and quality management 
and be transferred across SC tiers (Figure A3.1) (Aramyam et al., 2006). Turbulent markets 
increasingly make predictions of supply, demand, and market trends difficult, disrupting actors’ 
production and delivery schedules and increasing transaction costs. Actors facing turbulent 
markets are expected to manage this by intensifying their organizational SC network structures 
(Wang et al., 2015). Associated uncertainties and risks in highly turbulent markets can be 
mollified by enhancing information flow through the formation of (i) hybrid relationships that is 
centered on streamlining operations and logistics with trading partners, though could reduce 
autonomous adaptability and; (ii) closer network of horizontal and lateral relationships with 
competitors and supporting external actors, respectively (Reardon, 2015; Williamson, 1979).  
H1a: Perceived market turbulence positively influence the tightness of vertical relationships 
H2a: Perceived market turbulence positively influence the closeness of horizontal relationships 
H3a: Perceived market turbulence positively influence the closeness of lateral relationships 
Technological progress captures the rate of technological advances in the industry (Autry et al., 
2010; De Clercq et al., 2016). In this study, technological progress is only considered for the 
production tier due to the fast technological progress with regards to shifting towards outboard 
engines with different capacities, driven by input market development and consumer demand 
(Figure 3.2). Frequent updates and volatile changes of technologies and degree of innovation 
increase the degree of asset specificity and the investment costs to adapt operations and, thus, 
might render existing SC network structures ineffectually. Smallholder producers would respond 
by either agglomerating, tightening organizational relationships, synchronizing and imitating 
competitor’s activities and/or jointly securing and operating technology (Autry et al., 2010). 
H1b
1
: Perceived technological progress positively influences the tightness of vertical relationships 
H2b
1
: Perceived technological progress positively influences the closeness of horizontal relationships 
H3b
1






Figure 3.2: Research model with hypotheses for producers developed from Otter et al., (2014) 
For shrimp processors, however, distrust levels during their interactions with the middle-men are 
a major contingency rather than technological progress since their activities are conducted 
manually (Figure 3.2). Trust, a reoccurring concept in the SC management literature, depicts the 
levels of confidence in trading partners’ capabilities and actions, which cannot be controlled by 
individual SC actors (Johnston et al., 2004; Kwon & Suh, 2004). The levels of trust determine 
actors’ information exchange behaviors and influence the degree of commitment and 
collaborative-decisions in buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier relationships, thereby facilitating 
complexity in organizational structures (De Clercq et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2004; Otter et al., 
2014). Smallholders often face high distrust levels along SCs which increases behavioral 
uncertainty and risks among trading partners and consequently, higher transaction costs (Barrett 
et al., 2012; Williamson, 1979). From what is known in existing research, smallholders could 
reduce behavioral uncertainty from distrust by forming tighter/closer organizational relationships 
with buyers, producer groups or stakeholders such as public agencies and NGOs to enhance 
reliability and information sharing (Hobbs & Young, 2000; Otter et al., 2014). 
H1b
2
: Perceived distrust positively influences the tightness of vertical relationships 
H2b
2
: Perceived distrust positively influences the closeness of horizontal relationships 
H3b
2






Figure 3.3: Research model with hypotheses for processors developed from Otter et al., (2014) 
Lastly, though vast definitions of power exist in the literature (Otter et al., 2014; Reimann & 
Ketchen, 2017), we define power as the “capacity to effect (or affect) organizational outcome” 
(Mintzberg, 1983). Influential actors in SCs require some sources of power with bargaining 
advantages which are skillfully used to claim higher share of value available in the transactions 
between actors (Reimann & Ketchen, 2017). The globalization and urbanization of food systems 
in developing countries have increased the influence of middlemen, causing an inequitable shift 
in bargaining power and value share to smallholders (Reardon, 2015). As such, the concept of 
power has become important for smallholders, who could make a counter through the formation 
of closer organizational SC networks that allows for better coordination and cooperation among 
actors (Barrett et al., 2012; Mintzberg, 1983; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). 
H1c: Perceived power asymmetry positively influences the tightness of vertical relationships 
H2c: Perceived power asymmetry positively influences the closeness of horizontal relationships 
H3c: Perceived power asymmetry positively influences the closeness of lateral relationships 
3.3.2 Effects of internal contingencies on organizational SC network relationships 
Internal contingencies are disaggregated into tangible and intangible resources (Barney, 2001; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Smallholders in food systems face limited or lack access to tangible resources 





resources rather than capabilities to capture predominant internal contingencies that fulfill the 
VRIO conditions. Smallholders’ age, experience, and collaborative efforts can be proxies for 
human resources, thereby capturing relational capability in a way (Grant, 1991; Wang et al., 
2015). Financial resources originate from smallholders’ access and level of financial capital. 
They are unequally attained by smallholders in developing countries, with most generally 
endowed with low capital-base due to constraints by history and path-dependent strategies which 
makes imitation rather costly (Barrett et al., 2012; FAO, 2017b). This similarly holds for 
smallholders’ experience and reputation, suggesting that these resources are heterogeneously 
distributed and imperfectly mobile across smallholders in this study. Thus, it can be expected that 
smallholders with better human resources would easily access financial capital and combine both 
productive resources to create relatively better performance. Smallholders with human and 
financial resources would be incentivized to form tighter SC networks to reduce production and 
marketing risks, create more values and optimally improve performance (Aragón-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003; Barney, 2001; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014). 
H1d, H2d, and H3d: Human resources positively influence the tightness/closeness of organizational 
relationships 
H1e, H2e, and H3e: Financial resources positively influence the tightness/closeness of organizational 
relationships 
H4: Access to human resources positively influence access to financial resources 
H5a: Strategic human resources positively influence firm performance 
H5b: Strategic financial resources positively influence firm performance 
3.3.3 Effects among different organizational SC network relationships 
Managers’ decisions on the nature of network relationships are not independent of sequentially 
arranged vertical ties (Lazzarini et al., 2001). Though actors that forge tighter but informal 
vertical relationships could overcome some contingencies, this as a standalone coordination 
mechanism might not be sufficient to fit with all contingencies (Donaldson, 2006; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967). Smallholders in developing countries often collectively access input and output 
markets and obtain supplementary market information by forging producer groups/cooperatives. 
Thus, positive links between tighter vertical and closer horizontal relationships are assumed, 
though different findings are plausible in settings where there are fewer market imperfections 
(Lazzarini et al., 2001; Otter et al., 2014). Similarly, closer horizontal relationship is expected to 





major condition to initiate and establish contacts with government agencies, extension agents and 
NGOs in developing countries (Emmanuel et al., 2016; Gramzow et al., 2018). Lateral 
relationships with non-supporting stakeholders are not considered in this study since they are 
under-represented in this local food system. 
H6: Tighter vertical relationships intensify the closeness of horizontal relationships 
H7: Closer horizontal relationships intensify closeness of lateral relationships 
3.3.4 Effects of organizational SC network structures on firms’ performance 
Organizational performance varies with the degree of fit between organizational SC networks and 
external and internal contingencies (Donaldson, 2006; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Tighter 
vertical relationships, a consequence of coordination mechanisms beyond market, guide 
interactions and can help mitigate business uncertainties and overcome market failure 
experienced in many developing countries (Dries et al., 2014; Williamson, 1979). The efficiency 
of smallholders’ internal contingencies to generate competitive advantage can be improved by 
tighter vertical relationships (Barney, 2001; Grant, 1991), which has been found to positively 
influence performance in certain business situations (Leuschner et al., 2013; Otter et al., 2014).  
Further, horizontal relationships afford individual actors to pool their financial and productive 
resources to attain economies of scale in commercializing products and purchasing inputs 
(Lazzarini et al., 2001). Smallholders in developing countries can promote intensification, 
increase market orientation and create values by sharing associated risks and costs collectively 
through producer groups/cooperatives which consequently improve individual performance 
(Gramzow et al., 2018; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). Stakeholders are important in 
organizational structures since they influence the success of business enterprises in modern 
turbulent environments (Freeman, 1984). Lateral relationships with stakeholders are forged to 
strengthen smallholders’ competitiveness in many developing countries by enhancing access to 
public infrastructure, market information, knowledge, and technology (Emmanuel et al., 2016). 
Positive performance effects could become evident for forming closer relationships to well-
functioning institutions, although negative effects from mal-functioning institutions have been 
documented (Otter et al., 2014). 
H8: Tighter vertical relationships positively influence smallholder performance 
H9: Closer horizontal relationships positively influence smallholder performance 





3.4 Research methodology 
This study uses primary cross-sectional data obtained between May and August 2018 in three 
major shrimping states of Nigeria. Data was collected from both artisanal producers and 
processors. Case-specific information for the research design was gathered during a pre-study 
that included three focus group discussions (FGD) and 21 face-to-face interviews with key actors 
such as producers, processors, and experts. 
3.4.1 Sampling 
For the sampling, a multi-stage design was used. Initially, three states representing different 
socio-cultural settings- Lagos, Akwa-Ibom and Ondo- were purposively selected based on their 
high level of shrimping activities. From these states, four shrimping local government areas 
(LGA) - Badagry and Eti-Osa in Lagos, Ibeno in Akwa-Ibom and Ilaje in Ondo state - were 
purposively selected based on the population of artisanal producers and processors and 
concentration of shrimping activities in the areas. A two-stage cluster sampling technique was 
used to randomly pick 20 shrimping communities and the sampling units (-artisanal producers 
and processors) within the four LGA. Lists of shrimping communities as a basis for random 
sampling were constructed with the help of experts during the interviews. In this study, producers 
are defined as business owners (those that own shrimping inputs) and shrimpers (those that lead 
canoes) while processors process and/or market shrimp and prawn. Overall, 643 smallholders 
were sampled and surveyed representing 405 artisanal producers and 238 processors/marketers to 
assess organizational SC network structures across two tiers. 
3.4.2 Data and Sources 
The data were collected using standardized questionnaires for producers and processors designed 
based on a thorough literature review and the qualitative data from the pre-study. The 
questionnaires were pretested with 22 randomly selected producers and processors in two 
shrimping communities. The final versions were applied via face-to-face interviews by 10 
intensively trained local enumerators, using tablets with “Sawtooth Software”. The producers’ 
and processors’ questionnaires comprised eleven and six sections, respectively from which 
information on contingencies, organizational relationships, and performance constructs was 
requested. 5-point Likert-scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, continuous 
and dummy variables were used for these constructs. Table A3.1 and Table A3.2 present 





Performance indicators have been categorized into financial and non-financial/operational 
measurements (Aramyan et al., 2007), capturing four indicators: “efficiency”, “flexibility”, 
“responsiveness” and “food quality”. These measures are crucial to assess the success of 
activities and decisions, yet there is no consensus on performance metrics in the literature 
(Aramyan et al., 2007). Smallholders often aim at achieving own marketing performance 
standards depending on product and marketing strategy, making operationalization of their 
performances also very complex. Most relevant studies have focused on single and/or diverse 
performance measures (Johnston et al., 2004; Kayser et al., 2015; Otter et al., 2014), which limits 
the reliability and generalizability of findings across tiers and SCs. This research uses multiple 
“efficiency” indicators, namely; quantity caught/processed, gross margin, profit and cash at hand 
(business liquidity) as measures of smallholders’ long-term and temporal performances, thereby 
increasing the reliability and validity of our analysis (Zeithaml et al., 1988) and allowing for 
comparison across tiers.  
3.4.3 Analytical method 
We take advantage of a second generational research approach by employing a variance-based 
SEM to analyze the disaggregated data. Variance-based SEM is generally suitable to test 
complex explorative research models with several latent variables/constructs relationships 
compared to Covariance-based SEM
 
(Hair et al., 2018). Although the approach is subject to 
potential bias and inconsistent estimations, it offers the methodological robustness to explore the 
interplay between underlying conceptual models and theory (Hair et al., 2018, 2014). The 
structural models were analyzed using SmartPLS Version 3.2.8 software and subjected to several 
measurement reliability and validity tests using item loadings and signs, internal consistency 
reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2018, 2012).  
The reliability tests require all factor loadings to be logically correlated and above 0.4 –the 
threshold for exploratory research (Hair et al., 2012). Factors’ internal consistency is measured 
by composite reliability (CR) values and should be within the range of 0.70 and 0.94 (Hair et al., 
2018) while the convergent validity captured by average variance extracted (AVE) should be 
0.50 or higher (Hair et al., 2014). Discriminant validity test is done by checking the cross-loading 
which must load highest on the construct it is intended to measure (Hair et al., 2018, 2014, 2012). 
Further, the Fornell-Larcker criterion is used to test discriminant validity. The criterion is fulfilled 





structural model (Table A3.4 and Table A3.5) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Other quality criteria 
measures such as multicollinearity using inner and outer VIF values and more efficient 
heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) (Table A3.6) were checked (Hair et al., 2018, 2014). 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive results for producers and processors presented in Table 3.1 indicate that they 
share similar socioeconomic characteristics. The majority of fisher folks are settlers in the 
shrimping communities, with more than 70% having no access to tarmacked roads. An exception 
is fisher folks in Akwa-Ibom state where most (98%) have access to tarmacked roads. They both 
have relatively low start-up capital for the season, N153343.20 (425 USD) for the producers and 
N188000 (522USD) for processors. 
Information on producers’ internal contingencies indicates that most of the producers are young 
(mean 39 years; minimum 18; maximum 85) with an average of 16.41 years of experience and 
little education (average of eight schooling years). With only 21.73% of the subsample having 
access to credit, credit and huge capital-base are rare for producers. The production tier is 
dominated by men although there are few women producers (3.5% of the subsample) who own 
production inputs and employ men as shrimpers (Table 3.1 Column 2). Producers sell more than 
50% of their products to an average of two processors/marketers (minimum 1; maximum 8), 
through informal agreements. This reflects the characteristics of tighter vertical relationships 
rather than open market transactions which are often characterized by numerous trading partners 
(Barrett et al., 2012). 24.44% of the producers belong to producer groups in which they have 
participated averagely for 10 years and collaborated with 5 group members. Only 4.69% of 
producers forge lateral relationships with extension agents and stakeholders who are reportedly 
making fewer visits to shrimping communities (SE5_1) (Table 3.1 and Table A3.1).  
Descriptive information on production shows that 96% of producers use plank canoes equipped 
with outboard engines (OBE), with an average capacity of 40 Horse-power (HP). On average, 
producers shrimp four days/week during the peak season and spend about nine hours/day at sea 
(Table 3.1 Column 4). Generally, they shrimp more during the peak season, spending an average 
of 23 weeks as compared to 11 weeks during the offseason. The overall catch is about 





gross margin earned by producers is N9.87.million/annum
10
 (27420USD/annum; minimum -
204.41; maximum 248888.88).  
Table 3.1: Producer and processor descriptive statistics 
                                                 
10
 N denotes Nigerian Naira currency. Averagely, 1USD=N360 between May and August 2018. Shrimp is a high-valued 
products, however variable costs on engines, canoes and piracy which producers sometimes incurred several times 
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Source: Own elaboration based on PLS-estimations 
Notes: x is presented in Table A3.1 and Table A3.2 while - indicates that variables are not applicable for the corresponding 
respondent. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
The second subsample consists of processors/marketers. Generally, processors/marketers have 
similar socio-economic and institutional characteristics compared to the producers since most 
reside close or are even related. The processors are also young (mean ≈40 years; minimum 15; 
maximum 75) with 15 years of experience and little to no formal education. Similar to producers, 
credit access to processors is rare, with only 24.44% having access. A clear distinction is that the 
processing/marketing tier is dominated by women (Table 3.1 Column 4). The result also shows 
that processors/marketers sell to 6 major buyers (minimum 1; maximum 50), suggesting that they 
seldom sell more than half of their products to several trading partners. 21% of the processors 
participate in women unions with most already participating for an average of 11 years and 
collaborating with 5 union members. Only 0.02% of the processors forge closer lateral 
relationships with extension agents and other stakeholders who find it hard to channel fisher 
folks’ grievance easily to the right authority (SE1_5). Overall, processors forge relatively loose 
vertical relationships, horizontal and lateral relationships compared to the producers. 
Information on processing activities indicates that processors spend an average of six days/week 
to process during the peak season and two days/week during the offseason. Similar to the 
producers, processors process for an average of 23 weeks during the peak season and 11 weeks 
during the offseason (Table 3.1 Column 4). The average quantity processed by the processors is 
518.28kg/week and 123.97kg/week during the peak and off-season, respectively. The quantity 
difference observed between the production and processing tiers ensues because products are 
Higher education 31 7.65 12 5.04 
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fried and/or dried at the processing tier. However, with production and processing durations and 
associated quantities following the same trend indicates the existence of strategic dependencies 
between the tiers. The average gross margin for processors/marketers is N3.79million/annum 
(≈10500USD/annum; minimum 253; maximum 43756.25), confirming that shrimp as a high-
value product. 
3.5.2 PLS-estimations 
All quality criteria depicted in Table A3.1, Table A3.2, and Table A3.3 indicate that the structural 
models are reliable and valid. An exception is vertical relationships in the producer model with 
AVE value of 0.40. Nevertheless, we keep the construct because it satisfies other reliability and 
validity tests and is important for interpretation of the model. To test the hypotheses, the 
coefficient of determination (R
2
), path coefficients and significance levels of the inner models are 
taken into account. In both models, all items significantly load on all constructs while 
endogenous constructs such as financial resources, vertical relationships, horizontal relationships, 
and lateral relationships all show R
2
-values of 0.068, 0.345, 0.149 and 0.136, respectively (Figure 
3.4). Similarly, the endogenous constructs in the processor model indicate corresponding R
2
-
values: financial resources (0.167), vertical relationships (0.270), horizontal relationships (0.153) 
and lateral relationships (0.220). Using the threshold of 0.25 (Hair et al., 2018), these R
2
-values 
are considered low to medium. The complexity of the models, dependency on human perceptions 
and overall explorative nature of the analysis could be the reasons for these R
2 
values. However, 
they are larger than what was obtained in extant literature thus, can be considered satisfactory. 
Hypothesis testing for production tier 
The results from the producer model show that external environments largely influence 
organizational structures in the Nigerian shrimp and prawn SC. All external environments 
significantly influence tighter vertical relationships: perceived market turbulence (H1a 
confirmed: 0.347***), technological progress (H1b
1
 confirmed: 0.102**), and power asymmetry 
(H1c confirmed: 0.301***). Contrarily, internal resources (H1d and H1e) do not significantly 
influence producers’ vertical relationships. Furthermore, while contingency factors such as 
perceived market turbulence (H2a: -0.113*) and power asymmetry (H2c: -0.117*); and internal 
financial resources (H2e: -0.090**) decreases the closeness of horizontal relationships, human 
resources (H2d confirmed: 0.362***) positively increase its closeness. No significant influence 





horizontal relationships. The closeness of producers’ lateral relationships is positively influenced 
by external environments such as perceived technological advancement (H3b
1
 confirmed: 
0.100**) and power asymmetry (H3c confirmed: 0.205***), and closer horizontal relationships 
(H7 confirmed: 0.174***). Conversely, financial resources significantly influenced by inherent 
human resources (H4 confirmed: 0.261***) were observed to negatively influence the tightness 
of lateral relationships (H3e: -0.205***), while no significant influence was found from 
perceived market dynamism and human resources. 
We observed that producers’ shrimping performance is directly positively influenced by access to 
and utilization of different strategic resources- human (H5a confirmed: 0.249***) and financial 
resources (H5b confirmed: 0.320***). Organizationally, the formation of tighter vertical 
relationships by producers with their trading partners (H8 confirmed: 0.091**) ensures the 
attainment of competitive advantage. This indicates that the highest influence on small-scale 
producers’ shrimping performances ensue when producers can access and combine valuable and 
rare resources, and complemented by a positive performance effect when external contingencies 
are addressed with tighter vertical relationships. Overall, these endogenous constructs contribute 
22.7% of the variance in producers’ shrimping performances. No significant influence was found 
from horizontal and lateral relationships. 
 
Figure 3.4: Producer model showing path coefficients 






Figure 3.5: Processor model showing path coefficients 
Source: Estimated from survey data. Significance level: ***P<0.01; **P<0.05; *P<0.1. 
Hypothesis testing for processor tier 
According to the results from the processor model in Figure 3.5, external contingency factors 
have greater significant influence on processors’ organizational SC network structures. Perceived 
market turbulence (H1a confirmed: 0.229***), distrust (H2a confirmed: 0.151**), power 
asymmetry (H3a confirmed: 0.243***) significantly increase the tightness of vertical 
relationships. While access to financial resources increases the tightness of vertical relationships 
(H1e confirmed: 0.154***) in this case, no significant influence was found from human 
resources. Additionally, perceived distrust (H2b
2
: -0.155**) decreases the closeness of horizontal 
relationships while internal contingencies such as human (H2d confirmed: 0.176**) and financial 
resources (H2e confirmed: 0.195**) and tighter vertical relationships (H6 confirmed: 0.156**) 
increase its tightness. No significant influence was found from perceived market turbulence and 
power asymmetry on horizontal relationships. However, lateral relationships are found to be 
positively influenced by closer horizontal relationships (H7 confirmed: 0.256***), external 
contingencies such as perceived market turbulence (H3a: -0.143**), power asymmetry (H3c 
confirmed: 0.332***) and internal contingencies such as financial resources (H3e confirmed: 
0.133**). Contingencies such as distrust and human resources do not significantly influence the 
formation of closer lateral relationships. Conversely, human resources (H4 confirmed: 0.139**) 





Results from the structural model indicate that processors’ processing performances are directly 
influenced by closer horizontal relationships (H9 confirmed: 0.303***), lateral relationships 
(H10: -0.158***) and human resources (H5a confirmed: 0.214***) whereas direct significant 
influence from vertical relationships and financial resources were not found. For the processors, 
the highest direct influence on processing performance is from closer horizontal relationships 
indicating the importance of organizational relationships in attaining competitive advantage. 




3.6.1 External contingencies and organizational SC network relationships 
The study examines how four external contingencies influence organizational SC network 
relationships and performance. The results offer several important theoretical implications, 
particularly regarding actors’ contingency organizational adaptation process. Interestingly, our 
findings found that tighter vertical relationship is a critical factor for producers and processors to 
cope with all external contingencies. Such a result may be explained by the fact that external 
contingencies create different levels of operational uncertainties that require improved knowledge 
and information flow, by enhancing operational routine and coordination through tighter 
supplier-buyer relationships (Donaldson, 2001; Flynn et al., 2016). Furthermore, the influence of 
external contingencies on horizontal and lateral relationships are rather mixed across tiers but 
indicates the need for fit from both hierarchical coordination and network structures. A potential 
explanation for the mixed finding could be that the type, stability and significance of external 
contingencies differ across tiers, suggesting that smallholders would require different levels and 
types of organizational change to successfully cope with all external contingencies (Donaldson, 
2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Zeithaml et al., 1988). Besides, market and technological 
turbulence, power asymmetry and distrust arise due to lack of information and unclear or 
ambiguous business environment (Flynn et al., 2016). Hence, smallholders would forge closer 
relationships with competitors and extension agents to earn better knowledge and information, 
and innovative support needed to successfully cope with these external contingencies. 
Surprisingly, we found a loose effect of market turbulence on horizontal relationships in the 
producer model. Such a result can be intuitively explained by the fact that better-informed 
producers are rationally bound from sharing input and output market information with their 
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competitors in highly turbulent markets. Also, shrimp stocks are “common goods” which further 
exacerbate competition among fisher folks in the presence of fluctuating supply and demand. 
This forces individuals to take faster actions than rivals and avoid information sharing to 
maximize individual capture and sales (Arora et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2015). In both producer 
and processor models, power asymmetry tends to lead to closer lateral relationships while market 
turbulence results in loose lateral relationships. The findings that power asymmetry and distrust 
lead to loose horizontal but tighter lateral relationships in the processor model is surprising but 
confirms what Otter et al., (2014) also found. Processors facing high distrust could manage 
dependency and obtain better information to overcome the contingency by forging tighter vertical 
interactions with traders and closer relationships with extension agents (Flynn et al., 2016; Kwon 
& Suh, 2004). Such an organizational adaptation strategy would also reposition both producers’ 
and processors’ bargaining situations by facilitating informal supplier-buyer interactions and 
build their negotiating power and security through supports from extension agents and NGOs 
(Otter et al., 2014). Intrinsically, cooperative groups and relationships with extension agents and 
NGOs allow for efficient knowledge and information exchanges and decentralized decisions for 
innovation, making them complementary to supplier-buyer relationships in dealing with unstable 
external contingencies (Donaldson, 2001). Although different predominant external 
contingencies were considered across tiers, the results highlight that their influence on 
organizational structures follows the same contingency logic.  
3.6.2 Internal contingencies and organizational SC network relationships 
In line with our hypotheses, we found a direct influence of smallholders’ resources on 
organizational SC network structures. Both human and financial resources resulted in closer 
organizational SC network structures for processors; for producers, human resources only tighten 
horizontal relationships while financial resources loosen horizontal and lateral relationships. The 
levels of financial capital among producers are generally low hence, those with higher financial 
capital will tend to forge effective organizational strategies that maximize their resource-based 
values (Wang et al., 2015). Similarly, financial resources loaded by credit access in the processor 
model involve some levels of covariant risk and information asymmetry, which processors may 
overcome by pursuing more prudent managerial and organizational strategies. These results 





truly matter for the formation of closer organizational SC network structures (Brush & Artz, 
1999). 
Furthermore, we found that both human and financial resources are crucial in fostering firms’ 
performance directly in the producer model. Surprisingly, only human resources significantly 
improve performance in the processor model. This is probably because available credit facilities 
are costly (interest rates >10%) and processors’ investment intensity is lower making credit less 
valuable for improving processors’ margins. Hence, credit access in the processor model may not 
have fulfilled the VRI conditions of “firm resources” as suggested by RBT (Grant, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Confirming our hypothesis, we found that smallholders with huge resource-
base tend to improve performance by leveraging through their organizational SC network 
structures, such as horizontal relationships (Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). For example, 
experienced, older smallholders tend to rely on and forge longer collaborative relationships that 
enhance their knowledge and information and improve their chances of competitive advantage 
(Wang et al., 2015).  
3.6.3 Influence among different organizational SC network relationships 
Confirming the netchain proposition, we found that there is influence among the different 
relationships within organizational SC network structures (Lazzarini et al., 2001). Against what 
Otter et al., (2014) found, our PLS-estimations suggest that tighter vertical relationships foster 
closer horizontal relationships in the Nigerian local food system, although no significant 
influence was found in the producer model. There are several reasons for this result stemming 
from dynamic organizational and institutional peculiarities of the Nigerian cases. First, fisher 
folks operate in unregulated and informal markets with relatively lower bargaining power, which 
buyers generally seek to take advantage of. Hence, fisher folks tend to rely on information and 
support from cooperative groups to counter bargaining power of influential buyers (Barrett et al., 
2012; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). Second, fisher folks located in isolated coastal areas face 
high spatial market price differentials, which they overcome by leveraging on economies of scale 
and positive network externalities of cooperative groups to pool inputs and coordinate shrimping 
and marketing activities at lower transaction costs (Udong et al., 2010). Third, social ties 
intensify market information exchange which fisher folks use to complement tighter vertical 
relationships in overcoming uncertainties from changing market and technological uncertainties 





making which are crucial for perfecting shrimping routines to effectively utilize available human 
and financial resources and optimize performance (Grant, 1991). Committed smallholders that 
are mutually-dependent on buyers tend to reduce associated risks and transaction costs by 
attaining more market information through collective actions (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). 
Furthermore, the significant positive influence of closer horizontal relationships on lateral 
relationships suggests that smallholders forge horizontal relationships to facilitate more visits by 
extension agents and NGOs who serve as a medium for them to pass their grievances to the 
government (Otter et al., 2014). This also confirms the interdependency of different 
organizatzional relationships (Lazzarini et al., 2001), highlighting the organizational adaptation 
pathway through which smallholders can cope with changing contingencies (Donaldson, 2001). 
3.6.4 Organizational relationships and performance of mutually-dependent producers 
and processors 
We found that tighter vertical relationships positively influence producers’ shrimping 
performance, indicating that the contingency theory holds such that there is a fit between the 
contingencies and the organization variable (Donaldson, 2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). This 
means that the greater degree of “relational governance” between producers and processors fits 
well with predominant external and internal contingencies in the production segment. The 
“relational governance” fosters better exchange of implicit product information and consequently 
allows for effective coordination of producer-processor activities at lower costs. Although the 
influence is relatively small, the result confirms the effectiveness of tighter supplier-buyer 
relationships in fitting producers’ contingencies and improving performance (Dries et al., 2014; 
Leuschner et al., 2013). This finding further justifies our rationale for multi-tier analysis that 
includes the processing tier (Mena et al., 2013). 
In the processor model, financial performance is positively influenced by closer horizontal 
relationships, through processing groups. Consistent with contingency theory, the intermediation 
of processing groups fits well with processors’ contingencies such as turbulent market, power 
inequality, distrust and resources (section 3.0) and is thus, crucial in improving margins 
(Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008; Otter et al., 2014; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). The 
insignificant effect of producers’ horizontal relationships on performance might be due to a 






Quite surprisingly and contrary to our hypothesis (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3), producers’ and 
processors’ lateral relationships with external actors are rather ineffective in improving 
smallholders’ performances. Findings in existing literature have been rather mixed for different 
plausible reasons (Otter et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). In line with the contingency theory, this 
suggests that there is a misfit between fisher folks’ external contingency levels and the lateral 
relationships, resulting in low performance (Donaldson, 2001). Extension agents and public 
agencies in many African agrifood systems often face several institutional challenges such as 
inconsistent financial support and training that limit their capacity to support smallholders 
(Emmanuel et al., 2016). A misfit between smallholders’ contingencies and lateral relationships 
could erupt from these challenges since they inhibit the overall innovation process and 
knowledge exchanges needed to support smallholders’ organizational adaptation process. It is 
also plausible that the opportunity costs of time spent by smallholders in relating to external 
actors outweigh associated benefits, especially since fisher folks face high market turbulence that 
spur competition. This could cause misfit and lower smallholders’ performance, particularly their 
supply, demand and margins which are the dependent variables in this study. 
3.7 Conclusions and implications 
The need to further understand the influence of external and internal contingencies on 
organizational SC network structures and performance requires a comprehensive framework and 
analysis. This study presents the “Contingency-Netchain-Performance” (CNP) framework 
developed from the conceptual integration of contingent RBT (Brush & Artz, 1999) and the 
netchain approach (Lazzarini et al., 2001) to comprehensively capture influences between 
predominant SC contingencies, organizational network structures across multi-tiers and 
performance.  
The empirical application of the CNP framework on large samples of smallholder producers and 
processors in the Nigerian shrimp and prawn sector indicates its applicability in the context of 
highly dynamic agrifood systems of a developing country. The research models explain 22.7% 
and 16.7% of the variance of producers’ and processors’ performance, which is an improvement 
to the existing study by Otter et al., (2014). We found strong influences from external 
contingencies on complex organizational SC network structures, in which smallholders tend to 
forge closer hierarchical coordination and network relationships to cope with their contingencies 





and processors in which they have several organizational adaptation strategies that cut across 
multi-tiers to deal with their highly dynamic contingencies. Furthermore, the simultaneous 
integration of smallholders’ resource-base (Barney, 2001; Grant, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) as  
internal contingency that influences SC organizational network (Lazzarini et al., 2001) to adapt 
and fit (Donaldson, 2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) and maximize resource-based 
performances, represents one of the main findings in this study.  
The result supports RBT proponent and suggests that the utilization of strategic productive 
resources under fitting organizational SC network structures are crucial for small-scale producers 
and processors to attain and sustain competitive advantage (Otter et al., 2014). Additionally, the 
dawning step to understanding the association among the different organizational relationships, 
provides evidence that smallholders in developing countries’ agrifood systems are responsive and 
shifting towards complex network structures to fit changing market turbulence, technological 
progress, power imbalance and distrust (Barrett et al., 2012; Reardon, 2015). Several implications 
emerged from these results and are addressed to researchers, practitioners, and policymakers 
involved in developing interventions for the improvement of performances within dynamic 
industries. 
The CNP framework developed in this study offers a valid and richer explanation of the 
associations among the different constructs thus, it might be important for future applications in 
comparable industries like textile and retailing industries with dynamic external and internal 
contingencies, where actors continuously adapt organizational structures to fit and maximize 
performance. Instead of defining external and internal contingencies as moderator/mediator 
variables (Arora et al., 2016; Brandon-Jones et al., 2014; De Clercq et al., 2016; Wang et al., 
2015), the CNP framework suggests direct link to organizational SC networks (Donaldson, 
2001). With this, the empirical model may offer comprehensive results regarding the direct 
influence of both contingencies on organizational adaptation process. Since smallholders now 
forge complex network structures, the research framework may further provide a nascent and 
flexible basis to simultaneously test the influence of different levels of organizational structure 
variables on smallholders’ performance. 
Policymakers should focus on stimulating producers and processors to forge tighter informal 
vertical relationships among themselves as they create best fit for producers’ contingencies 





between producers and processors tends to provide effective coordination and information 
exchanges to deal with some contingencies, however, not enough for certain contingencies such 
as technological progress and power imbalance which require that both actors form closer 
complementary relationships with their competitors, extension agents and NGOs. Policymakers 
and NGOs should, therefore, attach greater importance to organize producers and processors into 
cooperative groups to ensure joint learning, and effective dissemination of information to fisher 
folks (Otter et al., 2014). Particularly, processors should simultaneously be encouraged to forge 
closer horizontal relationships to improve their capabilities and market performance as well as 
that of producers (Dries et al., 2014; FAO, 2017b; Leuschner et al., 2013; Otter et al., 2014). 
Also, policymakers and NGOs would need to provide producers and processors with necessary 
productive resources such as capital and training to improve the competitiveness of fisher folks in 
Nigeria. Even though credit access is generally seen by researchers and policymakers as strategic 
for smallholders, our research findings suggest that the stringent and unfavorable repayment 
conditions attached to both formal and informal credit access and use in developing countries are 
too costly (Reardon, 2015; Udong et al., 2010).While the role of external actors to support 
smallholders has been highlighted, the negative effects of lateral relationships suggest that 
external actors are inefficient in upgrading smallholders’ activities to improve performance. 
Public policymakers should, therefore, take the results as new proofs that public institutions still 
need institutional overhaul and resetting (Emmanuel et al., 2016).  
The scope of this study could have been limited by its reliance on perceived assessment of 
concepts thus; future studies can obtain real-time data to make an objective assessment of the 
concepts. Although the CNP framework was successfully developed and tested, explanatory 
power of performance captured by R
2
-values is still relatively low based on Hair et al., (2018). 
Future studies should further develop the framework by considering intangible resources such as 
capabilities to find out if intangible resources lead to organizational adaptation and consequently 
better performance. Also, to capture different institutional settings across sectors and countries, 
the framework can be applied to other sectors and industrialized countries characterized by 
different levels of contingency dynamism and types of internal and external contingencies such as 
labor constraints, and more formalized value chains. The organizational structures in this 





examine the simultaneous influence on each other and different performance measures such as 
food quality and sustainability.  
To understand whether organizational strategies in one tier simultaneously influence 
organizational decisions in subsequent SC tiers, multi-tier SC management theory (Mena et al., 
2013) can be integrated into the CNP framework to link and simultaneously test mutually 
dependent tiers, using for instance simulation modeling. Lastly, PLS-SEM applied in this study 
cannot adequately control for the endogenous influence of internal contingencies on performance. 
Thus, the associations between contingencies, organizational structures and performance should 
be further investigated using different research methods such as AMOS and LISREL and other 
statistically stringent approaches. 
Appendix 3 
Table A3.1: Reliability and discriminant validity for the producer model 































































Performance    0.85 0.65 
FE4c1 On average, how much cash in N did you have at hand per week 




GrossMargina Revealed Gross Margin in the last 12 months in N 9871434 9162106 0.80   
TotMargin_FE1a Stated margin in the last 12 months in N 9790000 1.14e+07 0.90   
Vertical Relationships 
   
0.80 0.40 





VR5_1b6 More than 50% of the total product processed/marketed by at 




VR6_1b6 I am more inclined to sell my product to processors/marketers 




HAS2_1b6 I have very close relationship with my product processors 4.47 0.65 0.62   
HAS3_1b6 I have long term relationships with my customers 4.44 0.63 0.68   






   
0.94 0.89 
HOR1d5 Are you a member of any fish producer group? 0.24 0.43 0.94   
HOR3c5 Longest time spent as member of fish producer group in years? 10.20 7.23 0.94   
Lateral Relationships    0.88 0.79 





SE6_1b6 Our grievances now easily get to the public agencies 1.85 1.06 0.87   
Perceived market turbulence 
   
0.78 0.55 
MT3_1b3 The cost of constructing dugout canoe/plank has increased 










 MT7_1b3 Cost of fuel has been unstable of recent 3.70 1.20 0.76   
Perceived technological advancement 
   
0.84 0.51 





ASS2_1b6 Shrimpers now need outboard engine to quickly land catches 4.66 0.54 0.67   
TA1_1b2 Recently, outboard engine has become more important for 









TA3_1b2 There are higher outboard engine capacities compared to the 




Perceived power asymmetry 
   
0.87 0.57 
PA1_1b5 Certain shrimpers often supply the largest quantity of products 




PA2_1b5 Certain producers have very high reputation in our industry 4.24 0.78 0.65   





PA4_1b6 Certain processors/marketers understand the business inter-










   
0.82 0.61 
AGEd4  Age of respondent (in years)? 39.00 11.25 0.77   
EMPFISHd4  Did you employ other fishers in the last 12 months? 0.60 0.49 0.76   
SHRIMPYEARc4  How many years has respondent been shrimping? 16.41 10.84 0.81   
Financial Resources 
   
1.00 1.00 
CAPITALc4  What was the start-up capital before the start of the season? 153343.20 166074.40 1.00   
Source: Own elaboration based on PLS-estimations 
Note: aCalculated from direct measures; bStatements scaled from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree; cContinuous; dDummy. 
Based on 1(Aramyan et al., 2007); 2(Autry et al., 2010); 3(De Clercq et al., 2016); 4(Grant, 1991); 5(Otter et al., 2014); 6(Pre-study)   
Table A3.2: Reliability and discriminant validity for the processor model 





























































Performance    0.78 0.54 
GM_12a1 Revealed gross margin in the last 12 months in N 3790000 3160000 0.71   
Profit_12a1 Stated margin in the last 12 months in N 3060000 3250000 0.69   
QUANPROC~ c1c1 How much shrimp and prawn (in kg) is processed/marketed per 





   0.85 0.66 
VR4_1b6 I sell more than 50% of my total processed/marketed product to 




VR5_1b6 More than 50% of the product traded/processed by at least one 




VR6_1b6 I am more inclined to sell my product to customers with whom 





   0.78 0.65 
HOR2c5 How many fish processing/marketing groups do you belong to? 1.08 0.27 0.73   






   0.88 0.79 





SE6_1b6 Our grievances now easily get to the public agencies 1.82 0.96 0.86   
Perceived market turbulence 
   0.81 0.59 
MT1_1b3 Sometimes our customer’s demand increases 




MT5_1b3 Our competitors in nearby villages do reduce the price 










   0.75 0.60 
T3_1b5 People who buy shrimp and prawn from me do not trust the 









Perceived power asymmetry 
   0.82 0.53 
PA1_1b5 Certain processors/marketers often sell the largest 




PA3_1b5 Certain processors/marketers are more knowledgeable about the 




PA4_1b5 Certain processors/marketers understand the business 




PA10_1b5 To me, customers who buy shrimp and prawn from me are 
more influential along the supply chain than me 
3.52 1.01 0.70   
Human Resources 
   0.78 0.55 
AGEc4 What is respondent's age (in years)? 39.96 10.81 0.84   
EMPPROCESSd4 Did you employ other processors in the last 12 months? 0.65 0.48 0.50   
PROCESSYEARc4 How many years has respondent been processing/marketing 
shrimp and prawn? 
15.12 9.74 0.85   
Financial Resources 
   1.00 1.00 
CREDITd4 Could you obtain credit if you needed it? 0.24 0.43 1.00   
Source: Own elaboration based on PLS-estimations 
Note: aCalculated from direct measures; bStatements scaled from 1=strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree; cRatio; dDummy. 
Based on 1(Aramyan et al., 2007); 2(Autry et al., 2010); 3(De Clercq et al., 2016); 4(Grant, 1991); 5(Otter et al., 2014); 6(Pre-study)   












Producer model Passed Passed Passed, except 
vertical relationships 
Passed Passed 
Processor model Passed Passed Passed Passed Passed 
Source: Own elaboration based on PLS-estimations  





































































































































Market Performance 0.81         
Vertical Relationships 0.14 0.63        





Lateral Relationships -0.03 0.13 0.18 0.89      
Perceived market turbulence 0.13 0.47 -0.12 0.02 0.74     
Perceived technological advancement 0.01 0.35 -0.02 0.21 0.24 0.71    
Perceived power asymmetry 0.03 0.47 -0.11 0.21 0.31 0.55 0.76   
Human Resources 0.34 0.08 0.34 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.78  
Financial Resources 0.40 0.10 -0.02 -0.17 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.26 1.00 
Source: Own elaboration based on PLS-estimations 


























































































































Market Performance 0.73         
Vertical relationships 0.13 0.81        
Horizontal relationships 0.31 0.22 0.8       
Lateral relationships -0.04 0.17 0.32 0.89      
Perceived market turbulence 0.24 0.4 0.17 0.08 0.77     
Perceived distrust 0.00 0.3 -0.02 0.09 0.34 0.78    
Perceived power asymmetry 0.09 0.41 0.19 0.34 0.49 0.21 0.73   
Human resources 0.26 -0.05 0.2 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.74  
Financial Resources 0.06 0.2 0.24 0.25 -0.01 0.13 0.14 0.14 1.00 
Source: Own elaboration based on PLS-estimations  













































































































































Producer model          
External Relationships 0.00 
        Financial Resources 0.19 
        Horizontal Relationships 0.22 0.02 
       Human Resources 0.15 0.29 0.45 
      Market performance 0.08 0.46 0.11 0.44 
     Perceived market turbulence 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.22 
    Perceived power asymmetry 0.26 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.48 
   Technological progress 0.26 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.40 0.78 
  Vertical relationships 0.17 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.70 0.58 0.47 0.00 
Processor model          
External Relationships 0.00         
Financial Resources 0.29         
Horizontal Relationships 0.53 0.34        
Human Resources 0.13 0.18 0.40       
Market performance 0.13 0.08 0.62 0.45      
Perceived market turbulence 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.11     
Perceived power asymmetry 0.17 0.10 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.71    
Perceived distrust 0.46 0.15 0.31 0.15 0.14 0.50 0.71   
Vertical relationships 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.20 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.00 















4 Can producer groups improve technical efficiency among artisanal 




Over the last two decades, scholars and governments in developing countries have widely 
recognized the formation of producer groups as a valuable institutional arrangement for 
smallholders to deal with complex production and marketing constraints and dynamic business 
environments. With scarce evidence from fishery subsectors and self-selection into producer 
groups, we examine the selectivity-corrected role of fisher groups in improving shrimpers’ 
capture and technical efficiency, using recent survey data from artisanal shrimpers in Nigeria. We 
apply Greene’s (2010) stochastic production frontier model and propensity score matching to 
account for selection bias from both observable and unobservable factors. The empirical results 
reveal that technical efficiency scores remain consistently higher for members regardless of how 
biases were corrected. Although technical efficiency scores for members and nonmembers tend to 
be overestimated if selectivity is not appropriately controlled, our findings suggest that 
participation in fisher groups is positively related to increases in capture and technical efficiency. 
Keywords: Technical efficiency, Greene’s Stochastic Production Frontier, Propensity Score 
Matching, Selection bias, Nigerian fisher group 
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Over the last two decades, smallholders in developing countries have increasingly faced 
significant transactional and contingency challenges in food supply chains due to complex 
production and marketing constraints and changes in economic, financial, environmental and 
sociopolitical structures (Chagwiza et al., 2016; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Orsi et al., 2017). The 
formation of producer groups/cooperatives is widely viewed as a valuable institutional 
arrangement for smallholders to cope with or overcome such production and market 
inefficiencies (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Markelova et al., 2009; Markelova & Mwangi, 2010; 
Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). This is grounded in the growing scientific evidence that producer 
groups have positive effects on smallholder’s economic performance and welfare (Ainembabazi 
et al., 2017; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Mojo et al., 2017; Ochieng et al., 
2018; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). Smallholders that act collectively can reduce the 
transaction costs of accessing input and output markets and technologies, mitigate entry barriers 
to high-value markets, enhance their negotiating and marketing power, and obtain necessary 
market information (Markelova et al., 2009). 
Despite several empirical studies promoting collective action among smallholders, only a few 
studies have empirically investigated the productivity and technical effectiveness of producer 
groups. It remains unclear if smallholders can channel these advantages to improve their 
immediate production and technical abilities, which are the keystones for several other aspects of 
economic performance. Furthermore, producer groups have also been documented to have 
insignificant and negative effects in other studies (Bernard & Taffesse, 2012; Bernard et al., 
2008; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Hellin et al., 2009). The mixed findings are 
attributable to producer groups’ heterogeneity, as well as biased and inconsistent estimations as a 
result of selectivity. Concerns over selectivity have been stressed in productivity and empirical 
economics literature over the last two decades (Greene, 2010). However, many studies
12
 
published on productivity and efficiency neglect selection bias (Abate et al., 2014; Gedara et al., 
2012; Hailu et al., 2015). Only Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai (2018) and Ma and colleagues 
(2018) have applied this approach in the context of group membership effects on productivity and 
efficiency in farm-based subsectors. Empirical evidence on the effect of group membership in 
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 Other studies account for selection bias by employing propensity score matching (PSM) and counterfactual 
endogenous switching regression (ESR) methods. However, solely using these approaches is marred by their 
inability to capture unobservable characteristics and produce consistent estimates due to misspecifications of the 





nonfarm-based subsectors is relatively scarce, particularly in the fishing subsector. Until now, the 
proportion of fishing households in formal producer groups remains relatively low, while 
artisanal fishers remain one of the most socially disadvantaged within African’s agricultural 
sector (FAO, 2007). Consequently, most African fishery subsectors become relatively 
underdeveloped and non-commercialized, finding it hard to connect with profitable, high-value 
markets (Kobayashi et al., 2015). So far, little is known about the role of fisher group 
membership in improving the technical abilities and economic performance of artisanal fishers. 
On this account, the objective of this study is to examine the selectivity-corrected role of fisher 
groups on the capture and technical efficiency (TE) of artisanal shrimpers in Africa. This article 
contributes in two ways to the literature: First, we estimate an unbiased effect of group 
membership on the capture and TE of artisanal fishers using an approach that combines Greene's 
(2010) stochastic production frontier (SPF) method and propensity score matching (PSM) to 
correct for selection bias. This method allows us to account for: (i) different technological sets for 
members and nonmembers; and (ii) sample selection bias from observed and unobserved factors. 
Consequently, unbiased TE and technical change effects attributable to group membership are 
estimated (Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012). Second, we identify factors that influence artisanal 
shrimpers’ decisions to belong to fisher groups using recent data obtained from treatment (n = 
95) and control (n = 258) groups of shrimpers in the Nigerian shrimp and prawn
13
 subsector.  
The Nigerian shrimp subsector is a primary example of a fishery sector that remains 
underdeveloped and with low participation in fisher groups. Despite the government’s strong 
political will to encourage agricultural cooperatives and collective action through various policy 
instruments,
14
 no cross-cutting program has been proposed to specifically encourage groups 
among fishing smallholders (WorldFish, 2018). Enhanced fishing efficiency through fisher 
groups could help to improve artisanal fishers’ competitiveness to concurrently commercialize, 
target profitable high-value markets and deal with adverse economic conditions. Thus, findings 
from this kind of study are long overdue and crucial to provide implementable policy insights for 
governments, stakeholders, agribusiness firms and policy analysts who seek to support artisanal 
fishers in the case country and other similar African countries. 
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Generally, known as shrimp (Kobayashi et al., 2015). 
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Basically introduced to propagate farmer groups through the Farm Settlement Scheme, National Accelerated Food 
Production, Agricultural Development Projects, Agricultural Transformation Agenda in 2011–12 and recently, the 





The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of shrimp production 
and artisanal fisher groups in Nigeria. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework and empirical 
specification. The data and model used, as well as the results and discussion, are presented in 
sections 4 and 5, respectively. The last section presents the concluding remarks and policy 
implications of the study. 
4.2 Shrimp production and artisanal fisher groups in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, shrimp is the most valuable fish product, with an average of 30 metric tonnes annual 
production, accounting for about 37.2% of total agricultural export in the third quarter of 2016  
and contributing about 3-5% to the agriculture share of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Achoja, 2019; NBS, 2016; Olaoye & Ojebiyi, 2018). The continental shelf cuts across the 
southern part of Nigeria and consists of nine coastal states (Ogun, Lagos, Ondo, Edo, Delta, 
Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and Cross River), located along the Atlantic Ocean (Olaoye & 
Ojebiyi, 2018). These states represent the main shrimp producing areas in the country. Of these, 
Ondo  State has the longest coastline, spanning about 180km, while Akwa-Ibom boasts huge 
wholesaling and retailing markets. Shrimp supply is under two production systems, namely, 
capture and aquaculture. The latter is underdeveloped, accounting for less than 5% of total 
domestic production (Achoja, 2019; Zabbey et al., 2010). Capture fishery involves harvesting 
naturally occurring fishery products from the wild by smallholder fishers (artisans) or industrial 
trawlers (fishing companies). While industrial trawlers largely export shrimp products, artisanal 
fishers are important domestically, contributing up to 90% of the total domestic supply (Olaoye 
& Ojebiyi, 2018; Zabbey et al., 2010). Thus, the subsector is dominated by numerous and poor 
artisanal fishermen who dwell in the rural coastal areas of the country. 
The shrimp subsector plays a critical role in economic development in Nigeria and is integral in 
ensuring food security among rural and urban households. Fish, including shrimp, supplies about 
22% of the protein intake and 13kg per capita consumption, consequently dubbed as “rich food 
for the poor” in the country (Olaoye & Ojebiyi, 2018; WorldFish, 2018). However, an increasing 
human population, the spiraling per capital demand for fish resources and the use of traditional 
methods has created a demand-supply gap (Achoja, 2019; Oluwatayo & Adedeji, 2019). To 
increase production and domestic supply and ensure a paradigm shift from the traditional 





various policies tailored to increase productivity and efficiency by encouraging fishers to form 
viable fisher groups. 
Historically, western-type groups/cooperatives were introduced to the Nigerian fishery sector by 
both the government and foreign stakeholders in the 1970s and 1980s during the “Green 
Revolution,” when state-sponsored credit and technical assistance were distributed through 
cooperatives. Thereafter, the National Fadama
15
 Development Project (NFDP) was implemented 
in the 1990s to promote low-cost technology under the World Bank financing program. The 
highlight of this project was the implementation of the second and third NFDP in 2004 and 2008, 
respectively, under a tripartite financial structure that includes the World Bank and federal and 
participating state governments. These projects aim to increase the incomes of farmers and 
fishers
16
 through a community-driven development approach (Alawode & Oluwatayo, 2019; 
Olaoye & Ojebiyi, 2018).  
The political will by the national government to solely aggregate fishers into groups for self-
sufficient production and marketing began in earnest a decade ago. In 2011–2012, the fisheries 
transformation plan was implemented under the Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA). 
ATA was a five-year (2011–2015) project designed to attain self-sufficiency in fishery 
production through aquaculture value chain development, thus reducing net import. ATA’s 
objective was to create an enabling environment for small-scale fish farmers to form clusters and 
to be part of the aquaculture value chain, develop various products along the aquaculture value 
chain, link up markets to consumers and establish, maintain and enforce quality standards. 
Recently, Agriculture Promotion Policy – a five-year (2016–2020) project – was intended to 
refresh strategies adopted in ATA. However, these policies had no concrete national plan to form 
artisanal fishers into groups/clusters, because the focus was on the development of modern export 
chains and the popularization of aquaculture (FMARD, 2011, 2016; Kobayashi et al., 2015). As a 
result, artisanal fishery through capture and localized value chains was neglected. 
Due to a lack of extant literature on Nigerian fisher groups, information about fisher groups is 
obtained from a pre-field study using focus group discussions (FGD) and interviews. The 
information reveals that most of today’s fisher groups in Nigeria are indigenous organizations 
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 Fadama is a Hausa word which means low-lying and flood plain areas characterized by shallow aquifers and 
found along Nigeria's waterways (Alawode & Oluwatayo, 2019). 
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with little or no external support, which are sometimes intertwined, but different from groups of 
extended families (clans), tribes and religious bodies (Zabbey et al., 2010). There are several 
prominent local fisher groups in different fishing communities, particularly in the Lagos and 
Ondo States. These fisher groups are mostly “production-oriented” and inactive in members’ 
marketing activities. The groups have at least four executive members – Chairperson, Vice-
Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer – any one of whom could organize and manage group 
activities. Most shrimpers belong to the Artisanal Fishers Association of Nigeria (ARFAN), a 
national association that has been in existence for over 20 years. This suggests that the ARFAN 
was formed under previous interventions when foreign stakeholders were active in the Nigerian 
fishery sector. ARFAN serves as an important source of information and is active in supporting 
members’ production activities. Similar to other local groups, ARFAN links members to input 
markets and ensures smooth production and transition of products to the processing segment. 
Additionally, the groups advocate for policy supports and interventions for their members by 
engaging government agencies, private businesses and other stakeholders through meetings and 
media. Various stakeholders collaborate with ARFAN to tackle issues such as low capture, water 
pollution from oil companies’ activities and piracy in the Niger-Delta region. However, there is 
no indication that members receive technological assistance through fisher groups. With open 
membership, shrimpers can participate in fisher groups by registering and subsequently paying 
registration and annual dues that differ with locations and groups. Information from the FGDs 
reveals several reasons for shrimpers to participate in fisher groups, which include commitment 
to fishery, learning from experienced shrimpers, obtaining necessary production inputs and credit 
facilities and getting external supports and interventions. 
4.3 Conceptual framework and empirical specifications 
In this section, we present a multi-stage framework to evaluate the effect of group membership 
on capture and TE levels of the members. We start with the determinants of artisanal fishers’ 
decisions to participate in fisher groups. Next, we generate comparable treatment and control 
groups and, thereafter, account for potential sample selection bias in the SPF model. With this, 
we intend to control for both sources of bias: observed and unobserved characteristics. 
4.3.1 Artisanal fishers’ decisions to participate in producer group 
Membership in producer groups is under the presumption that artisanal producers choose 





shrimpers are risk-neutral and take into account their possible net benefits (  
 ) derived from 
being a member of producer group and the expected net benefit (  
 ) derived from not being a 
member. Shrimpers are further assumed to be rational and would make a choice that would 
maximize their benefits (i.e. higher shrimping performance). Thus, shrimpers will choose to 
belong to a producer group if   
     
  -   
  >0.   
  cannot be observed but can be expressed as a 
function of some observed characteristics that influence membership decisions, such as 
shrimping and individual characteristics. We express   
  as a function of observable variables as: 
  
                    
        (1) 
where    is a dichotomous variable indicating producer group participation, with a value equal to 
1 and zero otherwise;    is a vector of parameters to be estimated;    is a vector of observable 
shrimping and household characteristics that influence artisan’s decision to participate in a 
producer group; and    is the error term of the latent variable framework, normally distributed at 
zero mean and variance   . The probability of participating in a producer group is given as: 
  (    )    (  
   )    (     
   )     ( 
   )  (2) 
where F is the cumulative distribution function for   . Here, we assume and expect that a 
shrimper’s participation in a producer group is associated with higher capture and TE, compared 
to shrimpers who are nonmembers (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2018; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). 
4.3.2 Stochastic production frontier model 
An SPF model, which was simultaneously introduced by Aigner and colleagues (1977) and 
Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977), is employed to determine the relationship between single-
output (yi) captured by individual shrimper i using a vector of production inputs (xi). The 
approach measures TE by depicting deviation of an individual shrimper’s capture from the best-
practice production frontier. Our general SPF model is defined as: 
     (    )                    (3) 
where     is the quantity captured by the ith shrimper; X depicts a vector of variables on inputs 
and production characteristic;    is a binary variable that captures the effect of group 
membership (MEMBERSHIP);     reflects the measurement error, omitted variables and 
statistical noise;     is assumed to be a one-sided random variable that captures technical 
inefficiency; and the subscript j depicts membership groups, that is,    for group membership 





4.3.3 Sample selection bias in stochastic production function model 
Several past studies have corrected for sample selection bias arising from observed and 
unobserved attributes in SPF models (Greene, 2010; Kumbhakar et al., 2009; Rahman et al., 
2009; Rao et al., 2012; Wollni & Brümmer, 2012). Kumbhakar and colleagues (2009) and 
Rahman and colleagues (2009) assume that selectivity bias arises from the endogeneity of TE 
with the decision of whether to belong to a producer group. This reflects that the error term    in 
the selection equation (4) is correlated with the error term    in the SPF model. However, Bravo-
Ureta and colleagues (2012) and Greene (2010) assume that selection bias comes from 
unobservable attributes captured by    in the selection model and is correlated with the error 
term in the SPF model   . Greene (2010) suggests an approach that is an extension of Heckman’s 
specification for the linear regression model to correct for selection bias in SPF models. The 
approach is based on simulated log likelihood functions, and it is computationally less demanding 
when compared with the likelihood functions suggested and used by Kumbhakar and colleagues 
(2009). 
First, in line with Bravo-Ureta and colleagues (2012) and De los Santos-Montero and Bravo-
Ureta (2017), we used PSM to match the members (MEM) and control (CONN) producers to 
eliminate bias from all relevant time-invariant observable variables. Specifically, PSM involves a 
two-step matching estimation. For the first step, we construct a suitable control group with 
observed characteristics that are similar to those of the members. PSM uses a probit or logit 
model to predict “propensity scores,” which are the probabilities of belonging to the treatment 
group based on a specified set of predetermined covariates (Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012). In the 
second step, the resulting “scores” are used to match similar producers in the control and 
treatment groups. The approach requires that the common support, overlap condition and 
balancing property are satisfied. Based on matching balance tests between members and 
nonmembers, ease of interpretation and intuitiveness (Bravo-Ureta et al., 2012; De los Santos-
Montero & Bravo-Ureta, 2017), we implement PSM using the “1-to-1 nearest neighbor without 
replacement” matching algorithm.
17
 Overall, even though it does not eliminate biases completely, 
PSM is commonly used and reliable when panel and experimental data are unavailable, as in this 
case (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). 
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Second, we account for biases by estimating the standard and sample selection SPFs and 
metafrontier models to compare TE for MEM and CONN. First, we estimate the SPF model 
using the pooled unmatched samples, in which the binary variable MEM is included as an 
explanatory variable to account for group membership. Next, two SPF models are estimated with 
unmatched data, one for MEM and another for CONN. The significance of MEMBERSHIP on 
the production frontier and a likelihood ratio (LR) test was done to test for equality of the pooled 
versus disaggregated models. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the estimated model 
from pooled samples is supported. If rejected, two separate SPF models are re-estimated, but 
corrected for selectivity bias as suggested by Bravo-Ureta and colleagues (2012) and Greene 
(2010). The aforementioned processes are repeated for matched samples, that is, one SPF model 
for pooled matched sample, two SPF models for MEM and CONN and two SPF models for 
MEM and CONN, controlling for sample selection bias. With this approach, selection bias from 
both observed and unobserved characteristics is controlled for (De los Santos-Montero & Bravo-
Ureta, 2017). The sample selection and SPF models, with their error structures, are expressed as: 
Sample selection:     
                          (4) 
Stochastic production frontier:      
                 
    (5) 
     (      ) observed only when    = 1 
Error structure:      =        
       =     =  ǀ  ǀ, where           
       =     =  ǀ  ǀ, where           
     (     )     (   ) (        
 )  
where    is a binary variable equal to 1 for MEM and 0 for CONN;   is the output variable;   is a 
vector of control variables in the sample selection equation;   is a vector of inputs in the 
stochastic production frontier;   , and    are parameters to be estimated and the depiction in the 
error structure corresponds to that in the stochastic frontier model. More importantly, parameter   
captures sample selection bias.
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4.4 Data and model specification 
The data used in the study was obtained from a survey conducted from May to August 2018 in 20 
shrimping communities located in three states (Lagos, Akwa-Ibom and Ondo) that represent 
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different socio-cultural regions (Figure 4.1). A multistage sampling technique, that purposively 
selected states and local shrimping areas and randomly selected 405 producers, was employed.  
 
Figure 4.1: Map of Nigeria showing shrimping communities and membership distribution 
The sampling procedure was guided by the information obtained from preliminary focus group 
discussions done with supply actors in 2017 and from extension workers and officials of national 
research institutes. The sample size compares favorably well with other shrimping surveys in 
Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa. Both the Ondo and Akwa-Ibom States have one shrimping area 
each, Ilaje and Ibeno, respectively, which were selected. In Lagos, two shrimping areas, Badagry 
and Eti-osa, were both selected based on the prevalence of shrimping activities. Information was 
collected using a pre-tested standardized questionnaire. Information collected includes data on 
shrimping and marketing activities and individual-level characteristics. Although information on 
the full season was obtained, only data on the peak season was used for the analysis. We rely on 
peak season data because it is generally characterized by high shrimping activities and efficiency 
values relative to the offseason. Additionally, producer observations that do not use engines were 
dropped because they have a different technological set and would operate on different frontiers 
and production functions. The final dataset contains 353 observations: 95 group members and 
258 nonmembers. The approach requires a second dataset obtained using a procedure that 
matches members and nonmembers based on household and shrimping characteristics in the 





nonmembers is achieved are used as the second dataset. Table 4.1 presents the definition of the 
variables used in the matching procedure, as well as in the estimation of probit and SPF models. 
Table 4.1: Definition of selected variables 
Variable   Description 
Dependent variables  
TOTALCAP
a
 (kg) Shrimp caught in peak season (kg) 
MEMBERSHIP 1 if farmer belong to a producer group, 0 otherwise 
Input variables used in SPF model 
ENGINEOPER Number of outboard engines operated  
QUANTFUEL Quantity of fuel used (liters) 
LEADERSEMP Number of skippers employed 
HELPERSEMP Number of helpers employed 
USEFULSEINE Useful life of Seine net (years) 
SHOCK 1 if respondent had a shock, 0 otherwise 
Independent variables  
AGE  Age of respondent (years) 
AGESQUARE Square of respondent’s age 
EXPERIENCE Years of shrimping experience 
EDUCYEAR Years of education 
REPEAT Number of times classes were repeated 
CUSTOMERS Number of major customers 
FEMLABSHR 1 if household female laborer engages in shrimping activities, 0 
otherwise 
FEMASS 1 if household female laborer belongs to a shrimping group, 0 otherwise 
AKWA-IBOM
b 
1 for Lagos State, 0 otherwise 
ONDO
b 
1 for Ondo State, 0 otherwise 
MOBILE 1 for mobile phone ownership, 0 otherwise 
EXTENSION 1 if respondent had access to extension, 0 otherwise 
CREDIT 1 if respondent had access to credit, 0 otherwise 
LEADER 1 if respondent is a skipper, 0 otherwise 
TAROAD 1 if respondent had access to tarmacked road, 0 otherwise 
COOP 1 if respondent participate in financial cooperative society, 0 otherwise 
Note: 
a
The dependent variable is log form of total capture measured in kg. 
b
The reference state is Lagos 
The matching procedure generated a total of 89 pairs, representing 89 members out of 95 with 
258 nonmembers. Following Bravo-Ureta and colleagues (2012) and De los Santos-Montero and 
Bravo-Ureta (2017), we ran a balance t-test before and after matching to check the distribution of 
the covariates and evaluate the null hypotheses that the means of observed characteristics of 
members and nonmembers are equal. The results indicate that the “1-to-1 nearest neighbor 
without replacement” matching procedure generated insignificant differences between the 
groups, suggesting that the balancing property is satisfied (Figure A4.1). 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables before and after matching. The data 
shows that shrimpers in the sample are smallholders with an average of 1.48 outboard engines. 
The average age and experience of producers are 40.20 and 17.39 years, respectively. Education 





education among the producers is equivalent to the level of primary school completed. Producers 
have at least one female household laborer who is also engaged in shrimping activities. Table 4.2 
further presents the significant mean differences in the characteristics of group members and 
nonmembers. Only 27% of the shrimpers belonged to a producer group during the 2017/2018 
peak season. Differences in age and experience means show that members tend to be significantly 
5.04 years older and 5.07 years more experienced than nonmembers, respectively. Members also 
have a higher chance of having one of their female household members participating in shrimp-
related groups, representing an important source of information.  
Overall, more members have access to physical and financial infrastructures: 94% of the 
members have access to mobile phones relative to 88% of the nonmembers. Compared to only 
2% among nonmembers, 14% of the members have links to extension agents. Likewise, more 
members had access to credit (33%) and tarmacked roads (36%) relative to 21% and 33% for 
nonmembers, respectively. In terms of input endowments, members tend to employ significantly 
more engines and employees than nonmembers, suggesting higher wealth and larger scales of 
operation. The average outputs for members are significantly higher than those of nonmembers 
during the peak season. Total capture for members was 11,299.56kg higher than associated 
nonmembers. The significant differences provide an initial indication that group membership 
might play an important role in enhancing shrimping output and margins. To provide proof of 
this, a sophisticated approach is needed to account for both endogenous membership decisions 
arising from observed factors such as age, experience and asset endowments; as well as 
unobserved characteristics. 
Table 4.2: Shrimping and socio-economic characteristics 
Variable 
Pooled  Members  Nonmembers 
Diff. 
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean  Mean 
Unmatched sample        
TOTALCAP (kg) 48003.93 34213.76  44942.97  35042.01 11299.56*** 
MEMBERSHIP 0.27 0.44  -  - - 
ENGINEOPER 1.48 0.79  1.63  1.43 0.20** 
QUANTFUEL 1145.31 748.83  1223.52  1116.50 107.02 
LEADERSEMP 0.69 0.91  0.95  0.60 0.35*** 
HELPERSEMP 1.03 1.02  1.34  0.91 0.43*** 
SHOCK 0.68 0.47  0.64  0.69 -0.05 
USEFULSEINE  2.18 1.41  2.28  2.14 0.14 
AGE 40.20 11.01  43.87  38.83 5.04*** 
AGE SQUARE 1736.37     1017.46  2011.33  1635.13 376.19*** 
EXPERIENCE 17.39 10.75  21.11  16.03 5.07*** 
EDUCYEAR 8.50 4.53  8.67  8.10 0.56 
REPEAT 0.096 0.47  0.042  0.12 0.074 





FEMASS 0.22 0.42  0.41  0.15 0.26*** 
AKWA-IBOM 0.18 0.39  0.18  0.18 0.007 
ONDO 0.33 0.47  0.11  0.42 -0.31 
MOBILE 0.89 0.31  0.94  0.88 0.06 
EXTENSION  0.05 0.22  0.14  0.02 0.12*** 
CREDIT 0.24 0.43  0.33  0.21 0.12** 
LEADER 0.13 0.33  0.08  0.14 -0.06 
CUSTOMERS 2.53 1.83  2.38  2.58 0.20 
TAROAD 0.26 0.44  0.36  0.22 0.14*** 
COOP 0.11 0.02  0.24  0.07 0.18*** 
Observations 353   95  258  
Matched sample        
TOTALCAP (kg) 46454.49 30479.26  52787  46730 6057 
MEMBERSHIP 2.57 0.44  -  - - 
ENGINEOPER 1.45 0.75  1.56  1.54 0.02 
QUANTFUEL 1128.18 712.27  1173.40  1159.50 13.90 
LEADERSEMP 0.65 0.87   0.87  0.79 0.08 
HELPERSEMP 0.97 0.97  1.24  1.11 0.13 
SHOCK 0.69 0.685  0.64  0.65 -0.01 
USEFULSEINE  2.15 1.40  2.25  2.18 0.07 
AGE 39.79 11.03  43.65  42.64 1.01 
AGE SQUARE 1704.71 1021.46  1995.20  1915.20 80.00 
EXPERIENCE 17.021 10.73  20.46  20.80 -0.34 
EDUCYEAR 8.205 4.604  8.56  8.35 0.21 
FEMLABSHR 1.326 1.502  1.25  1.26 -0.01 
FEMASS 0.20 0.40  0.37  0.27 0.10 
AKWA-IBOM 0.19 0.39  0.19  0.23 -0.04 
ONDO 0.35 0.48  0.11  0.17 -0.06 
MOBILE 0.89 0.31  0.93  0.90 0.03 
EXTENSION  0.027 0.16  0.10  0.05 0.05 
CREDIT 0.23 0.42  0.32  0.28 0.04 
LEADER 0.13 0.34  0.09  0.09 0.00 
CUSTOMERS 2.54 1.84  2.33  2.25 0.08 
TAROAD 0.25 0.44  0.36  0.33 0.03 
COOP 0.10 0.30  0.23  0.16 0.07 
Observations 347   89  258  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
To analyze the SPF of shrimpers and determine its effect on their capture and technical 
efficiency, we apply the parametric approach described in section 2, based on Greene (2010) and 
Bravo-Ureta and colleagues (2012). In the first step of the approach, a probit model of group 
membership, described as the sample selection model (4), is conducted to estimate the probability 
of belonging to a producer group. The model is expressed as a function of exogenous shrimping 
and individual characteristics ( ) that influence group membership. The probit model is 
expressed as: 
      ∑  
   
  
           (6) 
where    is a binary variable equal to 1 for MEM and 0 otherwise;   are unknown parameters to 





LEADER, EDUCYEAR, FEMLABSHR, FEMASS, ONDO, AKWA, MOBILE, EXTENSION, 
CREDIT, CUSTOMERS, TAROAD and COOP (Table 4.1). These control variables have been 
identified in previous studies as main determinants of membership in farmer groups (Abdul-
Rahaman & Abdulai, 2018; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Mojo et al., 2017). 
The second step involves the estimation of separate SPF models for MEM and CONN to account 
for different technological sets. An LR test in line with Bravo-Ureta and colleagues (2012) was 
conducted to compare whether the pooled (unrestricted model) or MEM and CONN models 
(restricted) are appropriate for both matched and unmatched samples. The LR test is expressed 
as:  
    (     (         )),    (7) 
with     ,      and      exhibiting the log-likelihood function values gained for the pooled, 
MEM and CONN samples, respectively. We assume a Cobb-Douglas (CD) SPF model to 
estimate a shrimper’s efficiency after preliminary LR tests led to the acceptance of the translog 
functional form for MEM and CD for CONN (Table A4.1). The translog and CD models are 
generally defined as: 
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    (     )         (9) 
where    denotes output of shrimper i during the peak season; (   ) is the quantity of input;   
and   are unknown parameters to be estimated; while           are the elements of error term    
that assume half-normal distributions, respectively. The vector x entails conventional shrimping 
inputs such as ENGINE
19
, FUEL, SKIPPER, HELPER and SEINE. The number of inputs 
operated during the peak season was used for the SPF estimation while seine (net) was measured 
using its useful life, depicting its quality. Previous studies on the SPF model have identified these 
variables as the classical inputs in the fishery subsectors (Esmaeili, 2006; Lokina, 2009; Sesabo 
& Tol, 2007). We add dummies    to control for shrimping characteristics such as location 
(Ondo and Akwa-Ibom States), shocks and high engine capacity. As done by Wollni and 
Brümmer (2012) and Rao and colleagues (2012), we also correct for zero values in input 
variables by creating and including a dummy which is equal to one if input variables are equal to 
                                                 
19





zero. Thus, we created dummies for SKIPPER and HELPER to control for 187 and 124 
observations that do not use these inputs, respectively. 
4.5 Empirical results and discussions 
4.5.1 Estimates of producer group participation decisions 
Table 4.3 and Table A4.2 show estimates of factors influencing shrimpers’ decisions to 
participate in producer groups for both matched and unmatched samples. Marginal effects are 
also computed to allow for easy interpretation of the coefficients. The chi-square test statistics 
reveal that the parameter estimates are jointly significant at the 1% level in both models (LR chi2 
(16) = 126.61 and 111.65). Table 4.3 reports that AGE plays a positive and significant role in a 
shrimper’s decision to participate in a producer group, a finding that is consistent with the results 
reported in previous studies (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2018; Bernard & Spielman, 2009; 
Bernard et al., 2008; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Mojo et al., 2017). However, we found this effect to 
be non-linear, suggesting that there is a threshold beyond which shrimpers are 0.1% less likely to 
participate in producer groups. It could be that shrimpers make shrimping decisions based on 
prior experiences and information received from trading partners as they grow older instead of 
ARFAN. In line with what Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai (2018) and Ma and Abdulai (2016) 
found, the result shows that EDUCYEAR, EXPERIENCE, FEMASS, COOP and TAROAD play 
positive and significant roles in shrimpers’ group membership decisions in Nigeria. EDUCYEAR 
and EXPERIENCE exhibit positive effects, suggesting that higher training and experience 
facilitate participation in fisher groups.  
The results on female household members are interesting in that shrimpers with a larger 
proportion of FEMLABSHR and FEMASS were 3.8% less likely and 16.6% more likely to join 
ARFAN, respectively. These results are associated with alternative sources of shrimper’s 
information and further clarify the finding by Chagwiza and colleagues (2016), in which the 
proportion of females in the household was found to insignificantly explain participation. Women 
who engage in shrimping activities serve as source for information for shrimpers, thus making 
shrimpers’ participation in ARFAN less likely. Conversely, shrimpers that have female 
household members in shrimp-related associations are consequently motivated to join related 
producer groups.  
Contrary to what Fischer and Qaim (2012) found, COOP shows a positive effect, suggesting that 





The result that TAROAD positively explains participation in fisher groups is intuitive in that 
access to tarmacked roads (reflecting close distance to roads) reduces associated transaction costs 
to organize and participate in producer groups. Similar results have been reported by Chagwiza 
and colleagues (2016) and Fischer and Qaim, (2012) who found negative and non-linear 
relationships between distance to collection centers (and roads) and group membership, 
respectively. However, location variables such as AKWA-IBOM and ONDO (reference to 
Lagos) depict negative effects, implying significant state, agro-climatic and environmental effects 
on ARFAN membership. In terms of business relationships, CUSTOMERS show a negative 
effect, indicating that the intensity and tightness of supplier-buyer relationships influence 
participation in fisher groups. Lastly, insignificant effects were found from variables such as 
LEADER, REPEAT, MOBILE, EXTENSION and CREDIT, indicating that they play less of a 
role in shrimpers’ membership decisions. These results were fairly consistent for matched 
samples in Table A4.2 and after addressing potential endogeneity in Table A4.3. 
Table 4.3: Probit model estimates of the determinant of membership in producer group (unmatched sample) 
MEMBERSHIP 
Probit coefficients Marginal effects 
Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. 
AGE 0.223*** 0.062 0.051*** 0.014 
AGESQUARE -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.0001 
EXPEREIENCE 0.020* 0.011 0.004* 0.002 
LEADER -0.261 0.280 -0.059 0.064 
EDUCYEAR 0.034* 0.020 0.008* 0.005 
REPEAT -0.241 0.331 -0.054 0.075 
FEMLABSHR -0.140** 0.065 -0.031** 0.015 
FEMASS 0.652*** 0.198 0.147*** 0.043 
AKWA-IBOM -0.943*** 0.344 -0.212*** 0.075 
ONDO -1.152*** 0.230 -0.260*** 0.048 
MOBILE 0.103 0.301 0.023 0.068 
EXTENSION 0.564 0.388 0.127 0.088 
CREDIT 0.325 0.200 0.073 0.046 
CUSTOMERS -0.134*** 0.050 -0.030*** 0.011 
TAROAD 0.619** 0.298 0.139** 0.066 
COOP 0.616** 0.256 0.139** 0.056 
Constant -5.959*** 1.421   
Log-likelihood -142.275    
LR chi2(15)     126.610    
Number of obs. 353    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 





4.5.2 Stochastic production frontier estimates 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 present the parameter estimates of the conventional and sample selection 
SPF models for the unmatched and matched samples, each for MEM and CONN, respectively
20
. 
The LR tests in equation (7) reject the null hypothesis of homogenous technology between MEM 
and CONN at less than 5% level for unmatched and matched samples (Table A4.1). Additionally, 
the significance of MEMBERSHIP parameters in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 confirm that MEM and 
CONN display different frontiers, thereby supporting the estimation of separate SPF models. A 
similar positive effect of MEMBERSHIP on outputs has been found in previous studies 
(Chagwiza et al., 2016; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Ma et al., 2018; Mojo et al., 2017). 
 As expected, the results in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 show that all estimated pooled models 
present positive partial production elasticities, which depict the percentage contribution of each 
input to percentage changes in output. Overall, in the pooled models, the result indicates that four 
conventional inputs (ENGINE, QUANTFUEL, LEADER and SEINE) contribute significantly to 
an increasing TOTALCAP. However, ENGINE and SKIPPER contribute the most for both 
members and nonmembers, suggesting that shrimpers rely more on these inputs for shrimp 
capture. This is in line with what has been documented in previous studies (Esmaeili, 2006; 
Lokina, 2009). While seine and fuel quantity play minor roles, no significant contribution was 
found from HELPERSEMP. The location fixed-effect parameters, AKWA-IBOM and ONDO 
(reference to Lagos), which account for environmental, shrimping and other socio-economic 
characteristics play positive and significant roles for both members and nonmembers.  
Finally, we add a shock dummy to account for shocks such as natural disasters and human 
activities that might disrupt shrimping activities. We found that shock also plays a minor role, 
especially for nonmembers. As this is an unregulated sector, this result is meaningful because 
shocks naturally regulate shrimping activities, keeping shrimpers away from the waters and 
allowing for the rejuvenation of fish resources. As shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, the null 
hypothesis of no TE (λ=0) is rejected with a probability value of less than 1%. This implies that 
technical inefficiency is an important contributor to the variation in TOTALCAP for both MEM 
and CONN. 
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Table 4.4: Parameter estimates for conventional and sample selection SPF models: Unmatched sample 
 lnTOTALCAP 
Conventional SPF  Sample selection SPF 
Pooled MEM CONN  MEM CONN 
 Coef.  St.Err.  Coef.  St.Err.  Coef.  St.Err.   Coef.  St.Err.  Coef.  St.Err. 
lnENGINEOPER 0.800*** 0.064 1.079*** 0.306 0.824*** 0.076  1.125***        0.423 0.822***       0.090     
lnQUANTFUEL 0.088*** 0.025 0.195*** 0.062 0.078*** 0.028  0.186** 0.078 0.078***      0.020    
lnLEADERSEMP 0.189** 0.076 0.669** 0.311 0.238** 0.099  0.622          4.489 0.236**      0.110 
lnHELPERSEMP -0.044 0.074 -0.373 0.297 -0.133 0.093  -0.356 4.634 -0.132 0.112 
lnUSEFULSEINE 0.058** 0.027 -0.209 0.307 0.048 0.033  -0.249 0.498 0.047 0.041 
lnENGINEOPER2   -0.404 0.334    -0.317 0.414   
lnLEADERSEMP2   -0.300 0.233    -0.230 2.244   
lnHELPERSEMP2   0.074 0.156    0.076 2.314   
lnUSEFULSEINE2   0.099 0.148    0.117 0.243   
lnENGINEOPERxLEADER   -0.215 0.258    -0.309 0.293   
lnENGINEOPERxHELPER   0.566* 0.316    0.502 0.386   
lnLEADERxSEINE   0.171** 0.078    0.191** 0.931   
ONDO 0.089** 0.037 0.119 0.084 0.075* 0.042  0.033 0.142 0.057         0.055 
AKWA-IBOM 0.082* 0.043 0.127* 0.076 0.046 0.053  0.081 0.111 0.043          0.063 
SHOCK 0.063* 0.033 0.013 0.058 0.086* 0.040  0.028 0.081 0.091**     0.046 
HighEngCap -0.108 0.100 -0.383*** 0.137 0.028 0.130  -0.397* 0.234 0.031 0.198 
Leadercontrol -0.043 0.044 0.278 0.220 -0.073 0.055  0.230 1.565 -0.071 0.060 
Helpercontrol 0.021 0.043 -0.047 0.132 0.031 0.052  -0.062 1.611 0.027 0.062 
MEMBERSHIP 0.109*** 0.036 - - - -  - - - - 
Constant 9.826*** 0.182 9.058*** 0.432 9.930*** 0.190  9.128***       1.917 9.948*** 0.164 
λ 1.01***       0.14 0.852*** 0.238 1.100*** 0.087  - - - - 
   0.113*** 0.021 0.068*** 0.044 0.126*** 0.024  - - - - 
   - - - - - -  0.234*       0.128 0.251***      0.083 
   - - - - - -  0.196***       0.051 0.246***       0.034 
 (   ) - - - - - -  0.612       0.533 -0.240      0.298 
Number of obs. 353  95  258   95  258  
L. likelihood -48.040  7.859  -42.932   -75.297  -110.30  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







Table 4.5: Parameter estimates for conventional and sample selection SPF models: Matched sample 
lnTOTALCAP 
Conventional SPF  Sample selection SPF 
Pooled MEM CONN  MEM CONN 
 Coef.  St.Err.  Coef.  St.Err.  Coef.  St.Err.   Coef.  St.Err.  Coef.  St.Err. 
lnENGINEOPER 0.793*** 0.065 1.226*** 0.352 0.824*** 0.076  1.295***        0.422 0.821***       0.089 
lnQUANTFUEL 0.088*** 0.025 0.227*** 0.068 0.078*** 0.028  0.219*** 0.078 0.080***      0.019    
lnLEADERSEMP 0.194** 0.079 0.793** 0.333 0.238** 0.099  0.790       0.602 0.222**      0.110 
lnHELPERSEMP -0.060 0.076 -0.462 0.313 -0.133 0.093  -0.471 0.667 -0.131 0.112 
lnUSEFULSEINE 0.057** 0.027 -0.190 0.322 0.048 0.033  -0.259 0.521 0.048 0.040 
lnENGINEOPER2   -0.617 0.415    -0.540 0.440   
lnLEADERSEMP2   -0.301 0.251    -0.253 0.338   
lnHELPERSEMP2   0.049 0.163    0.039 0.351   
lnUSEFULSEINE2   0.093 0.155    0.123 0.255   
lnENGINEOPERxLEADER   -0.235 0.278    -0.361 0.299   
lnENGINEOPERxHELPER   0.670* 0.374    0.694 0.421   
lnLEADERxSEINE   0.177** 0.086    0.202** 0.090   
ONDO 0.092** 0.037 0.142 0.086 0.075* 0.042  0.036 0.127 0.054          0.054 
AKWA-IBOM 0.088** 0.043 0.155* 0.091 0.046 0.053  0.082 0.097 0.040          0.023 
SHOCK 0.061* 0.033 0.014 0.068 0.086** 0.040  0.021 0.082 0.091**     0.045 
HighEngCap -0.102 0.101 -0.361*** 0.145 0.028 0.130  -0.382* 0.180 0.031 0.200 
Leadercontrol -0.047 0.044 0.295 0.234 -0.073 0.055  0.261 0.289 -0.074 0.060 
Helpercontrol 0.018 0.043 -0.034 0.137 0.031 0.052  -0.045 0.252 0.028 0.061 
MEMBERSHIP 0.104*** 0.036 - - - -  - - - - 
Constant 9.830*** 0.184 8.860*** 0.487 9.930*** 0.190  8.849***       0.590 9.945*** 0.138 
λ 1.002*** 0.081 1.322*** 0.280 1.100*** 0.087  - - - - 
   0.114*** 0.021 0.086*** 0.054 0.126*** 0.024  - - - - 
   - - - - - -  0.238***       0.077 0.257***      0.054 
   - - - - - -  0.206***       0.049 0.245***       0.028 
 (   ) - - - - - -  0.715***       0.065 -0.250     0.338 
Number of obs. 347  89  258   89  258  
L. likelihood -48.514  6.468  -42.932   -75.832  -109.542  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






The result of the sample selection SPF, as revealed by the significance of the  (   ) parameter21 
in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, shows statistical support for the presence of selection bias arising 
from unobserved factors in the matched samples. This implies that the TE values estimated in the 
conventional model are biased and inconsistent. This also justifies the estimation of separate SPF 
models for MEM and CONN to correct for selection bias and supports several recent studies that 
have highlighted the importance of accounting for the presence of selection bias arising from 
unobserved variables in the estimation of the group membership effect (Abdul-Rahaman & 
Abdulai, 2018; Ma et al., 2018; Mojo et al., 2017). The interpretation of  (   ) directions 
indicates that shrimpers choose to belong to ARFAN based on their comparative advantage and 
those with a below-average catch have a higher probability of participating in fisher groups. This 
finding is plausible, since producer groups are expected to enhance the performance and ability of 
fishing members (Table A4.4). This is consistent with some extant studies (Fischer & Qaim, 
2012; Ma & Abdulai, 2016; Markelova et al., 2009), but differs with Bernard and Spielman 
(2009). 
4.5.3 Catch and technical efficiency levels 
The summary of the mean TE scores for the pooled sample, group members and nonmembers 
derived from the conventional and sample selection SPF models is summarized in Table 4.6 and 
Table A4.5. We also present reports of the statistical t-test of mean differences between MEM 
and CONN groups. For the unmatched sample in the conventional SPF model, Table 4.6 shows 
that ARFAN members and nonmembers operate at an average TE level of 0.878% and 0.821%, 
respectively, relative to their group frontiers. The sample selection SPF model results in slightly 
lower average TE levels of 0.835% and 0.822% for members and nonmembers, respectively, 
relative to their group frontiers. For the matched sample, the results show that ARFAN members 
operate at average TE levels of 0.838% relative to 0.821% for nonmembers in the conventional 
SPF model, and 0.831% relative to 0.819% for nonmembers in the sample selection SPF model. 
The TE values reported in this study are generally higher when compared to what is found in 
African’s fishery sector (Sesabo & Tol, 2007), although similarly high TE scores have been 
reported for small-scale fishers in Tanzania and Nigeria (Lokina, 2009; Oluwatayo & Adedeji, 
2019). It is important to recall that the data used in this study are for the peak season, for which 
comparatively higher TE values have been recorded in the literature. 
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In general, the results suggest that the TE for shrimp capture tends to be overestimated if 
selection bias is not accounted for properly. The results in Table 4.6 indicate that lower TE scores 
are related to the implementation of the sample selection SPF model, compared to the 
conventional SPF model. In particular, the mean TE values in the unmatched sample decreased 
for the pooled model and members by about 3.13% and 5.15%, respectively. However, it 
increased for nonmembers by about 0.12% when sample selection SPF was implemented. A 
decreasing trend was observed for the matched sample in which average TE values decreased in 
the pooled model, for both member and nonmember groups, when sample selection SPF is 
implemented. These results are meaningful, in that accounting for selection bias has allowed us to 
estimate parameters efficiently, but lead to lesser share of fishers operating close to the group 
production frontier. This could be due to the lack of a national government plan and stakeholder 
support for ARFAN and other local fisher groups, thus inhibiting groups’ potentials in improving 
artisanal fishers’ performance
22
 (Markelova & Mwangi, 2010).  
Conversely, the TE scores for ARFAN members remain consistently and significantly higher 
than those of nonmembers in both conventional and selectivity SPF models. The stochastic 
metafrontier model (SMF) in Table A4.5 also indicates that members consistently have higher 
metafrontier TE values, although both members and nonmembers operate close to the 
metafrontier. Therefore, this suggests that group membership plays an important role in 
improving member’s knowledge, technical performance and economies of scale (Markelova et 
al., 2009). 
Table 4.6: Technical efficiency levels across the SPF models 
SPF model 
Pooled Members Nonmembers 
Change (%) Test of means 
Mean St. Err. Mean St. Err. Mean St. Err. 
Unmatched         
Conventional 0.857 0.003 0.878 0.040 0.821 0.068 6.943 7.708*** 
Sample selection 0.831 0.037 0.835 0.071       0.822     0.064       1.458 1.670** 
TE difference (%) -3.129  -5.150  0.122    
Matched         
Conventional 0.835 0.059 0.838 0.071 0.821 0.067 2.071 1.967** 
Sample selection 0.822     0.004 0.831    0.008    0.819    0.004     1.465 1.412* 
TE difference (%) -0.973  -6.482  -0.244    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We also compare the effect of MEMBERSHIP on TOTALCAP assuming all shrimpers' 
operations are efficient. For this, we use the mean predicted frontier catch generated from the 
unmatched and matched conventional and selectivity SPF models. Thus, the differentials in 
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TOTALCAP measured, which are distances between the group production frontiers for MEM 
and CONN (i.e. technological gap), are presented in Table 4.7, alongside the respective t-tests. 
Table 4.7 shows that without correcting for observed differences and selection bias, ARFAN 
members attain a higher catch than nonmembers, with an average predicted frontier of 62.82 tons 
compared to about 53 tons, respectively. This comes with a highly statistically significant 
technical change of about 18.53%. However, the technical change fades off to 11.03% and 1.27% 
after controlling for observed and unobserved differences, respectively. Still, these differentials 
remain consistently higher for members,
23
 suggesting that participation in ARFAN and other 
local fisher groups contributes to improving shrimp catches. 
Table 4.7: Predicted frontier output for unmatched and matched samples 
SPF model Pooled Members Nonmembers 
Technical 
change (%) 
Test of means 
Unmatched conventional        
Mean 55422.65 62820.67 52998.10 18.53 2.45*** 
Minimum 19684.96 24421.24 19684.96   
Maximum 234011.80 332576.90 234011.80   
Matched conventional 
       
Mean 53841.56 58846.39 52998.10 11.03 1.55* 
Minimum 19684.96 26533.19 19684.96   
Maximum 234011.80 171894.10 234011.80   
Matched sample selection 
     
Mean 53971.80 54480.06 53796.47 1.27 0.19 
Minimum 19912.85 22886.43 19912.85   
Maximum 238923.70 174172.20 238923.70   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.6 Concluding remarks and policy implications 
In this study, we used a selectivity correcting model to examine the role of fisher groups in 
improving artisanal fishers’ capture and technical efficiency in Africa. Using recent cross-
sectional survey data collected from 353 artisanal shrimpers in the major shrimping communities 
in southern Nigeria, we contribute empirically by identifying factors that influence shrimpers’ 
decisions to belong to producer groups. Additionally, we employ an approach that combines PSM 
and Greene's (2010) sample selection correction stochastic production frontier to estimate 
unbiased effects of group membership on artisanal shrimpers’ productivity and TE. This 
approach allows for the correction of potential selection bias arising from both observed and 
unobserved factors. 
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The probit models reveal that shrimpers’ age, experience and education; female household 
members’ participation in shrimp-related groups; access to tarmacked roads; and participation in 
financial cooperatives are the main determinants of shrimpers’ participation in fisher groups. Of 
these, female household members, tarmacked roads and financial cooperatives have the highest 
positive marginal effects on group membership decisions, reiterating the importance of women 
and infrastructural facilities in the African fishery subsector (Oluwatayo & Adedeji, 2019; 
WorldFish, 2018). The SPF likelihood ratio test indicates that the estimation of separate 
production frontiers for members and nonmembers is preferred in both unmatched and matched 
samples. As in other African fishery subsectors, conventional inputs such as engine, fuel and 
skipper are the main factors of production for members and nonmembers in the Nigerian shrimp 
subsector.  
Furthermore, the estimates show the presence of selection bias, implying that the selectivity-
correction procedures adopted in this study were relevant to mitigating the effect of unobserved 
attributes. The empirical results from separate SPF models revealed that fisher groups such as 
ARFAN tend to improve shrimpers’ capture and TE. Although values are over-estimated without 
selectivity models, TE and capture remain consistently higher for members in both conventional 
and selectivity models. TE for members ranges from 0.831 to 0.878 and from 0.819 to 0.822 for 
nonmembers, subject to how biases were corrected. Against previous non-selectivity correcting 
studies, these results show the importance of accounting for selectivity from both observed and 
unobserved attributes, to avoid over-estimation of group membership effects on fishery capture 
and TE. The selectivity results further show the inclusiveness of fisher groups, in that shrimpers 
with below-average performance tend to participate more in ARFAN. 
Our results have several policy implications. The finding that fisher groups play an important role 
in improving the capture and TE of artisanal shrimpers spurs the need for increased policy 
support from the governments, private agribusiness firms and development stakeholders. Such 
policy support is needed to: (i) encourage the formation of fisher groups in areas in which they 
are nonexistent and/or malfunctioning; (ii) align the objectives of fisher groups to enhance the 
members’ comparative advantage beyond current production-oriented activities; (iii) stimulate 
nonmember shrimpers to join fisher groups; and (iv) implement far-reaching agricultural and 
value chain development interventions through fisher groups.  





participation in fisher groups by investing in female empowerment and infrastructures such as 
schools/training centers, tarmacked roads and integrative cooperative schemes (Abdul-Rahaman 
& Abdulai, 2018; Chagwiza et al., 2016; Ma & Abdulai, 2016). In particular, state governments 
and development stakeholders in Ondo and Akwa-Ibom would need concentrated policy 
measures and public-private partnerships to incentivize formation of and participation in fisher 
groups.  
Furthermore, the presence of selection bias provides policy insights on the equity effects of fisher 
groups in Nigeria. Our result that shrimpers with below-average capture have a higher probability 
of participating in ARFAN indicates that fisher groups may lead to a more even distribution of 
economic performance and wealth in Nigeria and other similar African countries. Hence, the 
current Nigerian Agriculture Promotion Policy should seek to support the operations and 
dynamics of fisher groups to foster the attainment of inclusive agricultural and economic growth. 
Policy instruments, like research and development and training, would build the technical 
capability of fisher groups and enhance members’ skillsets and, consequently, motivate 
nonmembers to participate in fisher groups. This can be coupled with effective government and 
private extension services that target technology transfer, enhance sustainable production and 
marketing activities and coordinate business relationships (FAO, 2007; FMARD, 2011, 2016). 
This study is limited by its inability to capture large samples and variations in shrimpers’ socio-
demographic characteristics over time. Thus, future research could use panel data to provide 
more insights into the effect of group membership on productivity. Although this study has 
focused on the productivity effect of fisher groups, future research can determine whether the 




Table A4.1: Hypothesis testing for Stochastic Production Frontier Models 









Unmatched conventional       
Cobb-Douglas (CD) is appropriate:          
Members 11.95 6 9.99 Reject H0: CD is inadequate 
Nonmembers 6.89 6 9.99 Accept H0: CD is adequate 
Matched conventional       
Members 11.55 6 9.99 Reject H0: CD is inadequate 
Nonmembers 6.89 6 9.99 Accept H0: CD is adequate 





Unmatched conventional 35.20 19 32.24 Reject H0: No homogenous technology 
Matched conventional 32.26 19 32.24 Reject H0: No homogenous technology 
Unmatched conventional z statistics p-value of z   
No technical efficiency effects: γ=0     
Members 2.99 0.00  Reject H0: Frontier not OLS 
Nonmembers 6.54 0.00  Reject H0: Frontier not OLS 
Matched conventional       
Members 3.49 0.00  Reject H0: Frontier not OLS 
Nonmembers 6.54 0.00  Reject H0: Frontier not OLS 
  
Table A4.2: Probit model estimates of determinant of membership in producer group (matched sample) 
MEMBERSHIP 
Probit coefficients   Marginal effects 
Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. 
AGE 0.22*** 0.064     0.051*** 0.014 
AGESQUARE -0.002*** 0.0007    -0.0005*** 0.0002 
EXPEREIENCE 0.020* 0.011     0.005* 0.002 
LEADER -0.251 0.282    -0.056 0.064 
EDUCYEAR 0.033 0.028     0.008 0.005 
REPEAT -0.240 0.330    -0.055 0.075 
FEMLABSHR -0.140** 0.066    -0.032** 0.015 
FEMASS 0.631*** 0.203     0.144*** 0.045 
AKWA-IBOM -0.931*** 0.347    -0.213*** 0.077 
ONDO -1.141*** 0.234    -0.261*** 0.049 
MOBILE 0.103 0.303     0.024 0.069 
EXTENSION 0.509 0.411     0.116 0.093 
CREDIT 0.315 0.206     0.072 0.047 
CUSTOMERS -0.134** 0.052    -0.031*** 0.012 
TAROAD 0.615** 0.302     0.140** 0.068 
COOP 0.612** 0.260 0.138** 0.058 
Constant -5.862*** 1.419   
Log-likelihood -141.740    
LR chi2(15)     111.65    
Number of obs. 347    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The results in the model are estimated using equation (5). 
  
Table A4.3: Probit model addressing potential endogeneity (pooled and matched samples) 
MEMBERSHIP 
Pooled Matched 
Probit coefficients Marginal effects Probit coefficient Marginal effects 
Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. 
AGE 0.220*** 0.064 0.224*** 0.014 0.220*** 0.064     0.220***     0.064 
AGESQUARE -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.0002 -0.002*** 0.001    -0.002***     0.001 
EXPEREIENCE 0.019* 0.011 0.019* 0.002 0.019* 0.011     0.019*     0.011 
LEADER -0.256 0.283 -0.256 0.064 -0.248 0.282    -0.248     0.282 
EDUCYEAR 0.033* 0.020 0.033* 0.005 0.033 0.020     0.033     0.020 
REPEAT -0.253 0.336 -0.253 0.075 -0.251 0.333    -0.251     0.333 
FEMLABSHR -0.136** 0.066 -0.136** 0.015 -0.136** 0.066    -0.136**     0.066 
FEMASS 0.630*** 0.203 0.630*** 0.045 0.618*** 0.204     0.618***     0.204 





ONDO -1.132*** 0.235 -1.132*** 0.049 -1.123*** 0.235    -1.123***     0.235 
MOBILE 0.100 0.302 0.100 0.069 0.096 0.302     0.096     0.302 
EXTENSION 0.833* 0.488 0.833 0.093 0.780 0.495     0.780     0.495 
CREDIT 0.336 0.204 0.336 0.047 0.319 0.205     0.319     0.205 
CUSTOMERS -0.135*** 0.051 -0.135*** 0.012 -0.135** 0.052    -0.135**     0.052 
TAROAD 0.599** 0.300 0.599** 0.068 0.593* 0.304     0.593*     0.304 
COOP 0.601** 0.256 0.601** 0.058 0.598** 0.259     0.598**     0.259 
Constant -5.923*** 1.415   -5.828*** 1.414   
Log-likelihood 159.899    198.320    
LR chi2(15)     87.15    80.26    
Number of obs.  353    347    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The results in the model are estimated using equation (5). We use distance to tarmacked roads and fishers’ perception 
of extension usefulness as instruments to address potential endogeneity (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2018). With 
Wald χ
2
 = 1.06, the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected so we rely on Table A4.2 estimates. 
 
Table A4.4: Roles and reasons for participating in fisher groups 
Indicator %Yes 
Roles   
Do you sell shrimp products through a fisher group? 2.13 
Do you get inputs through a fisher group? 14.89 
Were you trained through a fisher group? 21.28 
Did you obtain public assistance since joining the fisher group? 10.64 
Reasons   
To learn from experienced members 62.77 
To jointly access input markets at lower cost 39.36 
To receive high market prices 19.15 
To collaborate when not having necessary inputs 69.15 
To increase profit 30.85 
To get government support 77.66 
To market product easily 32.98 
To access credit facilities 78.72 
To feel a sense of belonging in the village 70.21 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on field survey 
Table A4.5: Metafrontier levels across the stochastic metafrontier (SMF) models 
SPF model 
Members Nonmembers 
Mean St. Err. Mean St. Err. 
Unmatched Conventional     
Technological gap ratio (TGR)  0.99 0.01 0.99 0.002 
Metafrontier technical efficiency (MTE) 0.87 0.04 0.82 0.07 
Unmatched Selection corrected     
Technological gap ratio (TGR)  1.00 0.05 1.00 0.04 
Metafrontier technical efficiency (MTE) 0.83 0.08 0.82 0.07 
Matched Conventional     
Technological gap ratio (TGR)  1.00 0.01 1.00 0.002 
Metafrontier technical efficiency (MTE) 0.84 0.07 0.82 0.07 
Matched Selection corrected     
Technological gap ratio (TGR)  1.00 0.04 1.00 0.04 
Metafrontier technical efficiency (MTE) 0.83 0.09 0.82 0.07 
Calculated following Huang et al.'s (2014) two-step SMF regression method that applies, first, the conventional 
maximum likelihood method to estimate parameters of SMF regression and second, the SMF method to directly 






Table A4.6: Endogenous switching regression for unmatched sample 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A4.7: Endogenous switching regression for matched sample 
 Capture   
  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err. 
 Members Nonmembers Selection  
AGE      0.011     0.028     0.007     0.012     0.106     0.090 
AGESQUARE     -0.000     0.000    -0.000     0.000    -0.001     0.001 
SHRIMPYEAR     -0.005     0.004     0.003     0.003     0.014     0.015 
LEADER     0.117     0.121     0.207***     0.073     0.015     0.435 
EDUCYEAR     -0.001     0.008     0.004     0.005    -0.004     0.030 
FEMLABSHR      0.041     0.034     0.027*     0.015    -0.164     0.108 
FEMASS      0.084     0.073    -0.043     0.067     0.426     0.299 
Akwa_STATE      0.335***     0.120     0.159     0.122     0.484     0.791 
Ondo_STATE      0.061     0.110     0.270***     0.061    -1.020**     0.398 
MOBILE     -0.558***     0.141     0.007     0.072     0.117     0.421 
SE1      0.083     0.101     0.037     0.169     0.837*     0.501 
CREDIT     -0.168**     0.076     0.016     0.059     0.349     0.306 
VR1      0.018     0.019     0.015     0.013    -0.012     0.071 
SHOCK      0.023     0.067     0.068     0.052    -0.007     0.283 
TAROAD     -0.105     0.092     0.135     0.113    -1.103*     0.640 
COOP     -0.124     0.086     0.105***     0.094     0.605     0.387 
SHRIMPLABOR_r1_c1      0.201***     0.066     0.221***     0.055     0.070     0.278 
SHRIMPLABOR_r2_c1      0.170***     0.061     0.153***     0.048     0.108     0.241 
NeighmemberAsso     3.221*** 0.366 
ProdgroupNumber       0.281** 0.142 
_cons     10.588***     0.627     9.748***     0.270    -4.674** 2.073 
/lns1 -1.240***    0.072     
/r1    -0.443**     0.221     
/lns2   -1.053***     0.045   
/r2       0.153     0.399   
LR test of indep. eqns.:         4.71**      
Log likelihood                 -172.251      
Observations 353  353  353  
 Capture   
  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err. 
 Members Nonmembers Selection  
AGE      0.008     0.028     0.007     0.012     0.099     0.089 
AGESQUARE     -0.000     0.000    -0.000     0.000    -0.001     0.001 
SHRIMPYEAR     -0.005     0.004     0.003     0.003     0.013     0.015 
LEADER     0.123     0.122     0.206***     0.073     0.020     0.432 
EDUCYEAR     -0.003     0.009     0.004     0.005    -0.012     0.031 
FEMLABSHR      0.045     0.035     0.027*     0.015    -0.163     0.107 
FEMASS      0.074     0.076    -0.042     0.067     0.414     0.298 
Akwa_STATE      0.361***     0.127     0.158     0.122     0.510     0.787 
Ondo_STATE      0.066     0.111     0.268***     0.061    -1.005**     0.395 
MOBILE     -0.566***     0.143     0.006     0.072     0.141     0.423 
SE1      0.098     0.113     0.036     0.167     0.695     0.521 
CREDIT     -0.152*     0.079     0.017     0.059     0.371     0.308 
VR1      0.012     0.020     0.015     0.013    -0.013     0.071 
SHOCK     -0.010     0.070     0.067     0.052    -0.011     0.285 
TAROAD     -0.118     0.099     0.136     0.114    -1.126*     0.636 
COOP     -0.140     0.088     0.106     0.094     0.553     0.393 





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A4.8: Endogenous switching regression showing effects of fisher group on capture 
Output
a
  Members    Nonmembers ATT t-value 
Unmatched 10.771 10.686 0.085 3.766*** 
 Matched  10.735 10.604 0.132 5.617*** 
Note: ATT, average treatment effect on the treated. 
a
 Log of capture in peak season is used as dependent variable for 
ESR. ATT is also given in log form. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Figure A4.1: Common support property for the PSM model 
  
 
SHRIMPLABOR_r2_c1      0.141**     0.063     0.154***     0.048     0.105     0.241 
NeighmemberAsso        3.219***     0.366 
ProdgroupNumber         0.297**     0.142 
_cons     10.710***     0.638     9.747***     0.269    -4.483**     2.073 
/lns1 -1.236***    0.074     
/r1    -0.463**     0.224     
/lns2   -1.052***     0.045   
/r2       0.184     0.401   
LR test of indep. eqns.:         5.02**      
Log likelihood                 -171.087      





5 General conclusions 
The emergence of modern value chains (MVC) with stringent governance mechanisms and 
private standards in developing countries’ agrifood systems has several implications for 
smallholders and women, particularly regarding their exclusion and economic marginalization. 
As a response to these contingencies, excluded smallholders and women develop alternative 
markets and modify their organizational relationships to form local value chains (LVC), which 
are often within their reach. LVCs’ upgrading can, therefore, be an alternative development 
model to reduce poverty and economic marginalization for numerous smallholders and women in 
developing countries (Lie et al., 2012; Markelova et al., 2009). Though there are few emerging 
studies on LVCs, it is still important to understand the organizational structures of LVCs to 
suggest possible upgrading strategies that will improve smallholders’ and women’s performance 
(Lie et al., 2012; Mani et al., 2018). This is particularly important for neglected smallholders in 
dualistic agrifood systems in which LVCs function parallel to MVCs. While there are indications 
that smallholders update their organizational structures to fit changing contingencies, there is no 
consensus about the association among their business contingencies, organizational structures and 
performance in the literature. With a focus on the Nigerian shrimp and prawn sector, this 
dissertation aims at bridging these gaps by exploring the association between smallholders’ 
organizational structures and performance in the neglected LVCs of developing countries. 
5.1 Main findings 
In the first paper, we uncovered how LVCs in dualistic systems are organized along their 
predominant governance themes and gender roles to come up with necessary upgrading strategies 
for smallholders. By doing this, we map LVCs distinctively from MVCs and consider all 
predominant governance mechanisms along the chain. We also make a conceptual contribution 
by extending and suggesting a framework that includes global value chain (GVC) and gendered 
value-web approaches. This framework is relevant as it allows for the simultaneous analysis of 
the roles of governance themes and hidden gender-relations in LVCs.  
Results from the Net-map indicate that the most important and predominant LVC marketing 
channel is long and includes in this case, producer–women processors/marketer–trader–retailer–
consumer link. A long chain has ensued because most producers are located in secluded coastal 
areas that are far from local markets and cities. Thus, the system relies on intermediaries’ 





emergence of regional markets and industrial firms, suggesting that the LVC has developed over 
time. However, smallholders continue to target final consumers in the local retail markets due to 
the presence of huge demand that transmits into higher product value. 
Against the pre-notion that LVCs are unstructured in developing countries, this LVC was found 
to be structured, with coordinated activities and trading partners and target markets. Analysis of 
the governance themes according to the GVC framework suggests that the LVC is buyer-driven 
such that competitive traders at the midstream are the lead actors and main drivers of the chain. 
Traders engage in a “hub and spoke business model” by continuously sourcing and consolidating 
products from landing sites and marketing them in different markets. Traders dominate because 
they have access to rich market information and higher purchasing and bargaining power. To deal 
with the product characteristics such as high perishability and counter traders’ power along the 
LVC, fishers, and processors evolve their activities and governance mechanisms. Fishers and 
processors, based on their gender comparative advantages, have become specialized and shifted 
from open-market transactions to relational governance, managed by reputation, social ties, and 
proximity.  
Additionally, analysis of the gendered value-web highlights the vital role that women, 
particularly processors play in ensuring value addition and effective flow of products along the 
LVC. Aside from their processing activities that increase product’s shelf life and marketing 
opportunities, women processors act as a financial cushion for fishermen, point of contact for the 
supply base and precursor to all midstream and industrial value additions. However, benefits 
were found to be distributed inequitably to both fishermen and women processors at the supply 
base because of several organizational and infrastructural constraints that suggest the need to 
critically focus on the production and processing segments. 
The second paper comprehensively analyzes the influence between external and internal 
contingencies, organizational SC network structures and performance across multi-tiers. Based 
on the results and implications of the first paper, a variance-based structural equation model was 
employed to analyze quantitative data from mutually dependent producers and women 
processors. This paper contributes to the existing literature by taking a cue from contingent 
resource-based theory and netchain approach to suggest the “Contingency-Netchain-
Performance” (CNP) framework that comprehensively depicts the influence of both external and 





performance. The resulting CNP framework was empirically tested on the production and 
processing tiers to derive valid and rich evidence comparable across tiers. Our results indicate 
that both external and internal business environments significantly influence smallholders’ 
organizational SC network relationships in both producer and processor models.  
Against what holds in some extant literature, all external contingencies (such as market 
turbulence, technological progress, distrust, and power asymmetry) positively influence the 
formation of tighter vertical coordination. However, the influence and significance of external 
contingencies were found to be different for horizontal and lateral relationships across the tiers. 
This confirms vertical and network relationships as complementary, such that there are several 
organizational adaptation strategies for smallholders to deal with highly dynamic contingencies. 
The influence of internal contingencies (such as human and financial resources) on organizational 
SC network structures represents one of the main findings in this paper. This result highlights the 
importance of organizational reconfiguration to adapt and fit to changes in smallholders’ internal 
contingencies. Our result that SC vertical relationships positively influence horizontal and 
consequently, lateral relationships, indicates the organizational adaptation pathways in which 
smallholders tend to forge complex organizational SC networks when dealing with higher 
contingencies. 
Further, we found that internal contingencies and organizational SC network structures influence 
smallholders’ performance. The consistent positive association between internal contingencies 
and performance indicates that smallholders’ performances are resource-based. Besides, vertical 
and horizontal relationships positively influence producers’ and processors’ performance, 
respectively, confirming the contingency paradigm of fit for smallholder producers’ and 
processors’ facing highly dynamic contingencies. 
We estimate stochastic production frontier (SPF) models that correct for selectivity in the third 
paper to understand the role of producer groups in improving artisanal fishers’ productivity and 
technical efficiency. With this, we empirically determined the factors that influence fisher’s 
decision to participate in fisher groups and analyzed the effect of group membership on fishers’ 
productivity and technical efficiency. We employed an approach that combines Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) and Greene’s SPF model to account for different technological sets and correct 
for selectivity biases from observed and unobserved variables. Our results indicate that 





household members; and infrastructural facilities such as access to tarmacked roads and social 
participation in local financial cooperatives have significantly positive influences on shrimpers’ 
decision to participate in fisher groups. Of these, female household members, access to 
tarmacked roads and participation in financial cooperatives have the highest positive marginal 
effects on group membership. However, number of females participating in shrimping activities, 
Ondo and Akwa-Ibom location effects, and number of major trading partners exhibit significantly 
negative effects on group membership. Institutional factors such as extension and credit access 
did not exhibit significant influences on group membership. 
The SPF likelihood ratio test indicates the presence of different technological sets and supports 
the estimation of separate production frontiers for members and nonmembers. Our results show 
that conventional inputs such as engine, fuel, and skipper exhibit significantly positive effects on 
members’ and nonmembers’ capture. Prior linear regression tests and estimates in our SPF 
models indicate the presence of selection bias, implying that the selectivity-correction procedures 
adopted in this study were relevant to mitigate biased effects from unobserved attributes. The 
empirical results from separate SPF models revealed that fisher groups tend to improve capture 
and TE. Values are over-estimated without selectivity models, although TE and productivity 
values remain consistently higher for members in both conventional and selectivity models. 
Similarly, we find from our stochastic metafrontier model (SMF) that metafrontier technical 
efficiency (MTE) values are consistently higher for members, though both members and 
nonmembers function close to the metafrontier. This suggests that the TE values of nonmembers 
pull their mean MTE values down. Overall, these results indicate the importance of selectivity 
correcting SPF to estimate the effect of group membership on fishers’ capture and TE. 
5.2 Policy implications 
Several policy insights are derived from this dissertation for policymakers regarding how 
smallholders can be organized to develop and upgrade their activities and improve overall 
smallholder competitiveness within LVCs. These implications aim at upgrading existing policies 
and motivating the formation of new encompassing interventions and programs to support 
smallholders in LVCs. 
Our findings suggest that the development of LVCs holds several opportunities that can 
contribute to poverty reduction, attainment of economic equality and propagation of gendered 





2009). However, our results in the first paper suggest that smallholders at the LVCs’ supply base 
are constrained by limited technical skills, market access, innovative resources, physical 
infrastructure and institutions
 
(Trienekens, 2011). These factors were later found to be crucial in 
improving smallholders’ competitiveness in the second paper. Policy interventions should, 
therefore, provide an enabling physical and financial environment for smallholders, particularly 
in areas where basic physical and financial infrastructures are limited.  
Besides, private firms’ activities were found to be limited in the subsector, which consequently 
restricts entrepreneurial innovativeness and market development along the LVC. Thus, 
policymakers need to provide an enabling environment for private firms to act and formulate 
inclusive interventions that can reposition and involve smallholders progressively along the LVC. 
More importantly, well-coordinated public-private partnerships are imminent to improve 
entrepreneurial efficacy and smallholders’ operational efficiency and effectively link them to the 
growing local and regional demands (AUC/OECD, 2019; Trienekens, 2011). Only after these 
policies and smallholder’s process upgrading are achieved can product upgrading begin. The fact 
that these policies might take time to implement implies that actors along the LVCs should 
continue to target domestic and regional markets. With this, smallholders at the supply base can 
reap from LVCs’ emerging opportunities and gather experiences needed to deal with MVCs’ 
contingencies. 
Results from the analysis of the gendered value-web suggest that fishers and women processors 
are mutually dependent. This further indicates that they both face almost similar contingencies 
and problems. Thus, policies for effective process and product upgrading at the upstream and 
LVC development should simultaneously consider the two segments and be tailored to target 
smallholders’ differentiated gender roles. Our results generally indicate that women processors 
are important to accrue benefits to the supply base, counter traders’ bargaining and negotiating 
power, obtain information and determine producers’ participation in fisher groups
 
(AUC/OECD, 
2019; FAO, 2016a; Kamau & Ngigi, 2013; Schumacher, 2014; Udong et al., 2009; Udong et al., 
2010). As a result, policy interventions that provide complementary assets, financial support, 
training, and technologies are needed to further empower women both along LVCs and within 
households, reduce their drudgery and improve technical ability. 
Several policy implications emerged from the results on the role of organizational structures on 





significantly influence smallholders’ organizational SC network structures implies that 
policymakers need to postulate protective policies that shield smallholders from external 
contingencies such as market turbulence and power asymmetry.  
Although smallholders have tried to independently organize themselves by forming “relational 
governance” to deal with some contingencies, the producer-processor interface still lacks 
coordination to overcome certain contingencies such as technological turbulence and power 
asymmetry. Complementarily, smallholders would need to deal with all external contingencies in 
several ways, particularly by coordinating transactions with their trading partners and forging 
closer networks with competitors, extension agents and NGOs. Therefore, policymakers and 
NGOs should attach greater importance to stimulate and support the optimization of producer-
processor and processor-trader relationships by encouraging efficient information sharing through 
digitalization, and nudging smallholders to make concrete business strategies and plan (Hobbs & 
Young, 2000; Trienekens, 2011). The diverse influences of organizational relationships on 
performance across tiers reiterate that policy interventions should not be a “one-size-fit-all”. 
While the formation of tighter vertical relationships is crucial for producers as it fit their 
contingencies and improve shrimping performance, policymakers should stimulate women 
processors to forge closer horizontal relationships.  
While the role of external actors to support smallholders to adapt to certain contingencies has 
been highlighted, the negative influence of lateral relationships on smallholders’ production and 
gross margins is surprising. This result should serve as a new proof to policymakers and NGOs 
that public institutions in developing countries need to be overhauled to ensure that opportunity 
costs of interacting with external actors do not outweigh its benefits (Emmanuel et al., 2016). 
Policymakers need to ensure that public institutions’ capacities are revamped, staff well trained 
and budgets consistent to foster the invention and effective dissemination of knowledge and 
technologies to smallholders. 
The positive influence of horizontal relationships on catches, gross margins, productivity and 
technical efficiency in the third and fourth chapters suggests that collective action plays an 
important role in improving smallholders’ economic performance and welfare in neglected 
LVCs. Thus, policymakers at federal and state levels should encourage the formation of fisher 
groups in areas where they are non-existing or functional so far, strategically align group 





derived from the factors that determine smallholders’ participation in fisher groups. Besides the 
needed provision and improvement in physical infrastructure, the results from path analysis 
(Chapter 3) and probit models (Chapter 4) show that smallholders’ internal contingencies are 
important determinants of group membership for fisher folks. For instance, policies aimed at 
training producers, building tarmacked roads and supporting financial institutions should be 
encouraged. Nevertheless, the study warns that not all rare resources are valuable to create and 
sustain smallholders’ competitiveness. For instance, credit access is generally considered 
strategic in developing countries, however stringent and unfavorable repayment conditions could 
make it costly for smallholders. Policymakers should establish and encourage less stringent and 
more favorable formal and informal financial services for smallholders. 
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Some research limitations are acknowledged in this dissertation. The first paper in the second 
chapter is based on qualitative data obtained from focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews. Although we triangulated and validated our findings with several sources, relying on 
respondents’ qualitative perceptions could have skewed obtained data. Additionally, the snowball 
selection of experienced respondents from just three States could have biased our findings and 
omitted important socio-cultural concepts and contingencies, which affect smallholders’ LVC 
activities. Overall, we posited several upgrading strategies for smallholders based on their gender 
roles but without cost implications. Future studies can determine the most cost-effective 
upgrading choices for smallholders, particularly at the supply base. Furthermore, we analyzed the 
LVC following the dimension suggested by Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark (2016) and Kaplinsky & 
Morris (2001), however, several key dimensions such as the geographic scope, local institutional 
and stakeholder analyses were not done. This might have limited our understanding and 
implications regarding how to attain smallholders’ upgrading and LVC development in the 
subsector. Other studies can focus on the analyses of these dimensions. 
The scope of the second paper may have been limited by its reliance on perceived assessment of 
key concepts by respondents. The objective assessment of the data in capturing real-time 
situations may be questioned, even though statistical tests indicate that the data are considered 
reliable and valid. Also, although PLS analysis best suits our complex models, it presents several 
disadvantages. PLS analysis employs a non-parametric approach to evaluate the adequacy of 





estimates, which are subject to bias and inconsistency. Other studies can employ a covariance-
based structural equation modeling to determine causal associations between these concepts (Hair 
et al., 2012). 
Our proposed conceptual framework was successfully developed and tested, although the 
explanatory power of performance constructs, captured by R
2
-values, was relatively low based on 
Hair et al., (2018). Besides, the construct, vertical relationship in the producer model, had a low 
average variance extracted implying that it has more than 50 percent error. Thus, conclusions 
from the construct need to be taken with caution. To improve the measures and explanatory 
power, future studies can further develop our framework by considering intangible resources such 
as capabilities to find out if intangible resources lead to organizational adaptation and 
consequently better performance. Differeces in institutional set-up across sectors and countries 
can be captured by apply the CNP framework to other sectors and industrialized with different 
type and levels of predominant contingencies, organizational structures and performance 
measures. Likewise, the organizational structures in this framework can be further extended to 
include both supporting and pressuring stakeholders, to examine the simultaneous influence on 
each other and different performance measures such as food quality and sustainability. To 
understand whether organizational strategies in one tier simultaneously influence organizational 
decisions in subsequent SC tiers, multi-tier SC management theory (Mena et al., 2013) can be 
integrated into the CNP framework to link and simultaneously test mutually dependent tiers, 
using for instance simulation modeling. 
A few limitations are further acknowledged regarding the measurement of our dependent 
variables such as quantities produced and gross margins in the second and third papers. We 
measured these by subjecting respondents to data recall procedure. While measures of these 
variables were validated, directly and indirectly, such procedure could lead to recall bias. 
Besides, we only focused on shrimping activities during the peak season in the third paper. By 
neglecting activities during the offseason, important productivity decisions for the whole season 
might have been omitted. Furthermore, focus was placed only on smallholders’ productivity and 
technical efficiency in the third paper; it might be interesting to determine if the positive effects 
of group membership also translate into better welfare for smallholders. Evidence suggests that 





sectors (Ainembabazi et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018; Ochieng et al., 2018; Orsi et al., 2017). Thus, 
other studies can analyze the effect of fisher groups on fishers’ income and welfare. 
Endogeneity is other possible limitations. The conceptual frameworks in the second study might 
have resulted in the modeling of internal situations that are endogenous to smallholders’ 
performance while links between internal contingencies could have gone in either direction. We 
account for this by relying on sound theoretical frameworks, yet inability to correct for bias and 
inconsistent path estimations are likely disadvantages of PLS-method. Besides, producers could 
receive extension services due to their membership in fisher groups. This makes access to 
extension services to be endogenous in predicting group membership. However, we assume no 
endogeneity in the third paper after exogeneity tests could not be rejected. Since the PLS-method 
cannot appropriately deal with endogeneity, future research can apply more statistically stringent 
approaches to account for endogeneity and simultaneously analyze the models. 
Further peculiar limitations pertain to the static view obtained by the cross-sectional study design, 
which does not capture changes over time. This may also bring up some concerns over selectivity 
and unobserved heterogeneity. It might have been important to explore the dynamism in 
shrimping and organizational practices in the second paper. For instance, a more robust finding 
might have been obtained if seasonal variations in smallholders’ business contingencies, 
organizational structures, and performance were accounted for. Similarly, dynamic changes in 
producer group membership in terms of crowding in and out of members, location-based factors 
and seasonal agro-climatic conditions such as drought could have had different effects on 
productivity in the third paper. Additionally, the geographical scope of these studies in three 
states may have limited the generalizability of obtained results. Although we tried to capture 
socio-economic differences across different geographical regions, shrimping states omitted might 
have been facing different contingencies and performance measures. Besides, our analysis on 95 
and 89 producer group members in the third paper may be characterized by a lack of variation in 
socio-demographic characteristics that might not capture the reality. Future research can conduct 
this analysis using a large variety of panel data that captures these changes over time to provide 
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SHRIMP AND PRAWN SUPPLY CHAIN ORGANIZATION IN 
NIGERIA 
Pre-field Artisan Questionnaire, 2017 
Introduction 
Thank you for taking time to participate in a focus group discussion on the shrimp and prawn supply 
chain in Nigeria. This focus group discussion is part of a larger research process that we are 
conducting to learn about the different aspects of shrimp and prawn supply chain organizational 
structure with a focus on identifying some multidimensional characteristics, value additions and key 
actors within the industry. You are a group that has been purposively selected to participate in this 
discussion. Your selection is based on your activities along the shrimp and prawn supply chain. 
Therefore, we will like to hear from you about how shrimp and prawn flow from the point of 
capture/production until it gets to the last known actors. We will like to uncover details about your 
attributes, production and distribution activities you are involved in, relationships with and/or among 
other actors across or along the supply chain, and your supply performances within the industry. 
During this discussion, we will ask questions and facilitate conversation about the above-mentioned 
areas of interest including any other topics that we might find interesting during the discussion. We 
will use the Net-mapping tool to elicit information about the shrimp and prawn supply chain. You will 
be asked to represent this information on the cardboard that will be provided. It is, however, important 
to iterate to you that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. The main purpose is to stimulate 
conversation and represent the consensus opinion of everyone represented on the cardboard provided. 
Finally, please note that this will be recorded while …………………………………………… will 
take notes during the discussion. This will only ensure the adequate capture of your important 
contributions, which might be too ambiguous to note off hand. We will conclude by iterating that this 
discussion is for the purpose of research only and your comments during the discussion will remain 
confidential while your name will not be attached to any comments you make. 












VALUE-WEB IN SHRIMP AND PRAWN SUPPLY CHAIN 
 Before we start, let us do a round of introduction. 
o Can each of you tell the group your name and your years of experience with capturing and/or 
processing shrimp and prawn? 
Main questions Additional questions Clarifying questions 
What is the background 
information about the 
respondents? 
 What do you do? 
 What are the products you deal in? 
 What will you count as your major product? 
 To whom do you sell your shrimp and prawn? 
 What are the marketing destinations of your shrimp and prawn? 










 Do you feel the 
same? 
 
 Can you tell us 
anything else apart 
from the one already 
discussed? 
 
 What do you think 
about this? 
 
 Can you clarify a 
little further on this? 
 
 Can you provide 
some examples 
regarding this? 
What is the necessary 
background information 
about shrimp and prawn in 
your area? 
 What are the differences between shrimp and prawn? 
 What type of shrimp and prawn species do you have? 
 How many shrimping seasons do you have in your area? 
 What period is the peak shrimping season in your area? 
 When is the ideal time to capture shrimp and prawn? 
 Where is the ideal place/point to capture shrimp and prawn? 
What inputs do you need 
for capturing shrimp and 
prawn? 
 How did you obtain these inputs? 
 How much does it cost to obtain these inputs today? 
 What are the most important shrimping inputs required? 
After capturing shrimp and 
prawn with other fish 
resources, what value can 
you add to them? 
 
Responses should be 
represented on the 
cardboard provided!! 
 What constitutes your catch on the average? 
 What percentage of your total catch is represented by each fish resource? 
 What are the different types of value-addition possible for shrimp and 
prawn?  
 What determines the value-adding activities employed at a time? 
 What percentage of these fish resources goes into each of the value-
adding activities? 
 Are there any by-products from each of these value-adding activities? 
 What do you do with these by-products? 
How does the price of 
shrimp and prawn differ 
along the supply chain? 
 What will be the price of shrimp and prawn per unit if they are sold after 
each value-addition? 
 What is the price difference at each supply chain tier? 
 What are the reasons for such huge/small/no price differences? 
 What can be done to maximize the price of shrimp and prawn at each 
supply chain tier? 
What influence do female 
laborers have along the 
supply chain in your area? 
 How many female laborers are involved in each of these value-adding 
activities? 
 How important are female laborers in the industry? 
 To what degree do the female laborers in each tier have access to 
resources that can improve their activities? 
 To what degree are the female laborers involved in the decision-making 
process of each value-adding activity? 
 To what degree are the female laborers involved in the decision-making 
process at each supply chain tier? 
What are the perpetual 
characteristics of the shrimp 
and prawn supply chain in 
your area? 
 Who are the main actors you interact with and what kind of relationships 
exist between you and them? 
 While dealing with your supply chain partners, what are the things you 
always have in mind?  
 What changes have you observed recently within the industry? 
 What brought about such changes? 
 What can you say about: 
o  the level of trust 
o power asymmetry 
o technological advancements 
o market turbulence 







1. The researchers first explained to each focus group the objectives and significance of the study. The 
Net-map steps were described to participants, reiterating confidentiality of identities. Permissions were 
also taken to record the discussions, stating its essence. 
2. Respondents were asked to identify all the important value-adding activities and actors within the sector 
starting from input procurement until shrimp and prawn get to the final consumers. Each activity and 
actor was written on stickers with different colors that represent different segment and actors. 
Thereafter, the stickers were attached to A1 sized cardboard.  
3. For the value chain, participants were told to depict the sequential flow of shrimp and prawn by drawing 
arrows to connect all segments identified in step 2. Uni-directional arrows are used for this step since 
products flow in one direction in value chains. 
4. For the value-web, all value additions possible for each segment listed in step 2 were further identified. 
Then possible links between the value additions were made across the segments and value chains in step 
2 and 3 respectively. In all, two types of net-maps were made, namely: shrimp and prawn value chains 
depicting product flow and actor relationships, and value-web. 
5. After creating the value chains and value-webs, participants were asked if any important elements such 
as activities, actors or value additions that needed to be added are still missing in the net-maps. 
Participants were encouraged to probe and discuss whether missing elements should be added.  
6. Thereafter, further steps were made to discuss the characteristics of the value chains and value-webs. 
For the value chains, participants were asked identify the quantity of shrimp and prawn that goes to 
each segment as well as associated price. For the value-web, participants were nudged to identify value 
additions in which both men and women are dominant. Using a scale of 0-8
24
, participants ranked each 
value addition using an equally sized flat button-like material. The ranking was done based on 
perceived gender influence and was determined by counting and noting
25
 the number of materials piled. 
Decisions about the ranking were left to the respondents. Participants were allowed to argue out their 
points until they come to a single conclusion. Important information were recorded at the edge of the 
cardboard and in a reference notebook to increase credibility and reliability of the information obtained. 
7. Each session was ended by discussing of the net-maps. With the whole structure now visible, it became 
easy to raise questions and follow up on important discussions relating to the activities, position, 
relationships and power ranking of several actors along the chains. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 0 is the least and 8, the most influence. 
25
 This will represent how influential women are at different tiers. The power rank will basically capture women’s 




SHRIMP AND PRAWN SUPPLY CHAIN ORGANIZATION IN NIGERIA 
Pre-field Firm Questionnaire, 2017 
Introduction 
Thank you for taking time to participate in this interview on the shrimp and prawn supply chain organization in 
Nigeria. This interview is part of a larger research process that we are conducting to learn about the different 
aspects of shrimp and prawn supply chain organizational structure with a focus on identifying some 
multidimensional characteristics of key actors within the industry. Your firm has been purposively selected to 
participate in this interview. The selection of your firm is based on her activities along the shrimp and prawn 
supply chain. So, we will like to hear and uncover details about how firms organize themselves and interact 
along the supply chain, and how the changing characteristics of the industry have affected the firm’s operation 
and performance. 
During this interview, we will ask questions and facilitate conversation about the above-mentioned areas of 
interest including any other topics that we might find interesting during the discussion. It is, however, important 
to iterate to you that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. However, we crave for your valid contributions to 
the above subject. Finally, please note that this discussion will be recorded while 
…………………………………………… will take notes during the discussion. This will only ensure the 
adequate capture of your important contributions, which might be too ambiguous to note off hand. We will 
conclude by iterating that this discussion is for the purpose of research only and your comments during the 
discussion will remain confidential while your name will not be attached to any comments you make. 





Main questions Additional questions Clarifying questions 
What is the background 
information about the 
firm and respondents? 
 What does the firm do? 
 What are the products the deal in? 
 What will you count as the firm’s major product? 
 To whom does the firm sell her shrimp and prawn? 
 What are marketing destinations of shrimp and prawn? 
 What are the levels of respondents’ experience in the fishing and shrimping activities? 
 What are the job specifications of the respondents? 
 
 
 Can you tell us 
anything else apart 
from the one already 
discussed? 
 
 What do you think 
about this? 
 
 Can you clarify a 
little further on this? 
 
 Can you provide 
some examples 
regarding this? 
What is the necessary 
background information 
about shrimp and prawn? 
 What are the differences between shrimp and prawn? 
 What type of shrimp and prawn species do you have? 
 How many shrimping seasons do you have in your area? 
 What period is the peak shrimping season in your area? 
 Where and when is the ideal time and place to capture shrimp and prawn? 
 What are the potential bycatches you could have? 
After capturing shrimp 
and prawn with other fish 
resources, what value can 
you add to them? 
 
 What percentage of your total catch is represented by each fish resource? 
 What are the different types of value-addition possible for shrimp and prawn?  
 What determines the value-adding activities employed at a time? 
 What percentage of these fish resources goes into each of the value-adding activities? 
 Are there any by-products from each of these value-adding activities? 
 What do you do with these by-products? 
What influence do female 
laborers have along the 
supply chain? 
 How many female laborers are involved in each of these value-adding activities? 
 How important are female laborers in the industry? 
 How many female executives are there within the industry? 
What are the perpetual 
characteristics of the 
shrimp and prawn supply 
chain? 
 While dealing with your supply chain partners, what kind of things do you always have to consider? 
 What kind of situations is surrounding the shrimp and prawn subsector? 
 What changes have you observed recently within the industry? 
 What brought about such changes and how do you cope with them if they affect the firm’s operation? 
How are firms organized?  Who are the firm’s major trading partners? 
 From which countries are the firms trading partners from?  
 What kind of relationships do you have with your supply chain partners? 
 How long has the firm been in the relationships  
 How long is the firm bounded to be in relationship with them? 
 What is the firm’s relationship like with external stakeholders in the supply chain?  




SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAIN ORGANIZATION IN NIGERIA 
Producer Survey Questionnaire, 2018 
Introduction 
With this survey, we intend to examine different aspects of shrimp supply chain organization. You have been randomly selected to participate in this interview that covers your 
characteristics, production and distributing activities on shrimp, as well as your relationships with other actors across or along the supply chain, and market performance. 
We are doctoral students affiliated with the University of Goettingen. Thus, the information you will be providing will be used solely for research purposes, while all your responses will 
be kept confidential and untraceable to individuals. The questionnaire should take about 1 hour and 10 minutes to complete. We therefore crave for your consent to participate in this 




Details on Supervisor and Enumerator 
Supervisor’s Name:           Enumerator’s code:      
Enumerator’s Name:           Signature/date: 
Time started (STIME):            Time ended (ETIME): 
Date of interview (INDATE): 
Contents          Page number             Page 
number 
IDENTIFICATION         0 MODULE 10: RESPONDENT’S DEMOGRAPHIC ROSTER          12 
MODULE 1: GENERAL INFORMATION      1 MODULE 11: WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION AND ROLES        13      
MODULE 2: SHRIMPING INPUTS AND PRODUCTION COSTS (LAST 12 MONTHS)  2  
MODULE 3: SHRIMP OUTPUT AND MARKETING     4   
MODULE 4: PRODUCER SITUATIONS ALONG THE SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAIN  5  
MODULE 5: PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE  7          
MODULE 6: HOUSEHOLD ASSET HOLDINGS      8       
MODULE 7: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCER GROUP  9  
MODULE  8: CREDIT       11 




Note to the Enumerator: A household is defined as a group of people who live and eat together most of the time, i.e. more than six months of the year or 3.5days of the week. 
- The household head is defined as the household member who makes most of the economic decisions. 
- “Crayfish” as commonly known among the locals is a type of small shrimp specie and thus mostly used interchangeably here with shrimp. 
 
MODULE 1: GENERAL INFORMATION 
1.1 State (STAT) ({1} Lagos {2} Ondo {3} Akwa Ibom)  
1.2 Local Government Area (LGA) 
1.3 Village name (VILL) 
1.4 Name of household head (HHNAME)  
1.5 Name of respondent (RNAME) 
1.6 Do you own a mobile phone? ({1} Yes {0} No) (MOBILE) 
1.7 Mobile number of respondent? 
1.8 Gender of household head (HHGENDER) ({1} Male {0} Female)  
1.9 Distance to the nearest shrimp market in meters? (MDIST)  
1.10 Distance to the nearest shrimp market-hub in meters? (HUBDIST)  
1.11 How many years has respondent been shrimping? (FISHYEAR) 
1.12 What is the distance to the village head’s home? (VIHHDIST) 
1.13 How many years has the village head ruled? (VIHHREIGN)  
1.14 What is the occupation of the village head? (OCCUPHH) ({1} Fishing {0} others) 
 
 
1.15 What is the distance to the nearest fishing village in meters? (FVILL) 
1.16 Female household in association related to shrimp? (FEMASS) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
1.17 How many female laborers do you have in your household? (FEMLAB)  
1.18 Is any of these females dealing in “crayfish”? (FEMSHR) ({1} Yes {0} No)  
1.19 How many female household laborers deal in “crayfish”? (FEMLABSHR)  
1.20 Females in association not related to “crayfish”? (FEMASSO) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
1.21 Do you have access to credit facilities? (CREDIT) ({1} Yes {0} No)  
1.22 Do you have access to a tarred road? (TROAD) ({1} Yes {0} No)  
1.23 Distance between the point of landing and tarred road in meters? (DROAD) 
1.24 Are you a Nigerian? (NATIONALITY) ({1} Yes {0} No, skip to question 1.26) 
1.25 What tribe do you belong to? (TRIBE) ({1} Yoruba {2} Ijaw {3} Igbo {4} Others) 
1.26 Is respondent an indigene of this village? (INDIG) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
 
1.27 If No, where are you from? (COUNT) ({1} Ghana {2} Cameroon {3} Others) 
1.28 How many years has the respondent been resident in the village? (RESIDE) 




CODE A: [1] Half dug-out canoe/OBE [2] Half dug-out canoe/Paddle [3] Plank/OBE [4] Plank/Paddle [5] No Canoe [6] Others (specify.........................)  
CODE B: [1] Purchased [2] Inherited [3] Working under the owner [4] Gift [5] Rented [6] Borrowed [7] Others (specify.......................) 
Enumerator please note:  HDC = Half dug-out Canoe    Peak season (PS): (April-October 2017) 
OBE = Outboard Engine             Off-season: (November-April 2018) 
MODULE 2: SHRIMPING INPUT AND PRODUCTION COSTS (LAST 12 MONTHS i.e. April 2017- May 2018) 


















































































How many gears are 
owned by the 
respondent?   
 
How many shrimping 
gears did you frequently 







































Since the year of purchase, how 





















Canoe Seine Trap Tester 
Seine Trap Tester Seine Trap Tester Owned       
PS               Owned       
OS       Owned       
 
 


























What is the size of the 
gears? 
 
All should be recorded 
in m2. Enumerator 
should use scale 
conversion provided. 




each of the 
canoes in 
years? 
If you are to 






When did you 
buy each of 
the gears in 
years? 
If you are to sell each of these 
gears today, how much would 
you sell them? 




Seine Trap Tester Seine Trap Tester Beam Seine Trap Seine Trap Tester Beam 
Owned                    
Owned                    
Owned                    
Boss’             




2.2 Kindly fill in all information about the characteristics of other shrimping inputs used and their associated costs during the last 12 months (April 2017-May 2018) 
 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
How many fishers 
operated your canoes 
per week in the last 12 
months? 
For how many 
weeks did your 
fishers operate 
your canoes in 








in the last 
12 months? 
What was the average 
income earned by each of 














For those using 
motorized 
canoes, how 
many liters of 
fuel on average 
were used per 
week in the last 
12 months? 
What was the 
average cost 
of fuel per liter 
in the last 12 
months? 
What was the 
total LGA fee 
paid in the last 
12 months? 
How much in Naira 
did you pay for land 
rent per plot in the 






LGA_COST LRENT  PS OS  PS OS PS OS PS OS 
Leader   PS OS PS OS Leader + A       
Helper 1       Helper 1A           
Helper 2   Helper 2 A       
Helper 3   Helper 3 A       












1 2 3 4 5 6 
For those who own both canoes and gears, 
how many repairs on the average were made 
per month in the last 12 months? 
What was the average cost of a repair per 
month in the last 12 months? 
How much did 
you spend on 
food per week 
of fishing in 
the last 12 
months? 
How much did 




month in the 
12 months? 
How much was 
spent on other 
operation’s 
miscellaneous 
per week in the 
last 12 months? 
e.g. rope,  
How much did 
you spend on 
transporting 
your product 
to the point of 
sale per 
week? 
REPAIR REPAIR_COST FOOD_COST SPAR_COST MISC_COST TCOST 
Canoe Engine Seine Trap Tester Canoe Engine Seine Trap Tester     
          
CODE C: [1] Personal savings [2] Cooperatives/association [3] Trading partner [4] Friends and relatives [5] Bank credit [6] Others (specify………..) 
PS = Peak Season (April-October 2017) 
OS = Off season (November 2017-May 2018) 





MODULE 3: SHRIMP OUTPUT AND MARKETING 
3.1 Kindly fill in the information about shrimp output and trading during the last 12 months (April 2017-May 2018) 










How many weeks 
have you, your 
fishers and/or 
other members 
contributing to the 
household fishing 
activities landed 
crayfish during the 
last 12 months? 
How much fish resources 
did you catch per week 
during the last 12 
months? (in kg) 
 
What is the 
amount 
earned per 
week from the 
sale of other 
fish resources 
caught during 













the last 12 
months? (kg) 
How much “crayfish” 
(in kg) did you, your 
fishers and/or other 
household members 
catch in TOTAL 
during the last 12 
months? 






CODE: [1] Almost none 
[2] ¼ [3] ½ [4] Almost all 
 
What quantity of 
“crayfish” was 





CODE: [1] Almost 
none [2] ¼ [3] ½ 
[4] Almost all 
What is the 
average selling 
price of “crayfish” 
per kg in Naira? 
SP_LAND FI_CATCH FI_INCOME CR_CATCH CR_TOTCR CR_CONS CR_GIFT SALE_PRICE 
PS         

























10 11 12 13 14  
What is the quantity of 
“crayfish” sold per week 
in kg? 
How did you sell your “large 






[5]More than one  
How much did you 
earn on average per 
week from the sale 
of “large shrimp” 
during the last 12 
months in Naira? 
 To whom did you 





SALE_WE S_PROC SHRIMP_SALE  SALE_TO 
Fresh      
Sun-dried    
Smoked    
Iced    
TOTAL    
 
 
Note to the Enumerator: We use “Crayfish” as defined before. However, we recognized and use “large shrimps” differently in question 14 of this section. We define “large shrimps” 
here as the normal shrimps which are part of artisan’s bycatches. They are captured in small quantities but mostly sold off. As shrimp specie, we also account for them. 
CODE D: [1] Processors & marketers [2] Traders [3] Consumers [4] Firms through collectors [5] Food companies [6] others (specify....) [7] More than one 




MODULE 4: PRODUCER SITUATIONS ALONG THE SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAIN 
4.1 Kindly state the level at which you concur with statements on the external characteristics of shrimp supply chain organization 
S/N External contingencies Items Response 
1. Market turbulence MT1: Sometimes our customer’s demand increases unpredictably in our market  
MT2: The volume of crayfish I caught per trip is unpredictable   
MT3: The cost of constructing dugout canoe/planks has increased drastically of recent  
MT4: I am not sure of the stage in which my crayfish quality is by the time I deliver them to the processors  
MT5: Our competitors in nearby villages do reduce the price of their product to attract our customers  
MT6: The market price of crayfish changes drastically within our market  
MT7: Cost of fuel has been unstable of recent  
MT8: It is difficult for me to constantly supply crayfish because of the incessant activities of pirates in my area  
2. Technology TA1: Recently, outboard engine has become more important for shrimping in our industry  
TA2: To catch large quantities of “crayfish” I will need to use outboard engines  
TA3: There are higher outboard engine capacities compared to what am using now  
TA4: Recently, there are changes to the type of woods we use to construct our canoes  
TA5: Recently, I make my boat stronger by constructing it with zinc  
TA6: The quality of outboard engine I use nowadays is worse than the one I used before  
TA7: It is hard to predict what technological improvements will emerge in the nearest future  
3. Power PA1: Certain fishers often supply the largest quantity of products to the market  
PA2: Certain fishers have very high reputation in our industry  
PA3: Certain fishers are more knowledgeable about the business in our industry  
PA4: Certain processors/marketers understand the business inter-relationship with fishers more  
PA5: Certain processors/marketers can attain better financial background than others  
PA6: Certain processors/marketers can attract more buyers than others  
PA7: We are strongly dependent on processors to process our products  
PA8: We are strongly dependent on marketers to market our products  
4.2 Kindly state the level at which you concur with statements on the internal characteristics of shrimp supply chain organization 
S/N Internal contingencies Items Response 
1. Human resources HR1: My skills in shrimping are quite huge  
HR2: My employees are experienced fishers  
HR3: My employees are able to mend my fishing gears (seine, tester etc.)  
HR4: My employees have closer inter-relationships with my crayfish processors/marketers  




HR6: I keep accurate records of each quantity of “crayfish”  I sell to the processors/marketers  
HR7: I keep accurate records of my revenues from “crayfish”  
HR8: I consider myself as being not financially literate  
2. Business resources BR1: Correct forecast of changes in the demand for crayfish is of paramount importance to my business  
BR2: I have several sources of financing my business  
BR3: My business is located in an area where I can easily link up to my customers   
BR4: Out of 10, what proportion of your customers is linked to other artisanal producers in your area?  
BR5: I consider myself as being less creditworthy  
BR6: I have little amount of monetary reserve that can take my shrimping business through periods of struggle  
 
  
Note for the Enumerator: The respondent of this section should be the most experienced and active fisher in the household 
1         2     3          4    




MODULE 5: PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
5.1 Kindly fill in the necessary information and state the level at which you concur with some statements on the organizational structure of the shrimp supply chain 
S/N Inter-relationships Items Response 
1. Vertical relationships VR1: How many processors/marketers do you sell your crayfish to?  
VR2: What kind of agreement did you have with your customer? CODE: [1] Written contracts [0] Non-formal agreements  
VR3: How many years have you been supplying your longest standing "crayfish"processor?  
VR4: I sell more than 50% of my total “crayfish” caught to just one of the processors/marketers  
VR5: More than 50% of the crayfish processed/marketed by at least one of the processors/marketers comes from my catch  
VR6: I am more inclined to sell my product to customers with whom I have a long-term relationship  
VR7: I sell “crayfish” to as many buyers at a particular open spot  
VR8: I have to display my “crayfish” before I can get willing buyers  
VR9: Out of 10, what is the proportion of women among processors/marketers you sell your crayfish to?  
VR10: Does your main crayfish processor/marketer provide you with cash in order to shrimp? CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No)  
VR11: Out of 10, what is the average proportion of each cash received from processors/marketers in your total fuel cost per trip?  
2. Horizontal relationships HOR1: Are you a member of any fish producer group? CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No)  
HOR2: How many fish producer groups do you belong to?  
HOR3: Longest time spent as a member of fish producer group in years?  
HOR4: How many fishers do you collaborate with?  
3. External relationships SE1: Do you have access to extension services? CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No)  
SE2: How many times do extension agents/supporting personnel visit the community in a year?  
SE3: I get some vital information about fishing from extension agents  
SE4: Do you attend trainings organized by actors who are not part of the supply chain? CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No)  
SE5: Recently, we get more visits from people that want to support us  
SE6: Our grievances now easily get to the public agencies  
  
1   2     3      4                           5     






5.2 Kindly fill in the necessary information and state the level at which you concur with some statements on your performance during the last 12 months 
S/N Performances Indicators Items Response 
1. Financial Efficiency FE1: What is your average profit per week from shrimping during the last 12 months?  
FE2: What was your average profit per week from shrimping in 2016, 2015 and 2014?  
FE3: Over the last 3 years my profit from shrimping has been increasing  
FE4: On average, how much cash did you have at hand per week during the last 12 months?  
FE5: On average, how much cash were you having at hand per week in 2016, 2015 and 2014?  
FE6: Over the last 3 years the cash I have at hand from shrimping has been increasing  
FE7: Over the last 3 years the quantity of “crayfish” I catch has been increasing  
FE8: Over the last 3 years I have better profit relative to my competitors  
2. Operational Customer satisfaction OC1: Over the last 3 years I am more competitive in meeting the demand of women processors  
OC2: Over the last 3 years many women processors often lay complaints about my product  
OC3: Over the last 3 years many women processors continuously patronize me because they are satisfied  
Responsiveness OR1: Over the last 3 years I respond to the orders of women processors on time  
OR2: What was your average lead time in 2017, 2016-2014? (Period between when an order is placed and received by buyer in hour)  
Flexibility OF1: Over the last 3 years I am able to quickly respond to unpredictable orders by women processors  
OF2: Over the last 3 years  I am able to handle late orders from my immediate trading partner  
Food quality OFQ1: Did you carry out thorough sorting of your product over the last 3 years?  CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No)  
OFQ2: Over the last 3 years I strive to ensure my product is well sorted before sale to the women processors  
OFQ3: The quality of product is an important measure of my market performance  
OFQ4: I believe the quality of my product is of paramount importance  
Overall performance SCP1: How would you rate the success of your shrimp supply chain in comparison to other fishing supply chains over the last 3 years?  
1         2     3          4    
5     Strongly disagree       Disagree      Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree     
1       2                3                  4      5     




MODULE 6: HOUSEHOLD ASSET HOLDINGS 










 1 2 3 
Asset What quantity of the asset is currently owned by 
your household? 
 
Enumerator: Record 0 if no asset is owned. 
When was the longest time these 
assets were acquired in years? 
VAR ASS_TYP ASS_QUAN ASS_TIME 
1 Motorcycle (s)   
2 Bicycle (s)   
3 Tricycle (s)   
4 Vehicle (s)   
5 Colored Television (s)   
6 Black & White Television (s)   
7 Radio (s)   
8 Mobile phone (s)   
9 Generator (s)   
10 Land (s)   
11 House (s)   
12 Refrigerator (s)   
6.2 Do you have access to electricity? (ELECTRIC) CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No) 
6.3 Do you have access to piped borne water? (PIPED_WAT) CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No)  
6.4 Is the floor of your house concreted? (F_CONCRETE) CODE: ({1} Yes {0} No) 





MODULE 7: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCER GROUP 


















 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 








there in your 
fish producer 
group? 
What is the 
educational status 




[1] Non-formal  
[2] Primary  








Have you at 
any time left 
the producer 
group within 
the period you 


















What is the role 
of respondent 








What is the 
membership 
cost of your 
producer group 
in a year? 
How often 






Is any of your 
closest 
neighbor part 







What is the 
distance of 
your home to 
the home of 
the head of 
the producer 
group? 
ID PGNAME ASSO_NR EDU_ASSH PGYEAR PGDMEM ASSO_YR PGDTIME MEM_POSIT MEM_COST MCOST NEI_MEM DIST_ASSH 
1 ARFAN            
2             
3             
 7.2 If the response in 7.1 is yes, what is the essence of participating in fish producer group? 
7.3 Are you a member of non-fish related association? CODE: [1] Yes [0] No (SOCPAR) 
7.4 How many years have you been with other non-fish producing association? (SOPAR_YR) 
 
Do you agree with any of the statements below? Response 
ROLE1: Did you sell your product through the producer group? [1] Yes [0] No  
ROLE2: What share of your product did you sell to the women processors linked to your producer group?  
ROLE3: Did you obtain inputs jointly through the producer group? [1] Yes [0] No  
ROLE4: Have you been trained through the producer group on the maintenance of either gear or outboard engine? [1] Yes [0] No  
ROLE5: Have you obtained any government or public assistance since you joined the producer group? [1] Yes [0] No  
PART1: I joined the producer group because I could learn from experienced members  
PART2: I joined the producer group because I could jointly access input markets with other members at lower cost  
PART3: I joined the producer group because I could receive higher selling price than other fishers who did not join  
PART4: I joined the producer group because they could provide opportunity for members who do not have all necessary inputs to fish with someone who has  
PART5: I joined the producer group because my profit would increase  
PART6: I joined the producer group because I could easily get government support   
PART7: I joined the producer group because they would make it easier for me to market my crayfish  
PART8: I joined the producer group because they would provide me with the opportunity to easily access credit facilities  
PART9: I joined the producer group because I will feel among when I belong to the producer group in my village  
1     2          3             4              
5     
Strongly disagree           Disagree              Neutral    Agree            Strongly agree     




7.5 If the response in 7.1 is no, why is respondent not participating in producer group? 
Do you agree with any of the statements below? Response 
NPG1: I do not see the reason to join the producer group  
NPG2: The cost of being a member of the producer group is very high  
NPG3: I will get unsatisfying price for my product if I become a member of the producer group  
NPG4: I did not join the producer group because there is none located close to my village  
NPG5: There are very few full-time fishers in your village  
7.6 Kindly provide information about the person you often interact and learn from in the group 
7.7 Kindly provide information about the transaction attributes of shrimp in your village. Do you agree with any of the statements below? 
Transaction attributes        Strongly disagree  Disagree    Neutral    Agree      Strongly 
agree  
(1)           (2)         (3)        (4)             (5) 
HAS1: I have contact with more processors  
HAS2: I have very close relationship with my product processors 
HAS3: I have long-term relationships with my customers 
HAS4: I often get credit assistance from my customers 
HAS5: I often give my products on credit to my customers 
HAS6: My customers have mutual understanding of the business requirements 
HAS7: My customers respect mutually agreed business arrangements 
SIT1: My customers always have to wait at the landing site for my return  
SIT2: My customers make great effort to reside close to the landing site 
SIT3: Transportation to the processing site is not a problem 
SIT4: I made efforts to reside closer to the shore 
SIT5: I made efforts to reside where I can easily reach processors and marketers 
ASS1: I need outboard engine before I can go to the high-sea 
ASS2: I need outboard engine to quickly land my catches  
ASS3: We spend little time on the high-sea to meet quality standards 
ASS4: Shrimping requires special type of nets  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Name of the 
person you 
interact most 







Please specify the position 
of NAME in the group 
CODE G 
How long has NAME 
been a member of the 
group in years? 
How often did you talk with NAME 
during the last 12 months 
CODE H 
Is NAME’s market share 
larger than yours? 
CODE: [1] Yes [0] No 
Are you and NAME in 
other groups?  
CODE: [1] Yes [0] No 
Are you and NAME 
from the same ethnic 
group?  
CODE: [1] Yes [0] No 
ID NAME NGEND NAGE NRELAT NMEM INTER NMAR NOPG NETHNIC 
01          
1     2          3             4              
5     
Strongly disagree           Disagree              Neutral    Agree            Strongly agree     
CODE F: [1] Male [0] Female 
CODE G: [1] Executive [2] Member 





MODULE 8: CREDIT 
To respondents who answered yes to question 1.21 in Module 1, kindly fill in information about the credit facilities accessed. 
MODULE 9: SHOCKS AND EXTENSION SERVICES 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
What kind of 






What is the main 






How often did you 











[1] Beginning of the next 12 
months 
[2] During the shrimping season 
[3] After the shrimping season 
What was the 
value of credit 
applied for in 
Naira? 
How long did you wait on the 











What did you 





CRED_TYP CRED_SOUR CRED_FREQ CRED_TIME CRED_APP CRED_TAPP CRED_VAL CRED_PURP 



















1 2 3 4 5 6 




any of these happen 
during the last 
season?  
 
CODE: [1] Yes [0] No 
SHOCK_FREQ: 
How many times did 
these shocks occur 




How was the respondent’s 











[2] Monthly  
[3] Quarterly  
[4] Yearly 
EXT_INFO: What kind of 
information did you get? 
 
CODE: 
[1] Better capturing techniques 
[2] Technological improvements 
[3] Market information 
[4] Credit facilities and finance 
[5] Changes in policy and 
regulation 
[6] Weather conditions 
[7] Disease outbreaks 
[8] Others (specify……………) 
1 Disease outbreak    
2 Overfishing    
3 Under-fishing    
4 Natural disaster e.g. drought, flood    
5 Policy change    
6 Political dispute e.g. War, or protest    
7 Illness/death of household member      
8 Sharp increase in demand    
9 Piracy    
CODE I: [1] Cash loan [2] Input loan [3] Product loan [4] Others (specify……….)  
CODE J: [1] Cooperative society [2] Friends/relatives [3] Trading partner [4] Producer group [5] Esusu [6] Commercial Bank [7] Micro-finance Bank [8] Religious bodies 
CODE K: [1] Fishing investment [2] Non-fishing investments [3] Educational dues [4] Social activities [5] Saved [6] Health [7] Others (specify)……………. 
CODE L: [1] Never [2] Once [3] 2-5 [4] More than 5 






MODULE 10: RESPONDENT’S DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
What is the 
relationship of 
[RESPONDENT] to 























What is the 













What is the 
number of years 
[RESPONDENT] 
spent in school? 
 
 
What the number 
is of times 
[RESPONDENT] 
repeated classes? 
What is the 















What is the main 
occupation of 
[RESPONDENT] 














] employed in 
non-fishing 
activities in the 








someone in the 
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MODULE 11: WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION AND ROLES 
Kindly fill in the information about the participation and roles of female household members along the shrimp supply chain 
11.1 Did any female household laborers have access to financial resources/ assistance in the role she played in the last 12 months? CODE: [1] Yes [0] No 
11.2 Did any female household laborers have access to information that improved her activities during the last 12 months? CODE: [1] Yes [0] No 
11.3 Did any female household laborers have access to technological resources that improved her activities in the last 12 months? CODE: [1] Yes [0] No 
11.4 Thinking about the role women perform in the family and shrimp sector, kindly choose the degree of influence you think women have on the decision-making 






































            
11.5 Did any of female household laborers receive any kind of training regarding her role in the last 12 months? (F_TRAIN) ({1} Yes {0} No) 









SOC3: Lack of 
property right 
ECO1: Lack of 
capital 











MRK2: Lack of 
adequate processing 
equipment 
MRK3: Lack of access 
to bank credit facilities 




1          2     3          4   5     
No influence                  little influence          Neutral            More influence      Sole decision maker 





SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAIN ORGANIZATION IN NIGERIA 
Processor Survey Questionnaire, 2018 
Introduction 
With this survey, we intend to examine different aspects of shrimp supply chain organization. You have been randomly selected to participate in this interview that covers your 
characteristics, processing and distributing activities on shrimp, as well as your relationships with other actors across or along the supply chain, and market performance. 
We are doctoral students affiliated with the University of Goettingen. Thus, the information you will be providing will be used solely for research purposes, while all your responses 
will be kept confidential and untraceable to individuals. The questionnaire should take about 30 minutes to complete. We therefore crave for your consent to participate in this 




Details on Supervisor and Enumerator 
Supervisor’s Name:           Enumerator’s code:    
Enumerator’s Name:           Signature/date: 
Time started (STIME):            Time ended (ETIME): 
Date of interview (INDATE): 
Contents            Page number    
IDENTIFICATION           1  
MODULE 1: GENERAL INFORMATION        2 
MODULE 2: PROCESSING INPUTS AND COST        3  
MODULE 3: PROCESSING OUTPUT AND MARKETING       4  
MODULE 4: PROCESSOR SITUATIONS ALONG THE SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAIN    5  
MODULE 5: PROCESSOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE    6 





MODULE 1: GENERAL INFORMATION 
1.1 State (STAT) ({1} Lagos {2} Ondo {3} Akwa Ibom)  
1.2 Local Government Area (LGA) 
1.3 Village name (VILL) 
1.4 Name of household head (HHNAME)  
1.5 Name of respondent (RNAME) 
1.6 Do you own a mobile phone? ({1} Yes {0} No) (MOBILE) 
1.7 Mobile number of respondent: 
1.8 Gender of household head (HHGENDER) ({1} Male {0} Female)  
1.9 What is respondent’s marital status? (MARR) CODE A 
1.10 What is respondent’s educational status in years? (EDUC) 
1.11 How many years has respondent been processing shrimps? (FISHYEAR) 
1.12 What is the distance to the village head’s home? (VIHHDIST) 
1.13 How many years have the village head ruled? (VIHHREIGN)  
1.14 What is the occupation of the village head? (OCCUPHH) ({1} Fishing {0} others) 
1.15 What is the distance to the nearest fishing village in meters? (FVILL) 
1.16 What respondent’s age in years? (AGE) 
1.17 Distance to the nearest shrimp market in meters? (MDIST) 
1.18 Is respondent in association related to shrimp processing? (ASSO) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
1.19 How many years has respondent spent with this association? (YRASSO) 
1.20 Do you have access to credit facilities? (CREDIT) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
1.21 Do you have access to a tarred road? (TAROAD) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
1.22 Distance between processing point and tarred road in meters: (DROAD) 
1.23 Are you a Nigerian? (NATIONALITY) ({1} Yes {0} No, skip to question 1.30) 
1.24 What tribe do you belong to? (TRIBE) ({1} Yoruba {2} Ijaw {3} Igbo {4} Others) 
1.25 Is respondent an indigene of this village? (INDIG) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
1.26 If No, where are you from? (COUNT) ({1} Ghana {2} Cameroon {3} Others) 
1.27 How many years has the respondent been resident in the village? (RESIDE) 
1.28 Distance to the nearest shrimp market-hub in meters? (HUBDIST) 
1.29 Does respondent belong to other groups not related to “crayfish“? (SOC) ({1} Yes {0} 
No) 
1.30 How many other groups not related to “crayfish“ do you belong to? (SOCNUM) 
1.31 Is respondent a member of a cooperative society? (COOP) ({1} Yes {0} No) 
 
                                                                                                




MODULE 2: PROCESSING INPUT AND COSTS (LAST 12 MONTHS i.e. April 2017-May 2018) 

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
What did 
respondent 
majorly use to 
process 
shrimp during 




[1] Oven  
[2] 
Sheds/kitchen 
How many of 
these inputs 










per week in 
the last 12 
months? 







[2] Inherited  





[7] Others (specify.….) 
If inputs have 
been purchased 
or constructed, 
how much did it 
cost in Naira? 
If you are to sell 
each of these 
inputs now, how 
much will they 

















































PROCTYPE PROCINPUT INPUTOPER PROTYPESOUR 
PROTYPCOST PROTYPSALV USELIFE 
PROCWEEK PROCDAY EMPPROC CAPSOUR CAPITAL 
Owned    
PS     Owned         
OS  Owned    
 















































sacks on the 
average are 
needed to 
cover each of 
your 
shed/kitchen? 
How much did 
respondent 
spend on 
cover sacks in 
in Naira? 





fuel, fire starters, 
turners, chemical 
dips, basins and 
nylon etc. 
How much 
in Naira did 
you pay for 
your plot of 
land in the 
last 12 
months? 
For those who 
own either oven 
or shed, did you 
make any repair 
to them in the last 
12 months? 
How many times did 
you make such 
repairs in the last 12 
months? 
How much in 
Naira did each 
repair cost on 
average? 
PROCLAB WAGEDAY WOODTONS WOODCOST SACKNUM SACKCOST MISCCOST LRENT 
REPAIR REPAIRTIM REPAIRCOST 
Owned    
PS       
 
 Owned    
OS  
 
   Owned    
  CODE C: [1] Personal savings [2] Cooperatives/association [3] Trading partner [4] Friends and relatives [5] Bank credit [6] Others (specify………..) 
PS = Peak Season (April-October 2017) 





MODULE 3: PROCESSING OUTPUT AND MARKETING 



















1 2 3 4 5 6 
How much “crayfish” (in 
kg) is processed per 




What quantity of processed 
“crayfish” was consumed at 
home/week? 
 
CODE: [1] Almost none 
[2] ¼  
[3] ½  
[4] Almost all 
What quantity of processed 
“crayfish” was offered as a 
gift to friends and/or 
relatives per week? 
 
CODE: [1] Almost none  
[2] ¼  
[3] ½  
[4] Almost all 





kg in Naira? 
To whom did you sell most 
of your processed 
“crayfish”? 
 
CODE: [1] Traders  
[2] Consumers  
[3] Firms through collectors  
[4] Food companies  
[5] Others (specify....)  
[6] More than one 
How much did you earn on 
average per week from the 
marketing of “large shrimp” 
in Naira? 
SHRIMPROC SHRIMPCON SHRIMPGIFT SALEPRICE SALETO SHRIMPSALE 





PS = Peak Season (April-October 2017) 





MODULE 4: PROCESSOR SITUATIONS IN THE SHRIMP SUPPLY CHAIN 
4.1 Kindly state the level at which you concur with the following statements on the characteristics of shrimp and prawn supply chain organization 
S/N External contingencies Items Response 
1. Market turbulence MT1: Sometimes my customers` demand increases unpredictably in our market  
MT2: The cost of woods has drastically increased of recent  
MT3: My product deteriorate very fast  
MT4: Am not sure of the stage in which my “crayfish“ quality is by the time I deliver them to my trading partners  
MT5: My competitors in nearby villages do reduce the price of their product to attract our customers  
MT6: The market price for “crayfish“ drastically changes in our market  
MT7: Cost of constructing processing shed for “crayfish“ has been increasing drastically of recent  
MT8: I do not get a constant supply of “crayfish“ from fishers because of incessant activities of pirates in my area  
2. Trust T1: People who buy “crayfish“ from me often try to hide things which could negatively affect me  
T2: People who buy “crayfish“ from me never give me good advice  
T3: People who buy “crayfish“ from me do not trust me on the product information I provide them  
T4: Transactions with people who buy “crayfish“ from me are closely supervised  
T5: People who buy “crayfish“ from me often avoid taking advantage of me, even if the opportunity arises  
T6: People who buy “crayfish“ from me believe I do cheat them  
T7: Do you trust the traders who buy “crayfish“ from you? ({1} Yes {0} No)  
T8: I believe people who buy “crayfish“ from me want to cheat me  
T9: Generally speaking, I will say that most people along the supply chain cannot be trusted  
T10: When circumstances change, I believe that people who buy “crayfish“ from me will be willing to assist me  
T11: I need to be very careful in dealing with traders who buy “crayfish“ from me  
3. Power PA1: Certain processors/marketers often sell the largest quantity of “crayfish“ in our market  
PA2: Certain processors/marketers have very high reputation in the shrimp business  
PA3: Certain processors/marketers are more knowledgeable about the shrimp processing business in my area  
PA4: Certain processors/marketers understand the business interrelationship with fishers better than others  
PA5: Certain processors/marketers do attain better financial background than others  
PA6: Certain processors/marketers do attract more buyers than others  
PA7: It is easier for my customers to dictate what price I should sell my product to them  
PA8: We are strongly dependent on Ibo traders to constantly demand our "crayfish”  
PA9: Traders who buy “crayfish“ from me often dictate what measure they want me to sell my “crayfish” with  
PA10: To me, traders who buy “crayfish“ from me are more influential along the supply chain than me  
4.2 Kindly state the level at which you concur with statements on the internal characteristics of shrimp supply chain organization 
S/N Internal contingencies Items Response 
1. Human resources HR1: My skills in ”crayfish” processing are quite huge  
HR2: My employees are experienced processors  
HR3: My employees are experienced crayfish marketers  




HR5: My employees have closer inter-relationships with traders who buy crayfish from me  
HR6: I have built strong relationships with traders who buy “crayfish“ from me  
HR7: I keep accurate records of each quantity of “crayfish”  I sell to traders who buy from me  
HR8: I keep accurate records of my revenues from “crayfish” processing  
HR9: I consider myself as being not financially literate  
2. Business resources BR1: Correct forecast of changes in the demand for crayfish is of paramount importance to my business  
BR2: I have several sources of financing my business  
BR3: My business is located in an area where I can easily link up to my customers (traders)  
BR4: Out of 10, what proportion of your customers is linked to other artisanal processors in your area?  
BR5: I consider myself as being less creditworthy  




1         2     3          4    5     




MODULE 5: PROCESSOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE  













S/N Inter-relationships Items Response 
1. Vertical relationships VR1: How many major traders patronized you?  
VR2: What kind of agreement do you have with your trading partners? CODE: [1] Written contracts [0] Non-formal agreements  
VR3: How long have you been trading with your longest-standing customer (in years)?  
VR4: I sell more than 50% of my total “crayfish”  processed to just one of the traders  
VR5: More than 50% of the “crayfish“ purchased by at least one of the traders is processed by mea  
VR6: I am more inclined to sell my product to customers with whom I have a long-term relationshipa  
VR7: I sell my “crayfish“ to as many buyers at a particular open spot  
VR8: I have to display my product before I can get willing buyers  
2. Horizontal relationships HOR1: Is the respondent a member of fish processing group? ({1} Yes {0} No)  
HOR2: How many fish processing group does the respondent belong to?  
HOR3: Longest time respondent has been a member of a processing group?  





External relationships SE1: Do you have access to extension services? ({1} Yes {0} No)  
SE2: How many times do extension agents/supporting personnel visit the community in a year?  
SE3: Do executives in your association meet with external actors on your behalf? ({1} Yes {0} No)  
SE4: I get some vital information about our processing from extension agents  
SE5: Recently, we get more visits from people who want to support us  
SE6: Our grievances now easily get to the public agenciesa  
1   2     3      4                           5     









S/N Performances Indicators Items Response 
1. Financial Efficiency FE1: What is your average profit per week from processing during the last 12 months?  
FE2: What was your average profit per week from processing in 2016, 2015 and 2014?  
FE3: Over the last 3 years my profit from “crayfish“ processing has been increasing  
FE4: On average, how much cash do you have at hand per week during the last 12 months?  
FE5: On average, how much cash were you having at hand per week in 2016, 2015 and 2014?  
FE6: Over the last 3 years the cash I have at hand from “crayfish“ processing has been increasing  
FE7: Over the last 3 years the quantity of “crayfish” I process has been increasing  
FE8: Over the last 3 years I have better profit relative to my competitors  
. Operational Customer satisfaction OC1: Over the last 3 years I am more competitive in meeting the demand of my major buyers  
OC2: Over the last 3 years many buyers often lay complaints about my “crayfish”  
OC3: Over the last 3 years many buyers continuously patronize me because they are satisfied  
Responsiveness OR1: Over the last 3 years I respond to the orders of my customers on time  
OR2: What is your lead time? (Period between when an order is placed and received by buyer in hour)  
OR3: What is your lead time in 2016, 2015, and 2014? (Period between when an order is placed and received by buyer in hour)  
Flexibility OF1: Over the last 3 years I am able to quickly respond to unpredictable demands from buyers  
OF2: Over the last 3 years I am able to handle late demands from major buyers  
Food quality OFQ1: Did you carry out thorough sorting of your processed “crayfish“ over the last 3 years? ({1} Yes {0} No)  
OFQ2: Over the last 3 years I strive to ensure my “crayfish“ is well sorted before selling to the buyers  
OFQ3: The quality of my processed “crayfish“ is an important measure of my market performance  




MODULE 6: RESPONDENT’S DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
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What is the relationship of 











[8] Others (…...) 









What is the 



























What is the 













What is the main 
occupation of 
[RESPONDENT] 














T] employed in 
non-fishing 


















MBID RELATION GEND AGE EDUC EDUYR REPEAT MARSTAT OCCUP NONFISH APPRE 
00           
 
